Rush Hour Beyond The Kármán Line: Managing And Resolving Disputes About Space Debris And Orbital Congestion

Introduction

Lying approximately 100 kilometres above mean sea level, the Kármán line is the invisible boundary separating the Earth's atmosphere from outer space. Beyond this, several orbits around Earth provide important scientific and economic opportunities for humankind – these include geostationary orbit, low Earth orbit and medium Earth orbit. Whereas outer space is, by all accounts, infinite, Earth's orbits are not – and they are becoming worryingly polluted. With mounting orbital congestion travelling at ultra high speeds around the globe, the threat to our continued ability to benefit from space-derived technologies on Earth is increasing by the day. Efforts have been made in recent years to identify solutions to this dilemma, yet the problem continues to worsen year-on-year. Further action is therefore necessary, both to combat the issue of space debris itself, while the opportunity still exists, and to address and remedy the consequences – including the disputes – arising from it.

Growing problem of space debris and orbital congestion

During the past half-century, outer space has become increasingly accessible. This is true not only in terms of the pure physicality of actually getting into orbit (and beyond), with constantly advancing technology such as reusable rockets making it ever easier to access extraterrestrial realms, but it is also true in terms of the scope of participants to whom outer space is now available. The range of stakeholders in space activity has widened exponentially from a time when outer space remained the exclusive domain of a few states that had the financial resources to shoulder the colossal expense of a space programme. Today, many developing nations also have space agendas. Moreover, it is the private sector that is now driving the global space industry, which is expected to generate revenue in excess of US$1 trillion by 2040.¹ The gateway created by this increased accessibility to space has given rise to a surge in commercial outer-space activity and the generation of a new space economy.

It is no secret that our reliance on space-derived technologies is already immense, yet the extent of this dependence is often overlooked. Aside from the obvious and ever-increasing demand for data and bandwidth to fuel the visible technologies in our day-to-day lives, space technologies are constantly at play behind the scenes in many of our daily activities. Precision agriculture, for example, uses satellite technologies to provide farmers with guidance on crop rotation, optimal planting times and locations, harvesting times and soil management – thereby reducing wasted resources and increasing crop yields. This has revolutionised agriculture and ensured global food security. It has also hugely reduced the environmental effects of agriculture. Our ability to monitor climate change has also been transformed by the use of increasingly powerful Earth observation satellites, which can track pollution concentrations and enable sea levels to be monitored with accuracy to within a centimetre. Weather forecasting, natural disaster detection, global positioning and navigation systems, telecommunications and even contactless payment systems are all services that have become integral to and intertwined with our daily lives. The widespread recognition that 'the satellite has become a common infrastructure in all States'² therefore comes as no surprise – it is clear that space-derived technologies form the backbone of our modern economies. Even less developed countries have been able to latch on to the democratisation of space through the advances that have been made. The developments in this sector during the past 50 years comprise a modern-day equivalent of the industrial revolution. Our reliance on this sector is likely to increase even further in the coming decades, as technologies continue to develop. It is for this reason that we must ensure that our future ability to continue to benefit from these space-derived services is adequately safeguarded. Unfortunately, the worsening issue of space debris means that this is far from certain.

Just as we have continued to pollute Earth's atmosphere since the age of the industrial revolution, so we have also proceeded to pollute Earth's orbits as activity in space has boomed, to the point that – just as with our climate – we are nearing a point of no return. The total mass of all space debris orbiting the Earth is estimated to be to be more than 11,500 tonnes; there are currently 130 million pieces of debris in orbit between 1mm and 1cm in size, a further 1 million objects of between 1cm and 10cm, and 36,500 objects greater than 10cm.³ The same set of statistics also estimates there to be 11,500 satellites in space at present, approximately 2,500 of which are no longer functioning.⁴ These figures are disturbing and yet they continue to rise annually. In its 2023 report, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) predicted that, absent further international action, space debris may double within the next 25 years.⁵ It also found, chillingly, that even if no further launches are ever conducted, the current space debris population will nevertheless continue to grow as a result of collisions between existing debris objects.⁶

Space debris is defined as 'all man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional'⁷ and poses a very severe threat to those who have managed to establish themselves in orbit, as well as a risk, in turn, to all those who benefit from space-derived technologies on Earth. As this debris travels at ultra high speeds in space, any collision with operating spacecraft will have severe consequences. In 2009, the US satellite Iridium 33 was destroyed when it collided with the expired Kosmos 2251, which had not been deorbited at the end of its life. Even small particles of debris present a dangerous risk; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has confirmed that 'millimeter-sized orbital debris represents the highest mission-ending risk to most robotic spacecraft operating in low Earth orbit'⁸ and the 2023 IADC Report acknowledges that 'smaller fragments are considered to be large enough to be able to render spacecraft inoperable':⁹ a fleck of paint was enough to smash a window of the International Space Station in 2016.¹⁰ Although larger debris can be tracked using increasingly sophisticated monitoring systems (thereby facilitating any necessary avoidance manoeuvres), it still remains almost impossible to monitor smaller particles. This presents a serious hazard to those operating in the sector.

Extraterrestrial collisions also risk setting off a chain reaction of further collisions; with each crash, yet more debris is created, making subsequent accidents more likely. This phenomenon, known as the Kessler Syndrome in homage to NASA scientist Donald Kessler who coined the principle in 1978,¹¹ itself constitutes a separate, problematic consequence of over-pollution in space. The detrimental effect that this will have from an environmental perspective will render any clean-up of Earth's orbits ever more difficult. It may even result in large parts of Earth's orbits being rendered unusable or, worse, ultimately foreclose the ability of mankind to continue to use outer space at all.

A further, more visible, danger posed by increasing space debris, and the lack of internationally binding regulation surrounding its creation or prevention, is the threat posed by debris objects falling back to Earth's surface. While once considered an unlikely eventuality, several incidents of this nature have occurred in the past couple of years, particularly in the context of Chinese launches and uncontrolled re-entries of rocket components; apparently, significant debris from these programmes has fallen into Indian territory on various occasions;¹² and fragments from a Space X capsule landed in an Australian sheep farm in 2022.¹³ Although no harm or damage resulted in these instances, they have served to demonstrate the increasing urgency of the wider issue.

Potential legal risks and consequences of space debris

Concerningly, there is no binding international law governing the issue of space debris. Its prevention, avoidance and remediation are all entirely unregulated at the international level.

The Outer Space Treaty,¹⁴ the cornerstone of international space law, provides very little in terms of environmental obligations in respect of activity in outer space. It simply prescribes:

This provision has clearly been insufficient to avoid the alarming growth of space waste. The specific nature of this wording ('contamination' rather than a more general 'destruction' or 'pollution' or, even, 'congestion') is unlikely to prevent the further decline of the outer space environment as it becomes increasingly filled with commercial activity.

The glaring lack of international regulation in this regard poses an issue on two fronts.

First, there is no legal incentive at the international level to either address or remedy the problem; space operators are not bound to design their missions in a sustainable way, to deorbit satellites at the end of their lives, to refrain from creating debris in space (whether through anti-satellite testing or otherwise) or to take any preventative steps to prevent the creation of further orbital waste. Unless subject to domestic legislation prescribing such measures, or unless steps are taken voluntarily by spacefarers to avoid the creation of further debris, the problem will continue to exacerbate. Many examples of national laws on space debris avoidance and remediation, of international soft law guidelines and even of voluntary pledges by key industry players do in fact exist and are discussed further below. Despite these fundamentally important initiatives, however, debris levels continue to rise. As highlighted by the 2023 IADC Report, collective action at the international level is therefore necessary – 'only globally supported solutions can be the answer'.¹⁶

Second, as it continues to rise, the consequences of space debris will be felt with increasing frequency and force. Collisions will become commonplace, resulting in interruption to missions and the services they provide. This in turn will inevitably lead to a growth in debris-related disputes. Here, again, a twofold difficulty arises; not only are the provisions on liability in international space law outdated and in need of reform, meaning that such disputes will be complicated by the inconsistent and complex provisions of the existing legal regime, but the dispute resolution forums, through which any recourse may be pursued, are insufficient to serve the modern space age. Each of these aspects are discussed in turn.

Substantive law: liability

The Outer Space Treaty prescribes that its state parties 'shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . and for assuring that national activities are carried on in conformity with the provisions [of the Outer Space Treaty]'.¹⁷ State parties are also mandated to authorise and continually supervise such activities.¹⁸ Article VII of the Treaty concerns liability for damage caused by space objects – in theory, this would also include damage caused by space debris. The relevant provision creates an additionally liability on the part of launching states – it provides that:

The Liability Convention¹⁹ defines the concept of launching states in the same way. Accordingly, under current international space law, two (or more) state parties could potentially be liable for the operation of a satellite – and for any damage caused by such a satellite, including by any debris originating from it. These parties could include (1) the state party that launches (or procures the launching of) the satellite, (2) the state party whose national launches (or procures the launching of) the satellite, as state parties are responsible for national activities in outer space, and (3) the state party from whose territory the satellite is launched.

The identity of the state party in each of these cases may be different, of course: taking a simple example, the United Kingdom could launch (or procure the launch of) a satellite from the United States. In this case, the United Kingdom (the launcher) and the United States (the space port provider) would both remain internationally liable for any damage subsequently caused by the satellite in question, or by debris originating from it (whether the damage were caused in outer space or on Earth), to both (1) another state party and (2) the natural or juridical persons of that other state party. Article V of the Liability Convention suggests that this liability would be joint and several. In the case of a dispute arising from a joint launch (especially where a private party is the claimant), this dualist definition of launching state has the potential to cause confusion, or at least complication, for any claimant.

Another, even more significant, hurdle to any claim for damage caused by space debris is the fact that the identification – and, at times, fault²⁰ – of a state party or a launching state is required to establish liability; in a situation where damage has been caused by a small piece of space debris, neither of these are likely to be discernible.

Moreover, the Liability Convention, which complements the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, makes clear that its scope is restricted. It applies only to damage caused by space objects, with damage being defined as 'loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organisations'.²¹ This would suggest that, for example, compensation for loss resulting from expensive debris avoidance manoeuvres, or for loss of profits relating to disruption to the provision of a particular service, stemming from debris damage to a satellite, would not be covered.

Procedural mechanisms: dispute resolution

The difficulties arising from the existing lacuna within substantive international space law, highlighted above, are mirrored by a similar void in the dispute resolution mechanisms available to resolve legal quarrels in this area.

Many space-related disputes are well catered for, and there is no reason to consider that this will not continue to be the case. This is for the simple reason that a very significant part of extraterrestrial activity has a terrestrial component and, in turn, access to well-established courts and international arbitration institutions. Contractual disputes in the sector will proceed to be determined, as they always have been, under the relevant domestic law of the agreement in question and will be heard by the courts with appropriate jurisdiction or, if an arbitration clause has been elected, in accordance with the rules of the elected institution. Arbitration is a fitting dispute resolution tool to resolve conflicts in this sector; its cross-border nature, confidentiality, neutrality, flexibility and speed naturally lend themselves to the space industry, as does the ability to appoint arbitrators from within the sector, or with specific knowledge of outer space law. The means to enforce awards quickly and on a global basis is also an obvious appeal. In fact, the founding instruments of many of the principal intergovernmental bodies operating in the sector contain arbitration mechanisms for these precise reasons, including those of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMESAT), the International Mobile Satellite Organisation, the International Telecommunication Union and the Convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency (ESA). The ESA, and many of the main commercial space operators, have also incorporated arbitration clauses into their model contracts. Even the International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement includes an arbitration clause.

Space-specific courts, arbitral institutions and arbitration rules have also starting springing up during the past decade: the Permanent Court of Arbitration's Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (based on the Arbitration Rules 2010 of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law) and the Space Court based at the Dubai International Financial Centre are two such examples. On the state side, the International Court of Justice continues to provide a well-equipped forum for the resolution of any future state-to-state disputes.

Private commercial entities operating in space, however, still have no effective way of pursuing a claim against a state that arises under international law as set out above – namely, outside the scope of any Earth-based contract or investment treaty. This is especially problematic given that states remain liable for the extraterrestrial activity of their nationals, and for the consequences of spacecraft that have been launched from their territory. Any space debris claims, therefore, will almost inevitably have to be brought directly against a state under the present international legal framework. Yet there is no way, currently, for a private commercial operator to do this. Despite its assurances to such 'natural or juridical persons', the Outer Space Treaty is silent when it comes to any kind of dispute resolution facility. Although the very purpose of the Liability Convention was, at least in part, to embody 'the principles of a full measure of compensation to victims and effective procedures which would lead to prompt and equitable settlement of claims',²² it too fails to provide any effective recourse for private commercial spacefarers against culpable states – its proposed Claims Commission does not provide a resolution. Rather, the Commission is only available to states and its decisions are non-binding. These two deal breakers rather overshadow the other problematic aspects of this mechanism, which include a one-year time limit on any claims being brought (when it may take longer than this to even determine the cause of the accident), a mandatory 12-month state–state cooling-off period (double the length of that in most investment treaties), and an ability for the Commission to determine its own procedure (hardly appealing in a scenario where procedural certainty is coveted). Private, spacefaring entities with space debris claims, and other claims arising out of international space law, are thus wholly dependent on their own governments consenting to take on such legal battles, on their behalf, against another state.

Summary

The risks associated with the lack of any internationally binding legal regulation in relation to the avoidance and remediation of space debris are therefore only compounded when taken together with current international law on liability in space and the dearth of effective dispute resolution forums in which to address the inevitable disputes that will arise.

International efforts so far

Thankfully, the slow demise of the outer space environment has not gone unnoticed and is receiving increasing attention at the international level. Many positive efforts have been attempted to address it. These initiatives are welcome in the wake of the warning by the United Nations that it is 'deeply concerned about the fragility of the space environment and the challenges to the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, in particular the impact of space debris, which is an issue of concern to all nations'.²³

On the scientific and technological levels, numerous clean-up technologies are being researched and developed²⁴ and debris monitoring and tracking systems are becoming ever more powerful and precise.²⁵ The removal of space waste could itself become a profitable industry in the coming decades.

At the political level, intergovernmental bodies, such as the IADC, have been drawn together to coordinate efforts to confront the challenge. At the G7 Leaders' Summit in June 2021, delegates from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union expressly recognised 'the growing hazard of space debris' and jointly pledged 'to strengthen our efforts to ensure the sustainable use of space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries'.²⁶

On the legal plane, a significant body of soft law has evolved in recent years, which has been embraced by the international legal community. This has included the adoption by the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS) of the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2002 and the Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (the LTS Guidelines) in 2019. Indeed, COPUOS has been working tirelessly with various stakeholders to raise global awareness of the need to promote space sustainability and to highlight 'the urgency of responsible and sustainable behaviour in outer space'.²⁷ A new ranking system – the Space Sustainability Rating (SSR) – has also been devised for future missions.²⁸ This global project, which was initiated by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and includes partners such as the ESA, went live in June 2022 and will enable space operators to be scored on the sustainability of their missions:

This will not only be beneficial to the space environment but also to those who use it; a favourable SSR score may result, for example, in lower insurance costs or more favourable funding conditions. The WEF also published a new set of guidelines in June 2023, aimed at reducing the creation of orbital debris, which drew significant support from the private sector.

The Artemis Accords³⁰ comprise a further, separate effort to promote sustainable activities in outer space, including with regard to the limitation of orbital debris – all signatories have 'affirmed their commitment to transparent, safe, and sustainable space exploration' and have pledged to be 'guided by a set of principles that promote the beneficial use of space for all of humanity'.³¹ Most recently, the Zero Debris Charter, announced by the ESA in June 2023 and officially launched in November 2023, foresees both government and industry signatories committing to the equivalent of net zero in space, either by deorbiting their satellites at the end of their lives or by engaging in active debris removal services to deorbit them.

Concerted efforts are therefore ongoing, on various fronts. In view of the fact that the binding international legal framework governing these issues is worryingly scarce, these initiatives have been crucial. It is hoped that, in time, many of these soft law instruments will come to form part of customary international law.

Although these initiatives and recognitions are of fundamental importance, they are voluntary and non-binding. On the one hand, this facilitates their drafting and adoption; they then comprise persuasive guidance to parties whose behaviour is duly influenced by the moral obligation not to act in a contradictory manner and, over time, they assist the development of customary rules that can only assist the future space industry; however, the fact that soft law initiatives are ultimately non-binding will, unfortunately, always limit their legal effect.

It would be incongruous not to highlight here the fact that various binding domestic legislation and regulation has been passed, in certain jurisdictions, in a bid to address the issue of space debris and to prevent its increase. In 2022, for example, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new rules to minimise the creation of space debris and to ensure responsible end-of-life satellite disposal. Within a year, in October 2023, the FCC issued its first penalty for breach of these rules, fining satellite television provider Dish Network US$150,000 for its failure to properly deorbit its EchoStar-7 satellite. Further, in the first week of November 2023, the US Senate unanimously approved a bill for an Orbital Sustainability (ORBITS) Act to encourage government investment in technology to clean up space.³² It remains to be seen whether the proposal will be adopted by the House in due course. In other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, a precondition to the award of any licence is a robust space debris mitigation plan. Although binding regulations such as these are welcome from a space debris perspective, their effect remains constrained to the national jurisdictions to which they pertain and, therefore, is limited from a global perspective. Moreover, while a welcome supplement to the global anti-space debris initiatives set out above, they do present a double-edged sword to a certain extent; widespread independent national debris limitation regulations risk legal fragmentation that could, in turn, lead to unhelpful forum shopping among operators. A collective effort at the international level is therefore both preferable and necessary.

Need for an international, legally binding regime on space debris

The 2023 IADC Report has demonstrated that, even when taken collectively, the technological, political and soft law initiatives outlined above have proved insufficient to stem the increase in space debris. More must be done. An effective solution will likely only be achieved through the adoption of more stringent, and mandatory, rules at the international level that apply equally and consistently to all nations.

The pollution of Earth's orbits is a common concern of humankind. As with climate change, the traditional concept of sovereignty becomes redundant in this context, owing to the fact that extraterrestrial realms fall within the global commons, outside national jurisdictions – in other words, their use cannot be subject to sovereign claims or appropriation, their pollution ultimately affects even those who have had no hand in such deterioration, and ecological and economic dependence on them is truly global. Accordingly, the preservation of Earth's orbits, as an area of global commons, requires joint management and collective action at the international level in order to be effective and to ensure continued beneficial use by all. Collaboration from all nations, in the common interest, is necessary for success; the efforts of a few states acting independently may well be beneficial to an extent but they will not ultimately be sufficient to guarantee a future in which space debris is effectively controlled.

The difficulty of achieving international accord in today's divided geopolitical climate is an unfortunate yet unavoidable truth – not least because any global consensus will almost inevitably involve some form of compromise. Even in the face of a global emergency, the international response to climate change, for example, was sorely belated. Nevertheless, the environmental context does serve to demonstrate that international consensus is still possible, even in our modern age. The Paris Agreement, concluded in 2016, successfully brought together 195 nations from across the planet to pledge to work collectively towards safeguarding Earth's environment. Even in today's geopolitical context, this new legally binding international convention finally presented a solution that offered an arrangement that both industrialised and non-industrialised nations were able to accept.

The Paris Agreement provides hope for the space debris situation and a landmark model to follow, especially in light of the abundant similarities between the preservation of Earth's atmosphere and the protection of its orbits.³³ Although other international legal frameworks governing extraterritorial realms have been concluded, none matches the space debris context so closely as the climate change regime. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), often a common comparator with outer space, was concluded in a very different geopolitical era from that of today, and a like-for-like mirroring of its provisions in the space debris context may not succeed in drawing united accord. The Antarctic Treaty, while also relating to a global commons, does not, for many states, address the same level of urgent concern as that posed by environmental (and orbital) pollution. Further, although both UNCLOS and the Antarctic Treaty refer and relate to areas that are also deemed the common heritage of mankind, neither attracted anywhere near as many signatories as the Paris Agreement and neither mirror the specificities of space debris so closely. Moreover, the simple fact that the Paris Agreement was concluded as recently as 2016 means that it provides a template for space debris that was acceptable to the current global electorate. This, above anything else, is the key reason why it, more than any other international regime, is so particularly fitting in the space debris context. A new international regime on space debris avoidance and remediation, once in place, would then pave the way for follow-on national legislation and policy instruments on the domestic scene. These policies would further guide both behaviour and investment, just as they have done in the climate change context.

On the dispute resolution front, the situation of private, commercial spacefaring entities mirrors the position of foreign investors in the 1950s, with respect to foreign investment disputes, at a time when the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (which established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the ICSID Convention) had not yet been promulgated. The ICSID Convention transformed this status quo, granting private investors a direct recourse against foreign states in the event that the rights pertaining to their investments were harmed under international law. The creation of a similar facility that could cater for disputes arising under international space law would at least provide a setting for the resolution of such conflicts, even if the reform of space law on a substantive level remained in limbo for some time to come. This suggestion was proposed by Professor Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel in 1998.³⁴ In 2016, the present author made a similar call for the establishment of an International Convention on the Settlement of Outer Space Disputes – or an 'ICSOD Convention'.³⁵ Perhaps as the new space age develops these proposals will gain traction.

Conclusion

The serious threat posed by space debris to the future of humankind is grave and increasingly urgent, yet it cannot be resolved by any country acting alone; only international action and cooperation on a global scale will be truly sufficient to ensure the future preservation of Earth's orbits. Although international space law is in need of reform on many levels, conquering the space debris challenge is a goal towards which all nations should strive and from which all would derive common benefit.

To unite nations in the execution of a new international convention in today's fragmented geopolitical climate will be difficult, no matter how valid the cause; however, it should not be dismissed as an impossible feat – international consensus was achieved for a new global convention to protect the Earth's environment as recently as 2016. There is no reason that this cannot be mirrored in the space debris context, in relation to the preservation of Earth's orbits – and the Paris Agreement provides a useful template for this.

Similarly, the establishment of a neutral international dispute resolution framework, providing a recourse through which private entities would be able to pursue claims arising from debris-related incidents, would surely assist the evolution of humankind's activity in space. Once again, there is a template for such an instrument, in the form of the ICSID Convention.

Global inaction will only render the space debris challenge more difficult; the cost of rectifying the negative consequences of inadequate legal regulation will be far higher than the cost of preventing them in the first place. A unique opportunity currently exists to put in place a global framework on the avoidance and remediation of orbital waste (and, with it, international commitments, processes and supervision). The more advances that are made in space, the more actors who find themselves operating in the sector, and the more we come to rely on the achievements and technology that continually emerge, the more difficult it will be to settle the playing field and come up with a rule book by which all nations will agree to abide. Moreover, we are nearing a point of no return, after which we will simply not be able to bring space debris levels back under control. The window of opportunity to effect change is therefore closing. The future of space as a resource is now not so much in the hands of science as it is in the hands of governments and nation states, and policy and law makers. While regulatory measures often trail behind rapidly developing and disruptive industries, a tragedy of the commons is now looming. International cooperation, which has been an important principle from the very beginning of the space age, will be essential to ensure that the space debris emergency that we are now facing is dealt with effectively.

Footnotes

1 'Space: Investing in the Final Frontier', Morgan Stanley Research, 24 July 2020.

2 United Nations, 'Report on the status of the national space legislation of countries of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum National Space Legislation Initiative: Working paper submitted by Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Viet Nam', at the 60th Session of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS, 9 April 2021, p. 11 (A/AC.105/C.2/L.318).

3 The European Space Agency (ESA), 'The latest figures related to space debris, provided by the ESA's Space Debris Office at ESOC, Darmstadt, Germany', as updated on 6 December 2023 (https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers).

4 ibid.

5 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), 'Report on the Status of the Space Debris Environment', January 2023 (2023 IADC Report), p. 6.

6 ibid.

7 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), 'Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space', Vienna 2010, p. 1.

8 S Lewis, 'Space junk slams into International Space Station, leaving hole in robotic arm', CBS News (2 June 2021) (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/space-junk-damage-international-space-station/).

9 2023 IADC Report , op. cit. note 6, p. 5.

10 Press release of European Space Agency, 'Impact Chip', 12 May 2016.

11 D J Kessle and B G Cour-Palais, 'Collision frequency of artificial satellites: The creation of a debris belt', American Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 83, A6 (1978), 2645.

12 '"Irresponsible": Nasa chides China as rocket debris lands in Indian Ocean', The Guardian (9 May 2021) (https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/may/09/chinese-rocket-debris-earth-indian-ocean); 'India hit by more suspected space debris', Space News (16 May 2022) (https://spacenews.com/india-hit-by-more-suspected-space-debris/;) '25-ton Chinese rocket debris crashes to Earth over Indian Ocean', Space.com (30 July 2022) (https://www.space.com/chinese-long-march-5b-rocket-space-debris-crash); 'NASA Administrator Statement on Chinese Space Debris' (30 July 2022) (https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-administrator-statement-on-chinese-space-debris/).

13 'Space debris Australia: Piece of SpaceX capsule crashes to Earth in field', BBC News (3 August 202) (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-62414438).

14 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (Outer Space Treaty) (https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf).

15 Outer Space Treaty, Article IX.

16 2023 IADC Report, op. cit. note 6, p. 5.

17 Outer Space Treaty, op. cit. note 15, Article VI.

18 id., Article VI.

19 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972 (Liability Convention) (https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_26_2777E.pdf).

20 Article III of the Liability Convention makes clear that a launching state will only be liable for damage caused in outer space if it 'is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible'.

21 Liability Convention, op. cit. note 20, Article I.

22 United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2777, passed at the 1998th plenary meeting on 29 November 1971.

23 United Nations General Assembly Resolution adopted on 13 December 2019, A/RES/74/82.

24 See, for example, the work of Astroscale (https://astroscale.com/) and ClearSpace (https://clearspace.today/uk/), private orbital debris removal companies that have gained increasing recognition in recent years.

25 See, for example, the work of Seradata (https://www.seradata.com/), the space industry's leading launch and satellite database and space market analysis system.

26 UK government, 'G7 nations commit to the safe and sustainable use of space', UK Space Agency, Press release (13 June 2021) (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-nations-commit-to-the-safe-and-sustainable-use-of-space.

27 UNOOSA, 'The Promoting Space Sustainability Project' (2019) (https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/promoting-space-sustainability.html.

28 World Economic Forum, Press release, 'The world's first sustainability rating system for space exploration' (2 March 2023) (https://www.weforum.org/impact/world-s-first-space-sustainability-rating-launched).

29 ESA, Press release, 'Space sustainability rating to shine light on debris problem' (17 June 2021) (https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_sustainability_rating_to_shine_light_on_debris_problem).

30 The Artemis Accords are a non-binding multilateral arrangement between the United States government and other world governments participating in the Artemis programme. A full copy of the Artemis Accords can be found at https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.

31 NASA, Press release, 'NASA Welcomes Nigeria, Rwanda as Newest Artemis Accords Signatories' (13 December 2022) (https://www.nasa.gov/missions/artemis/nasa-welcomes-nigeria-rwanda-as-newest-artemis-accords-signatories/).

32 J Feldscher, 'Senate Passes Orbital Debris Legislation', Payload (2 November 2023) (https://payloadspace.com/senate-passes-orbital-debris-legislation/).

33 See R O'Grady, 'Paris moves to space: a proposal for a new international agreement to govern space debris avoidance and remediation', paper presented at 74th International Astronautical Congress (IAC), October 2023, IAC-23-E7.7.10.

34 Final Draft of the Revised Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Related to Outer Space Activities, adopted in 1998 by the International Law Association (ILA) at its 68th Conference in Taipei.

35 R O'Grady, 'Star Wars: the launch of extranational arbitration?', CIARb Arbitration Journal, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2016), 380–90. See also R O'Grady, 'Dispute-Resolution in the Commercial Space Age: Are All Space-Farers Adequately Catered For?', ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin, 2021, Issue 3.

Originally published by Global Arbitration Review

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