1. One of the many innovations of the Extradition Act 2003 ('EA 2003') was the removal of a number of bars to extradition. Although these changes were the cause of considerable concern both within Parliament and beyond, the Government offered reassurances at the time that the Human Rights Act 1998 ('HRA 1998') would provide an adequate safeguard, and that these bars were therefore no longer required. Some six years after EA 2003 came into force, it remains uncertain whether HRA 1998 is indeed as adequate a safeguard as we were originally led to believe.
2. The Government's confidence in HRA 1998 in fact emerged gradually as the Bill took shape between the initial Review in March 2001 and the Royal Assent of the Act in November 2003. This paper briefly considers the extent to which HRA 1998 has provided an adequate replacement safeguard for one former bar to extradition, namely the bar of triviality.
I. Reforming the bars to extradition
3. Broadly speaking, the following bars to extradition exist under EA 2003 for both category 1 and category 2 territories:
a. Double jeopardy (sections 12 and 80 EA 2003);
b. Extraneous considerations (sections 13 and 81);
c. The passage of time (sections 14 and 82);
d. Hostage-taking considerations (sections 16 and 83);
e. Speciality (sections 17 and 95).
4. EA 2003 also provides for the following potential bars to extradition for category 1 territories:1
a. The person's age (section 15);
b. Earlier extradition to the UK from another category 1 territory (section 18);
c.E arlier extradition to the UK from a non-category 1 territory (section 19).
5. In addition, EA 2003 provides the following bars for category 2 territories:
a. The death penalty (section 94);
b. Earlier extradition to the UK from another territory (section 96).
6. Finally, however, sections 21 and 87 EA 2003 require the District Judge at the extradition hearing to decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with their rights under the European Convention of Human Rights ('ECHR'), within the meaning of HRA 1998, and, if it would not be, to order the person's discharge.
7. The Extradition Act 1989 ('EA 1989') provided a number of other additional bars which are not reproduced in the new Act. These include:
a. If the offence was political in character (section 6(1)(a));
b. If the offence was a military offence which is not also an offence under general criminal law (section 6(1)(b));
c. If the offence was trivial in nature (sections 11(3)(a) and 12(2)(a)(i));
d. If the accusation was not made in good faith in the interests of justice (sections 11(3)(c) and 12(2)(a)(iii)).
8. As the following section shows in more detail, the Government's view as to which bars to extradition should be included within EA 2003 changed numerous times during the course of the Bill's passage. It would appear that sections 21 and 87 EA 2003 were included for purely political purposes since, as public authorities, courts are bound to act in a way which is compatible with ECHR under section 6 HRA 1998. These sections were included at the request of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee and the House of Lords European Union Committee in late 2001, at a time when the courts' obligations under HRA 1998 were less clear than they are today.
II. The development of the Government's reliance on HRA 1998
March 2001: Government Review
9. Although the Labour Government had begun a modest review of UK extradition law in 1997, it was only in 2000, in the wake of the Pinochet case, that the Government embarked upon a more thoroughgoing study, leading to the publication of a Review in March 2001.2 This Review contains many features of EA 2003 in nascent form and envisage implementing an EU instrument which was still being developed at the time but which eventually became the European Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, which was passed the following year.3 Nevertheless, there was also reason to streamline extradition proceedings between the UK and EU Member States given the Treaty of Amsterdam of October 1997, the Tampere Special European Council in October 1999, and the UK's acceptance of parts of the Schengen acquis in May 2000.4
10. It is striking that, in comparison with later documents, the Review is rather circumspect when it addresses how HRA 1998 will interact with the proposed legislative reform. Far from asserting that it will act as a safeguard, the Review admits that the Working Group was uncertain as to how HRA 1998 will affect extradition, and tentatively calls for advice:
We would welcome views on whether safeguards specific to the conditions in the requesting state should be retained in new extradition legislation, given the further effect that has been given to ECHR rights by the Human Rights Act 1998. 5
In view of the further effect given to ECHR rights under the Human Rights Act 1998, notably Article 2 (right to life), 3 (torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security of person) and 6 (entitlement to a fair and public hearing), we have concluded that there is a potential for confusion if ECHR criteria are considered in parallel to overlapping criteria relating to extradition.
We welcome views on whether safeguards specific to the conditions in the requesting state should be retained in new extradition legislation, given the further effect that has been given to ECHR rights by the Human Rights Act 1998.6
11. At this stage, the Review envisaged that, for 'tier one' (the forerunner of category 1) territories, the primary safeguard would not be HRA 1998 but the ECHR itself. It would not be necessary to worry about human rights violations when a tier one extradition request was made, because all territories were signatories of the ECHR:
Given that we are considering the extradition arrangements with our EU/Schengen partners, the Working Group considered that this is, in itself, a powerful protection for an individual. All of the Member States are well established democracies with whom we have close political and economic ties. Commitment to the rule of law and democratic principles is a requirement of accession to the Council of Europe and all EU Member States and Schengen countries are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights. We have regular extradition traffic with virtually all of our EU partners. While the overall standard of criminal justice in a requesting state cannot hold an absolute guarantee that it would be right to return every individual requested for extradition purposes, it is a reasonable presumption to make with these partners that the individual whose return is sought would be treated in accordance with ECHR principles; the requesting state, in turn, relies on the UK to provide the same protection for those who are returned here in response to an outgoing request.7
12. The Working Party recommended retaining certain restrictions (that is, a minimum sentencing threshold of 12 months in requesting state and ne bis in idem), but was uncertain as to whether certain bars should be included in the legislation, and welcomed views on the matter. These were:
a. Military offences which are not also offences in general criminal law;
b. Convictions imposed in absentia;
c. Offences which are not offences under the law of the requested state where the requesting state has taken on extraterritorial jurisdiction.
13. The Review concluded that the following should not be bars:
a. Conditions in requesting state;
b. Dual criminality;
c. The requirement for specialty provision to be in place;
d. The prohibition on extradition where the fugitive is facing the death penalty;
e. Political offence exception.8
14. The prospect of the death penalty as a bar to extradition was excluded with specific reference to the ECHR:
This is because all of our EU and Schengen partners are signatories to the ECHR. Article 1 of the Sixth Protocol of the ECHR states "the death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed". The prohibition for the purposes of extradition is therefore no longer necessary.9
15. The Review was similarly circumspect with regard to certain bars for tier two and tier three territories, which included EU territories which had not ratified the future EU instrument, the remaining ECE states, Commonwealth countries and bilateral treaty partners. The Review asks whether bars to extradition were required in light of HRA 1998, as mentioned above, highlighting three bars specifically:
a. If the accusation is not made in good faith in the interests of justice (sections 12(2)(a)(iii) and 11(3)(c) EA 1989);
b. If the request is made for the purposes of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions (section 6(1)(c));
c. Whether he might, if extradited, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions (section 6(1)(d)).
June 2001: Responses to the Review
16. Concerns were raised by a number of responses to the Review. Because similar points were raised in many, this paper focuses on two in particular, namely the responses by Justice and Liberty.
Justice
17. Justice was unsurprisingly cautious about the Government's certainty that requesting states would comply with their obligations under ECHR:
[I]nsufficient attention is paid to protect the fundamental rights of defendants under the fast-track arrangements proposed for Tier 1. Although the consultation paper refers to the protection of human rights being an important feature of any new extradition regime this is not explored in any depth. For example, the paper states that the proposals are 'considered to be compatible with the ECHR' (see para.10) but does not say why this is so. At the same time, the human rights protection for Tier 1 is based on the assumption that a fair system of justice automatically exists in those member states that have signed up to the ECHR. As we say below, experience shows that it is wrong to suppose that a signature on a Convention is sufficient protection per se even amongst the EU member states.10
18. It also raised concerns regarding the efficacy of HRA 1998 as a safeguard:
Although the paper acknowledges that the Human Rights Act will allow individuals to go behind this assumption, the implications of this are not adequately explored. For example, there is a question whether the removal of the existing safeguards specific to the conditions in the requesting state will be adequately replaced by the extraterritorial effect of HRA when it comes to an issue such as the defendant's fair trial rights. There is also no discussion of the minimum common standards in areas such as bail, detention, legal aid and interpreters that need to be agreed as part of a fast-track extradition package.11
19. More specifically, Justice voiced concern that, while certain states may have signed the ECHR, 'this is no guarantee that in an individual case the accused will receive his or her Convention rights. In any event, there needs to be greater scrutiny of the way in which countries may move between the various Tiers than is permitted under the proposed Order in Council procedure.'12
20. With regard to the political offence exception, they stated that:
Whilst we accept that reliance on a political offence exception is increasingly rare (and difficult to plead successfully) in extradition proceedings, it nevertheless provides an important deterrent to countries who might wish to seek extradition for the wrong reasons. It also remains a mandatory exception under the UN Model Treaty.13
Liberty
21. Liberty's response was couched in even harsher terms than that of Justice.14 The tier one proposals, it claimed, was a 'recipe for injustice'.15 The response appears unconvinced that ECHR and HRA 1998 would provide sufficient safeguards:
We [...] oppose all the proposals in the paper which would remove any protection currently available to extradition defendants. In our view, as we explain below, no adequate justification has been shown for these changes, many of which would remove features of the extradition system which have been present since extradition began in the early 19th century.16
22. The response reiterated Justice's concern that a state is not to be trusted simply because it has signed the ECHR.17 Their response also raised the concern that removing these bars might actually result in the UK breaching its own obligations under the ECHR.
We do not understand the potential for 'confusion' referred to in para. 111. The section 11/12 criteria are clear and specific. The Secretary of State, as a public authority, cannot act in breach of the ECHR and is therefore prevented from making an order for return where to do so would breach it.18
23. Liberty suggested either retaining the present system or including a 'power of the High Court to order discharge where extradition would breach the ECHR'. This was preferred because 'it has the advantage that all disputes of fact about conditions in the requesting state could be resolved in an adversarial context in court.'19
October 2001–January 2002: Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Arrest Warrant
24. The first opportunity for Parliament to address some of these matters was when the European Scrutiny Committee came to examine the proposed European Arrest Warrant. An initial Explanatory Memorandum on 9 October 2001 by Bob Ainsworth, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, suggests that, at that time, the Government was uncertain as to how the Human Rights Act would interface with the European Arrest Warrant:
The Framework Document may also, however, have implications for the operation of the Human Rights Act. Although human rights are mentioned within the Framework Document, there is no explicit bar to surrender based on Human Rights considerations. The question of the compatibility of the Framework Document with the Human Rights Act is under consideration, and this policy area is currently unresolved.20
25. The European Scrutiny Committee queried with Bob Ainsworth on 17 October whether the references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the preamble of the draft Framework Decision provided a sufficient safeguard of human rights.21 Bob Ainsworth is reported to have answered in a letter dated 6 November that the Government 'did not believe that there was a need for explicit references to individual articles of the ECHR in the instrument' but that 'there was no explicit bar to surrender based on human rights considerations on the face of the draft proposal.'22
26. On 12 November, Lord Brabazon of Tara wrote to Bob Ainsworth on behalf of the House of Lords European Union Committee to express a similar concern and requested that the Decision should explicitly make reference to the ECHR:
The text of the Decision does not [...] give the executing judicial authority a right to refuse execution on ECHR grounds. You said that this was not necessary, because it was implicit that the national authorities would apply the ECHR. The inference we draw is that an authority could refuse execution of a warrant where, for example, it believes the individual concerned would not receive a fair trial in the requesting State (Article 6 ECHR) or the request came for a 'judicial authority' not possessing the degree of independence needed to satisfy Article 5 ECHR. We take the view that this right of the executing authority should be expressly stated in the body of the Decision. It is important and there should be no need or room for argument.23
27. A subsequent revision of the Framework Decision in December that year introduced Article 1(3), which states that the instrument 'shall not have the effect of amending the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union'. The European Scrutiny Committee considered this to be 'no substitute for a clear provision allowing a Member State to refuse to surrender a person on ECHR grounds'.24 Their response echoed Lord Brabazon in declaring that
the text in paragraph 12 of the preamble and the provisions of Article 1(3) are unsatisfactory alternatives to a clear reference in the body of the Framework Decision to the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. We agree with the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union that the right of the executing authority to refuse to surrender a person on ECHR grounds should be expressly stated in the body of the Decision. We note that recent draft proposals for Framework Decisions have contained an express provision to the effect that they are without prejudice to the ECHR and we recommend that the UK press for the inclusion of such provisions as a matter of course.25
28. By this stage, the Government's reliance on HRA 1998 as a safeguard appears to have progressed. In a letter dated 23 January 2002 from Bob Ainsworth to the European Scrutiny Committee which responded to one particular concern raised by the Committee, namely the possibility of extradition in the case of military offences:
All countries within the EU have incorporated the ECHR into domestic legislation, which safeguards the right to a fair trial. Article 6 extends to military courts, except where a Member State has derogated from specific convention rights in respect of their military courts. However, in the unlikely scenario where a country had sought surrender for appearance before a military court, the executing judicial authority in the UK would have a duty under the Human Rights Act to consider whether surrender in such circumstances would be lawful.26
June 2002: Draft Extradition Bill and responses
29. On 27 June 2002, the Government published its first draft of the Extradition Bill.27 A number of substantial changes had been made in response to the consultation, including the simplification of the four-tier system to the familiar two-category system which was implemented in EA 2003 itself.
30. The accompanying Press Notice stressed that the observance of human rights were central to the proposed legislation: one of the five bullet points summarising the system for category one territories stated that 'Extradition will not take place where it would breach a fugitive's rights to a fair trial as set out in the European Convention on Human Rights'.28
31. This referred to the noteworthy innovation of clause 17, the predecessor of section 21 EA 2003, which required the judge at the extradition hearing to decide whether extradition would be compatible with Convention rights. This was welcomed by Justice in its response, who applauded the fact that it 'leaves no doubt as to the scope of applicability of the Human Rights Act 1998 in extradition proceedings'.29 Liberty, too, welcomed it to a 'limited extent'.30 However, both responses raised the concern that the drafting was potentially ambiguous as to whether the clause applied only to procedural rights at the hearing, or as the consequences of the actual return.31 Specifically, both hoped that requests made in bad faith would be refused under clause 17.32
32. The Law Society also welcomed clause 17, but raised the question of whether this would be an adequate substitute for certain existing bars, including the bar of triviality:
We welcome the positive obligation on the judiciary to make enquiry into the any possible breach of a suspect's rights should an extradition take place. We seek confirmation that proportionality arguments relating to extreme compassionate circumstances, triviality or the age of the suspect will be considered under this provision.33
33. Similarly, the Press Notice stressed, in the last of the six bullet points explaining the category two regime, that 'No extradition will occur from the UK where the request is believed to be made for the purpose of punishing a person on account of his race, religion or political opinion.'34 This referred to clause 61(1)(b) and 61(3), which provided a bar to extradition for 'extraneous considerations', meaning an extradition request made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing someone on account of race, religion, nationality or political opinions. This bar eventually made its way into EA at sections 79(1)(b) and 81. However, there was no bar for extraneous considerations for category one territories in the June 2002 draft.
July 2002: Joint Committee on Human Rights
34. The Joint Committee on Human Rights were broadly satisfied by the obligation to consider Convention rights under clauses 17 and 65, which they stated 'seems to us to provide adequate protection of Convention rights'.35
January 2003: House of Commons Standing Committee
35. The debate on the Extradition Bill in Parliament was so extensive that this paper limits its discussion to a number of specific examples of how the Government claimed HRA 1998 would be a sufficient safeguard.
36. Having inserted provisions into the draft Bill which were effectively redundant in that their effect was already achieved by HRA 1998 but which placated critics of the Bill, the Government came under fire at Committee stage for the opposite reason of including unnecessary provisions. John Maples, for one, pointed out that
Presumably, the extraneous considerations in that clause would be protected by human rights. I therefore wonder why both clause 13 and clause 21 are judged necessary. Indeed, if the rights already exist under the Human Rights Act, which I understand overrides all other legislation, why is either clause necessary?36
37. Bob Ainsworth defended these redundant provisions with some frustration:
We are burnt or scalded. If we build the provision into the Bill, we are asked why it is necessary, and if we do not, we are asked why not. It is unambiguously set out in the Bill that people should not be prevented from alleging that their human rights would be breached and that they could not secure a fair trial in another jurisdiction. That is fine by me. Extradition will be barred if they can convince the district judge that that will be the outcome.37
38. In the same debate, Conservative MP Nick Hawkins asked Bob Ainsworth to confirm that clause 21 'will allow a court to take into account various proportionality arguments, such as extreme compassionate circumstances, triviality or unreasonable delays'.38 It is unfortunate that Bob Ainsworth did not answer this question directly, since the question of proportionality appears not to resurface in Parliamentary debate again.
III. Has HRA 1998 lived up to expectations?
39. Since EA 2003 came into force at the beginning of 2004, numerous attempts have been made to resist extradition proceedings with reference to HRA 1998. The remainder of this paper focuses on one approach in particular, namely the use of Article 8 ECHR to resist extradition on the grounds of proportionality. Although this approach has attempted to resuscitate the bar of triviality, it has so far has been unsuccessful. It is therefore worth questioning whether HRA 1998 provides the level of protection which the Government increasingly claimed it would.
40. Article 8 ECHR allows for interference where it is proportionate to the legitimate aim of an extradition. It was held in Launder that extradition will only be disproportionate under Article 8 in 'exceptional circumstances'.39 In Ruiz Jaso v Spain,40 Dyson LJ stated that:
What is required is that the court should decide whether the interference with a person's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life which would result from his or her extradition is proportionate to the legitimate aim of honouring extradition treaties with other states. It is clear that great weight should be accorded to the legitimate aim of honouring extradition treaties made with other states. Thus, although it is wrong to apply an exceptionality test, in an extradition case there will have to be striking and unusual facts to lead to the conclusion that it is disproportionate to interfere with an extraditee's article 8 rights.41
41. Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue further in Norris, where Lord Philips pointed out that:
Instead of saying that interference with Article 8 rights can only outweigh the importance of extradition in exceptional circumstances it is more accurate and more helpful, to say that the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition.42
42. A particularly striking example of Article 8 being used to resist an apparently trivial matter arose in Sandru v Romania.43 Sandru had stolen and killed ten chickens from a neighbour in Romania; in his absence, he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Although Sandru attempted to resist the European Arrest Warrant on the grounds of proportionality, Elias LJ was not convinced:
I do not accept that triviality of the offence or length of sentence can, certainly in circumstances of this case, begin to bring this case within Article 8. No doubt the length of sentence is relevant to the degree of interference in private and family life, but it does not of course affect the principle that extradition treaties should be honoured.44
43. He further stated that refusing extradition on the grounds of proportionality would be to
risk undermining the principle of mutual respect which underpins Part 1 of the Extradition Act. Insofar as it is requiring our courts to question or review the appropriateness of the sentence passed by a foreign court, it is asking these courts to exercise a function they are ill-equipped to carry out. The appropriate sentence is, in part, a function of culture, and in any event the courts here have limited information about the factors leading a foreign court to impose the sentence it did.
It may be, for example, that in this case the Romanian courts treat theft of livestock and its subsequent destruction far more seriously than English courts would typically do. If the sentence is thought to be too high, the answer is to challenge it in Romania, which indeed is precisely what the appellant apparently is doing in this case.45
44. Elias LJ noted, too, that 'it is not open to the courts of this country to say that, in the circumstances, the offence is so trivial or that the sentence so disproportionate to the offence that extradition would be inappropriate', stressing that this is in explicit contrast to the regime under EA 1989, which allowed triviality as a bar.
45. However, there has been some suggestion from the judiciary that Article 8 could provide a bar of triviality. In a case concerning an extradition of someone accused of stealing a mobile phone, Maurice Kay LJ noted that:
one is becoming used to European extradition cases for less serious offences than used to come before the courts for extradition, but in my reasonable experience of cases under the 2003 Act I have never seen one quite as low down the calendar as this.46
46. Remarkably, a German court managed to imply an overall limit of proportionality into the European Arrest Warrant in February this year, effectively opening the possibility of a bar of triviality.47 The German court relied on German constitutional law as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that 'severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence'. One commentary points out that, ironically, this could not be done by an English court since the UK, fearing a 'second helping of human rights imposed upon the UK legal system by "Brussels"', obtained a concession from the Charter:48
There is an irony in this, because it looks as if the United Kingdom—not for the first time—has been hoist by its own petard. The UK Government would almost certainly be as pleased as any civil libertarian defence lawyer to find a legal means of preventing Polish public prosecutors from overloading our legal system with EAWs issued to recover truant Polish shoplifters. And it is thanks to a eurosceptic conspiracy hatched together with the Polish Government that it is unable now to use the Charter as an argument to keep a piece of EU legislation within reasonable bounds!49
47. Nevertheless, these commentators points out that the principle could be applied if the courts were to extend its current history of interpreting EA 2003 in light of the Framework Decision so as to interpret it also in the light of basic principles of EU law, although they accept that this might be too 'challenging' for the English judiciary to accept.
IV. Conclusion
48. Attempts to resist extradition now largely depend on evidence as to what will happen to the requested person if extradition is allowed. It is certainly possible to displace the presumption that a state will deal with a requested person simply because it is a signatory to ECHR or because it is a long-standing extradition partner, but compelling evidence is required in order to do so. Despite reassurances from the Government before EA 2003 was passed, it is now becoming increasing clear that ECHR Articles provide quite a different basis for resisting extradition compared with EA 1989, as can be seen from the line of cases where Article 8 has been pleaded. More specifically, Sandru shows that Article 8 does not provide a bar of triviality at present. In hindsight, the Government's confidence that HRA 1998 would guarantee a just extradition system may have been misplaced.
Footnotes
1. Council Decision of 13 June 2002 (2002/584/JHA).
2. Home Office, 'The Law on Extradition: A Review', March 2001.
3. Council Decision of 13 June 2002 (2002/584/JHA).
4. Home Office, 'The Law on Extradition', paras. 2 and 5.
5. Home Office, 'The Law on Extradition', paras. 109.
6. Ibid., para. 111.
7. Ibid., para. 78.
8. Ibid., para. 79.
9. Ibid.
10. Justice, 'The Law on Extradition: A Review', June 2001, para. 3.
11. Ibid., para. 4.
12. Ibid., para. 7.
13. Ibid., para. 14.
14. Liberty, 'The Law on Extradition: A Review', June 2001.
15. Ibid., para. 7.
16. Ibid., para. 3.
17. Ibid., para. 9.
18. Ibid., para. 22.
19. Ibid., para. 23.
20. Reproduced in House of Commons, Second Report of the European Scrutiny Committee, 17 October 2001, para. 7.22.
21. Ibid., para. 7.30.
22. House of Commons, Seventeenth Report of the European Scrutiny Committee, 30 January 2002, para. 10.
23. Letter from the Lord Brabazon of Tara to Mr Bob Ainsworth, MP, 12 November 2001. Reproduced in House of Lords, Sixth Report of the Select Committee on European Union, 12 November 2001, Appendix 3.
24. Ibid., para. 11.
25. Ibid., para. 12.
26. Ibid., Appendix.
27. Home Office, 'Extradition: Consultation on Draft Legislation', Cm 5545, 27 June 2002.
28. Home Office, 'Proposals For A Modern Extradition System Published', Home Office Press Notice 174/2002, 27 June 2002. Reproduced in House of Commons, 'The Extradition Bill: Bill 2 of 2002-03', Research Paper 02/79, 6 December 2002, 17–18.
29. Justice, 'Justice Response to Draft Extradition Bill 2002', September 2002, para. 4.
30. Liberty, 'Liberty's Response to the Draft Extradition Bill', October 2002, para. 13.
31. Justice, 'Justice Response', para. 5; Liberty, 'Liberty's Response'. para. 13.
32. Justice, 'Justice Response', para. 6; Liberty, 'Liberty's Response'. paras. 12–13.
33. Law Society, 'Law Society Response to Home Office Draft Extradition Bill', September 2002, 6.
34. Ibid.
35. House of Lords and House of Commons, Twentieth Report of Session 2001–2 of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 22 July 2002, para. 19.
36. Hansard, House of Commons, 14 January 2003, column 114.
37. Ibid., column 115.
38. Ibid., column 113.
39. Launder v United Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR CD 67.
40. [2007] EWHC 2983.
41. Para. 57.
42. Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16, para. 56.
43. [2009] EWHC 2879 (Admin).
44. Para. 10.
45. Paras. 14–15.
46. Zak v Regional Court in Bydgoszcz [2008] EWHC 470.
47. Higher Regional Court Stuttgart, Decision of February 25, 2010—1 Ausl. (24) 1246/09. For a translation and commentary on this case, see Joachim Vogel and J. R. Spencer, 'Proportionality and the European arrest warrant', Criminal Law Review 2010, 6, 474–82.
48. Vogel and Spencer, 'Proportionality', 481.
49. Ibid., 482.
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