CIVIL LAWS
I. Case Title: U. Sudheera and Others v. C. Yashoda and Others
Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 104
Court: Supreme Court of India
Decided on: January 17, 2025
Brief Facts: The case concerns a land dispute in Mangalam Village, Tirupati, involving the Gazetted Officers Cooperative House Building Society. The Society purchased land, including 0.61 acres in Sy. No. 10/1, but faced government acquisition proceedings, later quashed by the High Court in 1987. The land was developed and sold to defendants. In 2010, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte revenue record mutation and filed OS No. 48/2011 for an injunction, which the trial court granted.
However, the First Appellate Court overturned the decision in 2022, holding that a bare injunction suit was not maintainable without seeking a title declaration. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal (SA No. 518/2023) in the High Court, which granted interim status quo without framing a substantial question of law. Aggrieved by this, the respondents preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court's order was unsustainable in the absence of a framing substantial question of law.
Issue:
Whether a High Court, while dealing with a second appeal under Order XLI read with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC"), could issue an ad interim order for a limited period before framing substantial questions of law.
Judgement:
The Supreme Court upheld the contention of respondent, reiterating that appellate courts must first determine the existence of a substantial question of law before granting interim relief.
Relying on various judgements of the Apex Court, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court had acted beyond its jurisdiction by granting interim relief without fulfilling the required legal conditions. The court reaffirmed that an appeal can only proceed once a substantial question of law is identified and framed. Consequently, the Supreme Court annulled the High Court's order and reinforced the necessity of following proper legal procedures in second appeals.
II. Case Title: Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Another
Limited and Another
Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 82
Court: Supreme Court of India
Decided on: January 15, 2025
Brief facts:
In this case, the original plaintiff entered into a sale agreement for a property but later discovered that the seller had executed another sale deed in favor of the appellant. The plaintiff initially filed a suit for permanent injunction to protect possession, which remained pending. Subsequently, after the lifting of a government ban on sale deed registration, the plaintiff instituted a second suit for specific performance and cancellation of the competing sale deed.
The trial court dismissed the second suit, holding that the plaintiff was aware of the subsequent sale at the time of the first suit and could have claimed specific performance earlier. However, the High Court reinstated the second suit, ruling that the lifting of the ban triggered a fresh cause of action, making the new relief legally enforceable.
Issues:
Whether in the facts & circumstances of the present case, the principles enumerated under Order II Rule 2 CPC would bar the institution of a second suit and warrant rejection of the plaint filed by the respondent no. 1 herein in O.S. No. 122 of 2008?
Judgement:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case examined the applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC, which bars the filing of a second suit for a relief that could have been claimed in an earlier suit. The Court held that the bar does not apply when the second suit is based on a distinct cause of action or arises due to new factual developments that were unavailable at the time of filing the first suit.
A bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan upheld this view, affirming that when a subsequent event enables a plaintiff to claim relief that was previously unavailable, the second suit is maintainable. The Court clarified that Order II Rule 2 CPC does not compel a plaintiff to include all potential claims in one suit when some reliefs are legally unenforceable at the time.
III. Case Title: Central Bank of India & Anr. V. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors.
Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 121
Court: Supreme Court of India
Decided on: January 09, 2025
Brief Facts:
The dispute arose when Smt. Prabha Jain filed a civil suit challenging the validity of certain sale and mortgage deeds. She sought multiple reliefs, including a declaration that the deeds were null and void, restoration of possession, and damages. The Central Bank of India, one of the appellants, argued that the suit was barred under the SARFAESI Act, which deals with secured assets and ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts in such matters.
The bank filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking to dismiss the entire suit. The trial court accepted the bank's argument and rejected the plaint in full, stating that civil courts had no jurisdiction over the matter. However, the plaintiff appealed to the High Court, which reversed the decision, holding that even if some reliefs were barred under the SARFAESI Act, others remained maintainable.
Issues:
Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff, given the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, which typically oust civil court jurisdiction in favor of the DRT.
Judgement:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, reiterating that a suit should not be dismissed in full if at least one relief is legally valid. The Court observed that Order VII Rule 11 CPC is meant to filter out frivolous cases but should not be used to prevent litigants from pursuing legitimate claims. It emphasized that courts must examine each relief independently and allow the suit to proceed if any part of it is legally sustainable.
This judgment reinforces the principle that procedural technicalities should not obstruct access to justice. It clarifies that while special laws like the SARFAESI Act limit civil court jurisdiction, they do not automatically invalidate all claims related to secured assets. The ruling ensures that litigants are not unfairly deprived of their right to seek valid legal remedies.
By setting this precedent, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that courts must adopt a balanced approach when determining the maintainability of suits, ensuring fairness and proper judicial scrutiny in cases involving multiple reliefs.
IV. Case Title: H. Anjanappa & Ors. Vs A. Prabhakar & Ors.
Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 183
Court: Supreme Court of India
Order Dated: January 29, 2025
Brief Facts:
The case arose from a sale agreement executed in 1995 between the plaintiffs (appellants) and the defendant (since deceased, now represented by legal representatives). The defendant, acting through her Power of Attorney holder, agreed to sell the property for Rs. 20 lakhs, receiving an earnest money deposit of Rs. 5 lakhs. As the defendant failed to evict unauthorized occupants from the land, a supplementary agreement was executed, extending the timeline for the sale, and the plaintiffs paid an additional Rs. 15 lakhs. However, despite this, the defendant subsequently sold the property to another buyer for Rs. 40 lakhs, prompting the plaintiffs to file a suit for specific performance.
The trial court granted a temporary injunction, restraining the defendant from further alienating the property. However, in violation of this order, a portion of the land was sold to Respondents Nos. 1-2, who later sought to be impleaded in the suit. The trial court rejected their application, and after trial, it decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, granting specific performance. The defendant's appeal before the High Court was dismissed.
Two years after the High Court's ruling, Respondents Nos. 1-2 challenged the decree and sought condonation of a 586-day delay, which the High Court allowed, granting them leave to appeal. The plaintiffs then approached the Supreme Court, contending that a lis pendens transferee has no independent right to challenge a decree against their transferor unless they had been impleaded in the suit.
Judgement:
The Supreme Court observed that a lis pendens transferee claims under the defendant and is therefore bound by the decree. It noted that under Order XXI Rule 16 CPC, a transferee of a decree-holder may apply for execution, and by analogy, execution may proceed against a transferee of a judgment-debtor, regardless of when the transfer took place. Furthermore, Order XXII Rule 10 CPC allows a lis pendens transferee to seek substitution in ongoing proceedings, and while failure to implead does not invalidate their rights, such a transferee may still apply for leave to appeal post-decree.
The Court clarified that a lis pendens transferee, though not impleaded, may seek leave to appeal against a final decree, but the decision to grant such leave is discretionary. The exercise of discretion must be judicious, ensuring that procedural fairness is maintained while preventing misuse of litigation to delay execution of decrees.
COMPETITION LAW
I. Case Title: Maulik Surani And Alphabet Inc. & Ors.
Case No: 34 of 2024
Court/Tribunal: Competition Commission of India
Decided on: January 08, 2025
The CCI vide order dated 08.01.2025, prima facie allowed an information against Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, Google International LLC, and Google India Private Limited ("Opposite Parties") for contravening the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 ("the Act"). The CCI directed that the information be clubbed with Case Nos. 41 of 2021, 10 of 2022, and 36 of 2022, whereunder the Director General is examining whether the practices of the Opposite Parties constitute abuse of dominance in the online digital advertising intermediation services in India.
Mr. Maulik Surani ("the Informant") alleged that the Opposite Parties engaged in anticompetitive conduct while providing ad-tech intermediation services by, inter alia, favouring its own properties over those of Google Network members, hosting auction and simultaneously participating as a bidder through AdX, not disclosing information about the fees for its ad-tech intermediation services and by imposing exorbitant fees on publishers through Google Ad Manager. The CCI observed that the subject matter of the allegations in the information was substantially same as the subject matter of the practices of the Opposite Parties in the ad-tech intermediation services, that is already under examination in an ongoing investigation. CLICK HERE
II. Case Title: Rajesh George And Honda Motorcycle And Scooter India Private Limited
Case No: 16 of 2024
Court/Tribunal: Competition Commission of India
Decided on: January 14, 2025
The CCI vide order dated 14.01.2025 dismissed an information against Honda Motorcycle and Scooter India Private Limited ("Opposite Party") for contravening the provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 ("the Act"). The CCI found the reasons offered for condonation of delay in filing the information to be implausible, yet proceeded to analyse the allegations in the information and observed that they arose out of commercial disputes from a contractual relationship between the parties and were thus, beyond the purview of the Act.
Mr. Rajesh George ("the Informant"), a dealer of the Opposite Party, alleged that the Opposite Party engaged in anti-competitive conduct by pressurizing him into terminating his dealership with Suzuki, dumping offbeat and unpopular two-wheeler models in his showroom without any prior order, declining the induction of a director into his dealership and terminating his dealership agreement in an arbitrary and unilateral manner. The Informant also sought interim relief in the form of a direction to the Opposite Party to restore his dealership with immediate effect. CLICK HERE
III. Case Title: Beach Mineral Producers Association And IREL (India) Limited
Case No: 26 of 2022
Court/Tribunal: Competition Commission of India
Decided on: January 17, 2025
The CCI vide order dated 17.01.2025 dismissed an information against IREL (India) Limited ("Opposite Party") for contravening the provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 ("the Act"). The CCI observed that while the Opposite Party qualifies as an 'enterprise' under the provisions of Section 2(h) of the Act and holds a dominant position in the market for mining and supply of beach sand Ilmenite in India, no abuse of dominant position can be made out against the Opposite Party since it neither imposes discriminatory conditions in the sale of Ilmenite nor denies market access to domestic consumers.
The Beach Mineral Producers Association ("the Informant") alleged anti-competitive conduct against the Opposite Party on account of imposition of extraneous conditions for the supply of Ilmenite to domestic consumers, dissimilar treatment between domestic customers and foreign companies, and arbitrary and exorbitant pricing of Ilmenite. The CCI perused the investigation report of the Director General and observed that mining and supply of Ilmenite is an economic activity undertaken by the Opposite Party and not its sovereign function, no evidence of discrimination between similarly situated consumers by the Opposite Party exists and the pricing decisions taken by the Opposite Party for the supply of Ilmenite are determined by market dynamics.
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