Nigeria: Banks And Other Financial Institutions Act, 2020 - Highlight Of Key Changes

Section 2(2)

Any person who operates a banking business in Nigeria without a valid license under the Old Act was liable on conviction to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine of N2million or both.

Section 2(2-3)

The New Act reviews the penalty for operating without a banking license and introduces additional protections for account holders.

A person or entity operating without a banking license shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than 5 years and/or a penalty of the higher of N50million. A "person" shall include a body corporate, its promoters, directors, managers, and officers connected in anyway with superintending, directing, or managing the affairs of the company.

The New Act has also introduced a refund of twice the cumulative deposits of account holders as a penalty.

Section 3

The application is to be made to the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) with certain documents accompanying the application.

Section 3

The New Act prescribes new documentary requirements that must accompany the application. The feasibility report should now include the (minimum) 5-year financial projection of the proposed bank.

Also, where the proposed bank is a non-interest bank, a list of experts on non-interest banking that will serve as its advisory committee of experts is to be submitted with the application.

Section 3 (3) further gives the Governor of the CBN absolute powers to refuse to grant a banking license without giving any reasons whatsoever. Conferment of such unchecked and expansive powers, comes with the risk of abuse.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 3 (5) & (6)

A foreign bank or entity which does not have a physical presence in its country of incorporation, or is unlicensed in its country of incorporation and is not affiliated to any financial services group that is subject to effective consolidated supervision, shall not be permitted to operate in Nigeria and no Nigerian bank shall establish or continue any relationship with such a bank.

This new provision will mitigate or possibly eradicate the incidence of fraudulent acts carried out by foreign banks which would otherwise be impossible to trace to their country of domicile.

Section 5

A bank that fails to comply with any of the conditions of its license shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding N50,000 for each day of non-compliance.

A bank that fails to comply with fresh or additional conditions imposed on its license shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction to a fine of N500,000 and an additional fine of N5000 for each day of non-compliance.

Section 5

Under this Act, the penalty for failing to comply with the conditions of a license has been reviewed upward to not less than N20million and an additional N500,000 for each day of non- compliance.

For failing to comply with fresh or additional conditions, the penalty has been reviewed to N5million and an additional fine of N100,000 for each day of non-compliance.

Additional penalties have been imposed on the officers or directors of a bank that fail to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the conditions. Such director or officer shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than 3 years or a fine not less than N2million, or for both such imprisonment and fine.

Section 6

This Act prohibited the opening and/or closing of a bank branch without prior consent of the CBN. The Act further imposed penalties for the breach of this provision.

Section 6

Under the New Act, a bank intending to open or close a branch office or any of its subsidiaries is required to give at least 6-month prior notice to the CBN Governor.

The CBN may direct that a bank divests from any of its subsidiaries if, amongst other things, the CBN determines that such continued investment could pose a financial risk to the bank, or the CBN's oversight, or if the supervision by the host regulator over such subsidiary is not adequate in relation to the risks the subsidiary presents.

The New Act gives additional powers to the CBN Governor to order the closure of a bank branch that was opened without his consent or reopen a bank branch that was closed without his consent.

Section 7(1a)

The Act provided that except with the prior consent of the CBN Governor, no bank shall enter into an agreement or arrangement which results in a change in the control of the bank.

Section 7

This Act provides for the prior consent of the Governor to be sought where such agreement or arrangement not only results in a change in the control of the bank, but also where, though not resulting in a change in the control of the bank, it results in the transfer of a significant shareholding of that bank.

Other agreements or arrangements which require the prior written consent of the Governor include those for sale or transfer of the whole or part of the bank's business; amalgamation; merger; restructuring, reconstruction, reorganization; and a transfer of the whole or any part of the business of the bank to an agent.

In particular, Section 7 (2) provides that where a bank proposes to enter into any agreement or arrangement in respect of a restructuring/reorganization, the CBN may order separate meetings of the banks to be summoned in such manner as it may direct. This power of the CBN to order separate meetings may create a tussle of powers between the CBN and the Federal High Court.

Section 711 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2020 which regulates company operations, gives power to the Court to order separate meetings of companies in respect of a scheme proposed for a compromise, arrangement or reconstruction between two or more companies or the merger of any two or more companies. The introduction of Section 7 (2) of the BOFIA 2020 purports to give the CBN these same powers and in turn dispense with the role of the Federal High Court.

Section 8

This Act provided for a N1,000,000 fine for any person that contravenes this provision and an additional fine of N10,000 for each day during which the offence continuous.

Section 8

The 2020 Act has revised the penalties for the contravention of this section to a fine of N10,000,000 and includes a term of not less than 3 years imprisonment and/or N2,000,000 fine for every director of a bank that contravenes this provision.

It has further introduced offshore banking which the Old Act did not contemplate, and which also requires prior approval of the CBN.

Section 12

The 1991 Act (as amended) made provisions for circumstances that will warrant a revocation of a banking license.

Section 12

The new Act has introduced additional circumstances that may result in the revocation of a banking license by the Governor to include the following:

1. The bank conducts its business in an unsound manner, or its directors engage in unsafe practices;
2. It is involved in a situation or action which constitutes a threat to financial stability;
3. It is, in the opinion of the CBN, critically undercapitalized with a capital adequacy ratio below the prudential minimum or such other ratio as may be prescribed by the CBN;
4. It fails to commence banking operations within a period of 12 months following the grant of a license;
5. It fails to comply with provisions of the Act on minimum paid-up capital and minimum capital ratio.

When a license is revoked, the CBN Governor has power to appoint the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) as the liquidator and the NDIC shall be deemed to have been appointed by the Federal High Court and have the powers of a liquidator under the CAMA.

The remedy of a claimant or applicant in an action relating to revocation of license shall be limited to monetary compensation as no restorative or like order shall be granted against the CBN or its Governor.

The CBN's immunity against restorative orders is an attempt to introduce a draconian regime and if not properly addressed, may occasion unrestrained abuse of power. It may further dissuade the interest of potential investors who want to engage in the banking business for fear that they may not be able to seek relief against the CBN should circumstances warrant.

Section 13

A bank shall maintain capital funds in such ratio to all or any assets and/or liabilities of the bank and all its offices in and outside Nigeria as specified by the CBN. Section 14 of the Act prescribed the penalty for failure to comply with this provision to be a revocation of the bank's license.

Section 13

This provision in the BOFIA 2020 allows the CBN to prescribe a higher or lower adequacy ratio with respect to any category of banks and maintain additional capital in respect of specific risks. The CBN may also require a bank that has a holding and/or subsidiary company of a bank to calculate and maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio on a consolidated basis.

Contrary to the explicit provisions of the 1991 Act (as amended) on the penalty for contravening this provision, section 13 (6) of introduces uncertainty by giving the CBN power to impose "such additional holding actions, prohibitions and conditions" as it may deem fit. This uncertainty of sanctions could potentially trigger an abuse of powers by the CBN.

Section 20(2)(a)

A bank shall not, without the prior approval of the CBN, permit to be outstanding, unsecured advances, loans or unsecured credit facilities of an aggregate amount in excess of N50,000 to its director(s); a company, firm or partnership in which it or any of its directors is interested; or to any company in which it or its directors maintains (jointly or severally) shareholding directly or indirectly of not less than 5%.

Section 19 (3)

The New Act has increased the threshold of such unsecured advances or facilities. As such, a bank shall not, without the prior approval of the CBN, permit to be outstanding, any such unsecured advances or facilities of an aggregate amount in excess of N1million (or such amount as may be prescribed by the CBN) to its director(s), company or firm in which it and its directors are interested, or companies in which its directors or significant shareholders jointly or severally maintain (in)directly shareholding of not less than 5% or such percentage as may be specified by the CBN.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 19 (5)

A bank is prohibited from lending more than 5% of its paid-up capital to any of its directors and significant shareholders, and the aggregate of the bank's exposure to all its directors and significant shareholders shall not exceed 10% of its paid-up share capital or such percentage as may be specified by the CBN.

The bank further has an obligation to ensure that, in giving credit to its directors or significant shareholders, it does so on the same terms that are prevailing for similar transactions with non-directors or shareholders; the grant of the credit does not involve more than the normal risk of repayment; it follows credit appraisal procedures which are not less stringent than those applicable to comparable transactions with persons who are not directors or shareholders of the bank; and, it does not give preference to any director or shareholder.

Section 25

Banks were required to submit a statement (showing their assets and liabilities as well as an analysis of advances and other assets at their head office, branches, and subsidiaries) not later than 28 days after the last day of each month.

Section 24

Banks are now required to submit such statement not later than 5 days after the last day of each month.

Failure to comply with this provision attracts a fine of N25million and N 500,000 for each day of infraction.

Section 29

The Act made provision for the appointment of an Auditor referred to as "the Approved Auditor" whose responsibility is to provide the shareholders with reports of the bank's financial position, and provided a penalty of not more than N500,000 fine for any Approved Auditor that contravenes the provisions of this section where it is a firm and a term not exceeding 5 years imprisonment where it is an individual.

Section 28

This Act in addition to the provisions in the Old Act gives the CBN the power to direct in appropriate cases the appointment of more than one firm of auditors for any bank, which shall act jointly in auditing the bank's statement of financial position and statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income and the power to remove an auditor of a bank who in the opinion of the CBN is not discharging its functions effectively.

The New Act has further amended the penalties for contravention of this section to a fine of N2,000,000 where it is a firm; a term not less than 3 years imprisonment and/or a fine of N2,000,000 where it is an individual.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 30

Section 30 of this Act gives the Governor the power to issue regulations, guidelines and other policies to banks, other financial institutions, and specialized banks to:

1. ensure responsible conduct;
2. protect the interest of the consumers of products and services of banks, other financial institutions, and specialized banks;
3. promote competition in the Nigerian financial system;
4. engender and sustain public trust and confidence in the use of financial services in Nigeria.

This provision encapsulates the policies of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act and its relevance to banks, other financial institutions, and specialized banks.

Section 35 (2)

It set out the powers the Governor of CBN can exercise over failing banks.

Section 34

The 2020 Act vests additional powers on the Governor over failing banks; which include, the power to transfer the whole or part of the failing bank's business to a third party or private purchasers.

The New Act also empowers CBN to acquire the shares of any failing bank up to the level that guarantee's CBN's control over the bank provided the CBN shall dispose of such equity in the banks at the earliest suitable time.

Disposing of such equity might be an onerous task as failing banks, by virtue of their many liabilities are unattractive to potential investors. The CBN and NDIC have also made use of Bridge banks for such a period pending when a failing bank is viable to be sold to credible investors. This, albeit an effective mechanism, has had its own shortcomings as the Bridge banks have sometimes been made to operate longer than required due to the unavailability of willing investors to purchase equity in the bank. A laudable innovation that can cushion the harsh financial effects that come with an over-extensive Bridge bank, is the introduction of the Banking Sector Resolution Fund in section 79 to finance Bridge banks.

The additional powers given to the CBN to unilaterally restructure a bank in distress are commendable as it provides the CBN with better options to intervene where a bank is incapable of meeting its obligations or is on the brink of collapse.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 36

This Act provides that where there is crisis in the banking industry, the relevant agencies shall cooperate, render assistance, grant waivers or forbearances necessary to resolve such crises.

This provision entrenches the importance of collaboration and involvement of all the relevant agencies in the industry to resolve banking crises.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 37 & 38

The CBN for the purpose of rescuing a failing bank or financial institution can give directions to the effect that any contractual instrument executed or issued by the bank should be cancelled, modified, converted or changed in its form.

Note that the conversion, modification, or change shall be done as if it is a right exercised in such instrument. The CBN in this case will appoint one or more persons to perform an independent assessment to determine the extent to which the cancellation, modification, or conversion should be carried out for all or any eligible instrument and such person(s) shall furnish the CBN with a report post assessment. The Governor upon receipt of the report shall issue a Bail in Certificate to the failing bank.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 39

The New Act provides that all claims, debts, or judgements enforceable in respect of a contractual instrument existing or being pursued as at the date of a Bail in Certificate shall be suspended and unenforceable against a failing bank or financial institution during the period covered by the Certificate or as determined by the Governor.

It also provides that the CBN may make regulations under the Act, that would mandate banks and other financial institutions to ensure that contractual instruments contain provisions that would make parties bound to the Bail in Certificate. Hence, the provision of such instruments would be subject to the Bail in Certificate.

Subjecting contractual instruments to Bail in certificate breaches the Common Law doctrine of privity of contract. This hampers the freedom of banks to contract freely and can result in losing viable investment opportunities.

The immunity of Bail in Certificates from enforcement of claims, debt or judgement could lead to arbitrariness of the regulator in the exercise of its powers afforded under this section. This in turn would erode investor confidence, as the system would not be considered a level playing field for stakeholders.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 41

As part of measures to rescue a failing bank, the New Act empowers CBN to transfer the assets of a bank or financial institution to a Private Asset Management vehicle.

This can be done without obtaining the consent of the shareholders or complying with stipulated procedures under a written law or contract.

CBN or any person directed by it can also determine the consideration to be paid for the transfer of assets. The consideration can be a nominal or negative value.

Transferring the assets of a failing bank to a Private Asset Management Company and not AMCON is a welcome development. This will support a much needed reduction in AMCON's burden in managing assets of failing banks and should also speed up the debt recovery process in the sector.

Section 53

This Act provided that neither the Federal Government nor the Bank nor any officer of the Government or Bank, shall be subject to any action, claim or demand by or liability to any person in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in pursuance or in execution of, or in connection with the execution or intended execution of any power conferred upon that Government, Bank or any officer of that Government or Bank.

Section 51

This section ought to have been expunged, as its retention serves to restrict judicial intervention and grants immunity to officers/government institutions who have made poor judgment calls under the guise of "good faith". With the weight of responsibility shouldered by these financial sector actors, they should be open to scrutiny and more legal and judicial oversight, not less.

Section 58

This Act provided that no person shall carry on other 'financial business' in Nigeria other than insurance and stockbroking.

Section 57

This Act has included pension fund management, collective investment schemes and capital market business as 'financial businesses' in Nigeria.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 63

In addition to the minimum capital requirement provided in Section 9 of this Act, this section also confers on the CBN the power to require any bank, specialized bank, or other financial institution, to maintain capital funds of any amount (not less than the already prescribed minimum capital). The inclusion of this section legitimizes the powers of the CBN to issue circulars regulating Banks and specialized institutions as such power was not expressly provided under the Old Act neither was it provided under the CBN Act (with the exemption of the power to issue directives/circulars requiring banks to maintain a minimum cash reserve).

A notice by the CBN to this effect may also prescribe, amongst others, the appropriate level and quality of capital that is commensurate with the type and concentration of risk of a particular bank or financial institution; the manner and process for calculating the level or quality of the bank or financial institution; and the internal process of each bank or financial institution in assessing the adequacy of its level and quality of capital having regard to the risks from its activities.

The CBN is also empowered to restrict or suspend the operations of a bank which fails to comply with a notice under this section. A bank failing to comply with the notice, or any other restriction or suspension imposed by the CBN in exercise of its power pursuant to this section, will be liable to a penalty of not less than N2million and an additional penalty of not less than N50,000 for every day of non-compliance. This is a welcome development because under Section 64 (2) of the Old Act, the activities of a bank could be suspended on the unilateral order of the Governor for failure to comply with stipulated requirements. However, this power has now been given to the CBN which ultimately means the Board of the Bank.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 64

The CBN may now prescribe, by regulation, the framework for the exchange of information among regulators of entities related to, associated with, or otherwise affiliated to banks, specialized banks, or other financial institutions.

The CBN shall also be the coordinator of the consolidated supervision of a group to which a regulated entity belongs. As such, the CBN - in order to satisfy itself that the operations of an associated, holding or subsidiary company of a bank, specialized bank or other financial institution are not detrimental to the operations of such bank or institution, may appoint a competent authority from any other entity(ies) with expertise in the relevant field to carry out an inspection of the operations of said associated company, or of any person having control over same.

The CBN now also has the power to appoint an examiner to look into the books, accounts, and records of any bank, specialized bank, other financial institution, and entity associated with or affiliated to them.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 65

The Act expressly limits the application of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (FCCPA) such that the FCCPA neither applies to any function, act, financial product/service or transaction by a bank nor the CBN, its Governor, other executive officer or its staff.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Act permits that sections 92(1-3) (mergers and undertakings), 94 (consideration of the effect of merger on competition) and 98 (investigation of a proposed merger) of the FCCPA shall apply to mergers, acquisition and other business combinations involving banks and other financial institutions. However, the CBN Governor has the power to prescribe additional rules and procedures for mergers, acquisitions and other business combinations involving banks, specialized banks, and other financial institutions.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Sections 66 & 68

This Act provides that all banks and other financial institutions shall adopt policies stating their commitments to comply with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism under subsisting laws; and they shall also comply strictly with cybersecurity regulations and guidelines issued by the CBN. Also, the Governor has the power to issue regulations and guidelines to address money-laundering, financing of terrorism and cybersecurity issues.

With the modern day prevalence of fraudulent activities, this provision is very timely and will serve to remind the banks and other financial institutions of their duty to ensure transparency in all their dealings.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 69

The New Act appears to have set modern realities squarely within its sights especially regarding online/mobile payment transactions. This Section confers on the CBN, administrative powers to prescribe standards of operations relating to the payment, clearing and settlement activities of banks, specialized banks, and other financial institutions.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 70

The CBN shall by regulations pursuant to the New Act, prescribe the criteria for designating Systemically Important Banks (SIBs). The CBN Governor may designate any bank as a SIB, and any bank so designated is required to comply with the standards and requirements of an SIB. Failure of any bank to comply with any policy measures in the guidelines issued by the CBN is, in respect of each such failure, liable to a penalty of not less that N5million and an additional penalty of N200,000 for each day during which such failure persists.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 71

The CBN may regulate the operations of agents of banks. A bank agent is a person or entity contracted by an institution and approved by the CBN to provide the services of the bank on behalf of the bank in the manner prescribed by the CBN. However, this Act places a restriction on agents of banks from accepting withdrawals by cheque or being direct members of the Nigeria Bankers Clearing System. This Act also prohibits banks' agents from accepting deposits above the amount prescribed from time to time by the CBN.

The penalty for contravening this section is a fine of not less than N50,000 and an additional fee of N5,000 for each day during which the contravention persists.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 72

No withdrawal shall be made on an account which has not been operated for a year (or such other period as the CBN may specify) except with the approval of two authorized signatories of the bank, specialized bank or other financial institution involved. Such account shall be transferred to a separate register of dormant accounts and remain deposit liabilities in the books of the bank. The bank involved is mandated to notify the account holder of the dormancy of the account by email and in writing.

While the requirement to obtain two authorized signatories may afford better protection to account holders, it may also be cumbersome for certain categories of account holders who do not ordinarily carry out transactions frequently.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 73

The Act now empowers a liquidator of any bank, specialized bank, or other financial institution to discountenance certain transactions which affect the assets of the institution. Some of these transactions include: gratuitous transfers to persons related to, affiliates or insiders of, the bank, specialized or other financial institution; transactions with affiliates, insiders or key management personnel of these institutions conducted within 5years prior to the effective date of the liquidation; gratuitous transfers to 3rd parties made within 3 years prior to the effective liquidation date etc.

This Act also gives the liquidator the power to recover property or the value of property transferred by the bank, specialized bank or other financial institution from a transferee of an initial transferee only if the second transferee did not give fair value for the property or knew or ought to have known that the transfer can be set aside under this Act.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Sections 74-80

This Act has established a laudable initiative which is the Banking Sector Resolution Fund ("the Fund") domiciled with the CBN and not subject to tax.

The Fund is to be utilized exclusively for purposes such as: payment of operating cost of a bridge bank; provision of loan, advance, overdraft etc. to a bank, specialized bank or other financial institution under resolution or a bridge bank; and payment of any other costs reasonably incurred in the resolution measure such as legal cost, advisory service costs etc.

The Act provides that the CBN and the NDIC shall, on the Commencement date of the Fund and each calendar year thereafter, pay the sum of N10billion and N4billion respectively or such amount as the Board may determine. This Act also imposes a tax-deductible annual levy on banks, specialized banks and other financial institutions which is to be paid into the Fund.

Any bank, specialized bank or other financial institution which defaults in the payment of the levy or any part of it shall be prohibited from paying dividends or other similar distribution and from paying bonuses to its directors or employees while the default continues.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 81

This Act establishes a Board of Trustees which shall be responsible for the supervision, administration and management of the Fund and shall act prudently with due care and skill in the discharge of their functions with the utmost good faith.

The Board of Trustees shall consist of:

1. Two representatives of the CBN to be appointed by the Governor. One of whom shall be a Deputy Governor who shall be appointed as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.
2. Four representatives from among the officers of various banks not below the level of a director, on a 2-year rotational basis.
3. Representative of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation from among its officers not below the level of a director
4. One representative from other financial institutions to be appointed by the Central Bank.

Generally, Section 94 authorizes the Central Bank to issue guidelines and directions for regulating the management and operations of the Resolution Fund, and the proceedings of the Board of Trustees.

It is intended that the Board of Trustees will ensure fairness in the administration of the Fund as trustees bound by their fiduciary obligations.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991.

Section 93

No suit or action can be taken with respect to the Resolution Fund or a member of the Board of Trustees after the expiration of three months from when the alleged act or default complained of occurred. Even where an action is commenced within the three month window, no action can still be taken unless the aggrieved party has served the Board of Trustees a notice of intention to commence suit and the aggrieved party must also wait for one month thereafter before an action can be taken in court.

Every member of the Board of Trustees of the Resolution Fund shall be indemnified out of the assets of the Fund against any liability incurred in defending civil proceedings where such proceeding is brought against him in his capacity as a Trustee. This indemnity does not extend to proceedings initiated for a breach of a Trustee's fiduciary duties.

The limitation provided by the New Act will enable the Board of Trustees carry out their functions under the Act without numerous distractions and may give room for the resolution of matters amicably.

Section 64

The Governor of the CBN has the power to impose a sanction or a penalty not exceeding N2,000,000 for any contravention of any rules, regulations, guidelines, or administrative directives made, given or issued by the Central Bank.

Section 95

The New Act has increased the imposable penalty to a maximum of N100,000,000 for failure to comply with any provision of this Act or rules and regulations made therefrom or any other sanctions as may be deemed appropriate.

This provision was not available under the BOFIA 1991

Section 102 - 129

This New Act establishes the Special Tribunal for the Enforcement and Recovery of Eligible Loans.

The Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to causes and matters;

1. pertaining to enforcement and recovery of eligible loans by financial services banks, specialized banks or other financial institutions;
2. connected with or pertaining to the enforcement of security or guarantee, or attachment of any assets under an eligible loan made by any bank, specialized bank, or other financial institution in Nigeria, to its customers.

The Tribunal's award or judgment shall have the force of a judgment of the Federal High Court, State High Court, or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. An appeal against the decision of the Tribunal shall lie to the Court of Appeal and further to the Supreme Court.

The 11- member Tribunal is to be composed of persons with in-depth knowledge of the banking sector and law. It is intended that its establishment will help to mitigate incidences of bad loans. Good intentions notwithstanding, the Tribunal's establishment purports to limit the exclusive powers of the Courts in respect of disputes arising from banking and related matters. For the Tribunal to truly have the full weight of its office, the National Assembly must consider amendments to Section 251 (1) (c) (e) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).