On 6th September 2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sales Tax Officer (1) vs. Rainbow Papers Limited1 ("Rainbow Judgment"), in the context of the specific provision under Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act 2003 ("GVAT Act") which creates first charge for dues under the GVAT, has held that the claim of the tax department of the state squarely falls within the definition of "security interest" and becomes a "secured creditor" under the provision of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 ("Code").

This ruling has created all sorts of challenges for resolution processes under the Code, as till now the understanding was that the statutory dues have to be treated as per the priority set forth in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 53 of the Code. However, after this judgement, the statutory dues suddenly find themselves moving up in hierarchy at par with workmen and secured creditors. While there are several contrary views due to which the matter is still before the Supreme Court, the Rainbow Judgment will govern the space, till the issue is finally resolved. It is seen that in this regard Adjudicatory Authorities are seeking clarifications as to how the Statutory/Governmental dues have been taken care of in the light of the Rainbow Judgment.

I. First charge does not mean super priority: In view of the legal position as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, certain aspects maybe kept in mind while verifying and evaluating the statutory/ government claims. For instance, in case of the Rainbow Judgment, the Sales Tax Authority had asserted its claim as a secured creditor. This may not be the case with respect to all statutory/ government dues. Secondly, the provisions under the GAVT Act specifically provides for a first charge, with respect to the dues and sum payable under the act, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force. This may not be case with all governing statues. One such example is the Maharashtra Value Added Tax wherein section 37 creates a first charge for the dues and sum payable under the act. However, it is subject to any provision regarding creating of first charge in any Central Act for the time being in force, thereby ceding priority in favour of the secured creditors. Further, the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, casts an obligation on the liquidator under Section 17, to not part with any assets of the company or the properties in his hands, until he has been notified by the appropriate authority. Upon being notified, the liquidator shall set aside an amount equal to the amount notified. However, the subsequent provision protects payment in favour of secured creditors whose debts under law are entitled to priority of payment over debts due to Government.

On similar lines even the Income Tax Act does not provide for any in-built priority for the tax dues. This has also been confirmed and clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Dena Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co2. Similarly, the Finance Act 1994, which provides for abuilt-in charge for dues under the Act under section 883, is also subject to any provisions under any Central or State Act.

Moreover, Section 82 of the CGST Act4, although it states that any amount payable by the taxable person or any other person on account of tax, interest or penalty which he is liable to pay to the Government shall be first charge on the property of such taxable person, the same is subject to the provisions of the Code. This section clearly saves the provisions of the Code. Apart from the aforesaid, Section 93 of the CGST Act which provides for continuation of liability for the tax dues on the survivors, is subject to the provisions of the Code.

What can be derived from the aforesaid discussion is that first and foremost, the position upheld under the Rainbow Judgment was specifically with respect to the GVAT Act and the facts that were present before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Secondly, the proposition therein cannot be considered as blanket law applicable to all other prevailing Statutory/Governmental dues. Each and every claim of the Statutory/ Government Authorities will have to be individually examined in light of governing statue and especially the provisions dealing with the recovery and providing for statutory charge.

The statue providing for first charge for the statutory dues will not ipso facto be entitled as a priority over the dues of secured creditors, until and unless there is a non-obstante provision similar to that contained in section 48 of the GVAT Act as was the case in the Rainbow Judgment.

II. Inter-se Priority Among Secured Creditors: The next question that may naturally arise is that, even if the relevant statute does not provide for a priority and merely a first charge for the statutory dues, then also will such dues, as per the Rainbow Judgment, be entitled to be treated as a 'secured creditor'?.

Here, it may be seen that the Code under section 30(4), specifically protects inter-se priority between the secured creditor by laying down that "The committee of creditors may approve a resolution plan by a vote of not less than sixty-six per cent. of voting share of the financial creditors, after considering its feasibility and viability, the manner of distribution proposed, which may take into account the order of priority amongst creditors as laid down in sub-section (1) of section 53, including the priority and value of the security interest of a secured creditor..."

This issue was elaborately examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of provisions of section 529 of the Companies Act 1956, in the case of ICICI Bank vs Sidco Leathers Ltd5, and it was held that:

"Merely because Section 529 does not specifically provide for the rights of priorities over the mortgaged assets, that, in our opinion, would not mean that the provisions of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act in relation to a company, which has undergone liquidation, shall stand obliterated." (Emphasis supplied)

The following observations of the Supreme Court are noteworthy in this context:

"While enacting a statute, the Parliament cannot be presumed to have taken away a right in property. Right to property is a constitutional right. Right to recover the money lent by enforcing a mortgage would also be a right to enforce an interest in the property. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act provide for different types of charges. In terms of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act claim of the first charge holder shall prevail over the claim of the second charge holder and in a given case where the debts due to both, the first charge holder and the second charge holder, are to be realized from the property belonging to the mortgagor, the first charge holder will have to be repaid first. There is no dispute as regards the said legal position. Such a valuable right, having regard to the legal position as obtaining in common law as also under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, must be deemed to have been known to the Parliament. Thus, while enacting the Companies Act, the Parliament cannot be held to have intended to deprive the first charge holder of the said right. Such a valuable right, therefore, must be held to have been kept preserved. [See Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. vs. Management & Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 813]"

Even the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee (ILC)6, noted this aspect by observing:

"Moreover, the overarching intention of the Code to prioritize debts owed to unsecured financial creditors was sufficiently clear from the Preamble to the Code. In this regard, the Report of the BLRC Volume 1 (2015) ("BLRC Report") states as follows: "The Committee has recommended to keep the right of the Central and State Government in the distribution waterfall in liquidation at a priority below the unsecured financial creditors in addition to all kinds of secured creditors for promoting the availability of credit and developing a market for unsecured financing (including the development of bond markets)."

ILC further deliberated the issue and observed that the principles stated above that emerge from the ICICI case are also applicable to the issue at hand under section 53 of the Code. Moreover, although this was a case where creditors had not relinquished their security, the principles hold good under the Code even when creditors have relinquished their security. The Code unlike the Companies Act 1956, expressly recognises secured creditors who have relinquished their security as a separate category in section 53(1)(b)(ii) and distinguishes them from unsecured creditors. The Code in a bid to encourage relinquishment, also specifically places secured creditors who have relinquished security higher than unsecured creditors.

The legal position as regards the authority of Committee of Creditor to decide the manner of distribution of resolution plan amount among different stakeholders is well established in a plethora of judgements. However, a limited question of inter-se priority among the creditors at liquidation stage is before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd Vs Technology Development Board & Ors7, The Apex Court, by way of its order dated 25th September 2021, has stayed the operation of the judgment and Order passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal8 ("NCLAT") dated 5th April 2021, in which the NCLAT has disagreed with the view of Adjudicating Authority that the inter-se priorities amongst the Secured Creditors would remain valid and prevail in distribution of assets in liquidation.

Thus, the issue of payment to Statutory/Governmental dues under a resolution plan could easily be addressed in the light of the governing statute and distribution justified in the light of legal provisions as well as the ruling as discussed herein above.

Footnotes

1. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1661 OF 2020 with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2568 OF 2020 decided on 6th September 2022

2. (2000) 5 SCC 694

3. Section 88: Liability under Act to be first charge. — Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Central Act or State Act, any amount of tax, penalty, interest, or any other sum payable by an assessee or any other person under this Chapter, shall, save as otherwise provided in section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and the Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and the Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), be the first charge on the property of the assessee or the person as the case may be.

4. Section 83: 82. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, save as otherwise provided in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, any amount payable by a taxable person or any other person on account of tax, interest or penalty which he is liable to pay to the Government shall be a first charge on the property of such taxable person or such person.

5. Appeal (Civil) 2332 of 2006, decided on April 28, 2006

6. Insolvency Law Committee Report dated March 26, 2018

7. CIVIL APPEAL Diary No(s). 11060/2021

8. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.731 of 2020

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.