United States: Does State Law Really Allow Tort Claims For Failure To Report To Governmental Agencies?

Last Updated: March 6 2018
Article by James Beck

Claims predicating prescription medical product liability claims on purported failure to report adverse events to the FDA – á la Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir., 2013) (en banc), Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011), and Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr.3d 300 (App. 2014), were almost unheard of prior to the recognition of preemption in medical device cases in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). We know of only one decision, a prescription drug case at that, Axen v. American Home Products Corp., 974 P.2d 224, 235 (Or. App. 1999), that addressed such claims pre-Riegel.

Because failure-to-report claims are transparent attempts at common-law enforcement of FDA reporting requirements, our first reaction to such claims is that they should be impliedly preempted under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), and 21 U.S.C. § 337(a), as purely FDCA-based claims. Some courts have agreed, others (like the three cases cited above) – have been reluctant to put plaintiffs totally out of court on preemption grounds – so they have distorted the law by jamming the square peg of failure-to-report claims into the round hole of plain vanilla failure-to-warn product liability claims.

But what about that square peg? We've never (and we haven't seen it anywhere else, either) taken a look at the purely state-law issue of whether, in contexts beyond prescription medical products, the common law has ever given thumbs up – or thumbs down – to state-law tort claims actually predicated on failure to report something to some governmental body (excluding the FDA for these purposes).

Such laws do exist in a variety of areas. The most significant example are so-called "mandated reporting statutes" that obligate differing groups of statutorily designated persons to report child abuse (and more recently, elder abuse) to state or local authorities. The details differ, but from what we can tell, practically every state has a mandated reporting statute.

With plaintiffs being always on the lookout for extra deep pockets, no matter how bizarre the liability theory, surely somebody out there has tried to predicate liability on a purely state-law failure to report.

So we did some research that validated that gut feeling. Indeed, it turns out that state-law failure-to-report claims have been asserted fairly often.

Fortunately for the good guys, most states have rejected those claims, and even the minority of adverse decisions are mostly distinguishable.

Here goes.

Perhaps the leading case is Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998). In Perry, "[t]he sole issue [was] whether plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for negligence per se based on the Family Code, which requires any person having cause to believe a child is being abused to report the abuse to state authorities." Id. at 302. Before the Texas Supreme Court, that dog didn't hunt. "[W]e will not apply the doctrine of negligence per se if the criminal statute does not provide an appropriate basis for civil liability." Id. at 304 (footnote omitted). That the injured plaintiff was a person within the scope of the statute's protection was not enough. Id. at 305. The claim being asserted "corresponds to no common law duty." Id. at 306.

[W]e have considered the following factors regarding the application of negligence per se to the . . . child abuse reporting provision: (1) whether the statute is the sole source of any tort duty from the defendant to the plaintiff or merely supplies a standard of conduct for an existing common law duty; (2) whether the statute puts the public on notice by clearly defining the required conduct; (3) whether the statute would impose liability without fault; (4) whether negligence per se would result in ruinous damages disproportionate to the seriousness of the statutory violation, particularly if the liability would fall on a broad and wide range of collateral wrongdoers; and (5) whether the plaintiff's injury is a direct or indirect result of the violation of the statute. Because a decision to impose negligence per se . . . would impose immense potential liability under an ill-defined standard on a broad class of individuals whose relationship to the abuse was extremely indirect, we hold that [liability] is not appropriate.

Id. at 309.

Another interesting case is Ward v. Greene, 839 A.2d 1259 (Conn. 2004), which held that, while a cause of action for failure to report might be brought on behalf of the "identified" abused child him or herself, the statute did not protect other "unidentified" abused children allegedly injured by the same pattern of failure to report child abuse:

[W]e conclude that the [statute] appears to be directed at the child, or children in the case of multiple children placed at risk in a singular incident, who should be the subject of a report of abuse or neglect under the statute and are, accordingly, in need of services. The policy statement thus suggests that the legislature intended to focus on children who already have been exposed to conduct that amounts to a reportable event, and we do not find merit in the plaintiff's argument that the statute creates a duty of care to every child who has been in the care of the defendant.

Id. at 1266-67. The limited claim in Ward can't translate to drug/device liability because a similar construction of the FDCA's reporting requirements would not do plaintiffs any good. Causation in product liability doesn't work the same way. In drug/device cases, every court to consider the issue has held that failure to report a plaintiff's own adverse event cannot possibly be causal, since any failure to report necessarily happens after the plaintiff was injured. See Johnson v. Hologic, Inc., 2015 WL 75240, at *4 (Mag. E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 4745264 (E.D. Cal. March 6, 2015); Malonzo v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 2014 WL 2212235, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2014); Simmons v. Boston Scientific. Corp., 2013 WL 1207421, at *5 (C.D. Cal. March 25, 2013).

Perry and Ward are examples of the distinct majority of precedent addressing similar claims of injury due to somebody's failure to report child abuse. Most states do not recognize any purely common-law, or negligence per se state-law, duty to report child abuse. "The vast majority of courts . . . have held that their reporting statutes do not create a civil cause of action." Becker v. Mayo Foundation, 737 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. 2007).

Alabama: C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So.2d 98, 102 (Ala. 1995) ("there is no indication of any legislative intent to impose civil liability for failure to report").

Connecticut: Ward, supra, 839 A.2d at 1266-67.

Delaware: Doe 30's Mother v. Bradley, 58 A.3d 429, 452 (Del. Super. 2012) ("the statutory obligation to report [suspected child abuse] does not equate to a common law duty to act").

Florida: Welker v. Southern Baptist Hospital, Inc., 864 So. 2d 1178, 1182 (Fla. App. 2004) (the statute that "address[es] the subject of penalties for failure to report known or suspected child abuse . . . says nothing about the availability of a cause of action for damages. Moreover, those courts which have been presented with the same question regarding predecessor versions . . . have all concluded that no cause of action was created"), quashed on other grounds, 908 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2005); Mora v. South Broward Hospital Dist., 710 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. App. 1998) (recognizing, while rejecting analogous cause of action for failure to report elder abuse; that "Florida courts have consistently refused to impose civil liability for the failure to report suspected child abuse"); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So.2d 785, 790-91 (Fla. App. 1989) ("To find a legislative intent to provide a private right of action against non-reporters, we would have to ignore . . . the plain purpose and language of the statutes").

Georgia: McGarrah v. Posig, 635 S.E.2d 219, 222 (Ga. App. 2006) ("The legal duty to report, however, is imposed in Georgia by statute, and . . . this statute does not give rise to a private cause of action for damages") (emphasis original); Vance v. T.R.C., 494 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. App. 1997) ("nothing within the provision of the law purports to create, or indicates an intention to create, a private cause of action in tort in favor of a child whose abuse is not detected or reported"); Cechman v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. App. 1991) (child abuse reporting requirements not enforced by private liability). Cf. Govea v. City of Norcross, 608 S.E.2d 677, 683 (Ga. App. 2004) (no negligence per se claim based on failure to report reasons why police officer had been terminated).

Illinois: Varela v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Inc., 867 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ill. App. 2006) ("it would be illogical to argue that although the Illinois legislature has not expressly or impliedly created a private right of action for violation of the Reporting Act individuals may nevertheless assert a private right of action for violation of the Reporting Act, so long as those individuals allege they are proceeding at common law rather than on a statutory basis"); Doe v. North Central Behavioral Health System., Inc., 816 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ill. App. 2004) ("no evidence that the statute was designed to provide monetary remedies for victims of abuse or to impose civil liability on those who fail to report"); Sheetz v. Norwood, 608 F. Appx. 401, 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (following Doe and Cuyler); Doe-2 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Board of Directors, 593 F.3d 507, 514 (7th Cir. 2010) (a "mandate to report child abuse does not create any duty to the abused child enforceable under Illinois tort law"); Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Illinois common law did not impose on [defendant's] employees a tort duty" and "an imposing line of cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the private-right question . . . have held that a private right should not be implied") (Posner, J.) (emphasis original); Willis v. Williams, 2010 WL 4683965, at *3 (Mag. C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2010) ("Illinois common law creates no legal duty to report suspected sexual abuse of a child"), adopted, 2010 WL 4683624 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2010); Doe v. White, 627 F. Supp. 2d 905, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2009) ("there is no underlying common law duty to report" and "there is no tort liability for [a statutory] violation").

Indiana: Sprunger v. Egli, 44 N.E.3d 690, 693 (Ind. App. 2015) ("Indiana does not recognize a private right of action for failure to report abuse"); C.T. v. Gammon, 928 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. App. 2010) ("our legislature has declined to codify a civil cause of action against an adult who knowingly fails to report alleged child abuse"); J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 813 (Ind. App. 1994) ("Absent codification, we are not convinced that extending a civil remedy to a victim of abuse or neglect against all persons who know of child abuse and fail to report child abuse is good public policy."), abrogated on other grounds, Holt v. Quality Motor Sales, Inc., 776 N.E.2d 361 (Ind. App. 2002); Borne v. Northwest Allen County School Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1202-03 (Ind. App. 1989) ("the legislature did not intend to confer a private right of action for any breach of the duty to report imposed by the statute").

Kansas: Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 604 (Kan. 1991) "There is no express indication of legislative intent to impose any liability for failure to report."); E.P. v. United States, 835 F. Supp.2d 1109, 1117 (D. Kan. 2011) (the "common law does not recognize a cause of action for medical negligence based on failure to report child abuse"), aff'd, 520 F. Appx. 707, 716 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Kansas law does not hold healthcare professionals liable for failing to report child abuse").

Massachusetts: Doe v. D'Agostino, 367 F. Supp.2d 157 (D. Mass. 2005); ("it is implicit from the penalty imposed for failure to report that the legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action for a statutory violation").

Minnesota: Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 208 ("The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature chose to impose criminal, but not civil, penalties on mandatory reporters who fail to report."); Meyer v. Lindala, 675 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. App. 2004) (the statute "does not create a private cause of action for violation of its reporting requirements or create a duty which could be enforced through a common-law negligence action"); Kuelbs v. Williams, 609 N.W.2d 10, 155 (Minn. App. 2000) ("Minnesota courts have been reluctant to recognize private causes of action under reporting acts"); Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266-67 (Minn. App. 1993) ("There is no mention of a civil cause of action for failure to report nor is a civil action implied by the language of the subdivision;" "there was no underlying civil cause of action for failure to report suspected child abuse").

Missouri: Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 312-15 (Mo. App. 1995) ("no private cause of action can be implied under the Child Abuse Reporting Act, [so] the alleged breach of the Act also does not amount to negligence per se"; no prima facie tort for non-reporting); American Home Assurance Co. v. Pope, 360 F.3d 848, 851 n.7 (8th Cir. 2004) (Missouri "has prohibited" claims for failure to report child abuse); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676, 678 (W.D. Mo. 1994) ("the vast majority of courts . . . have found that reporting statutes such as the one at issue here, do not create a private right of action"); Thelma D. v. Board of Education, 669 F. Supp. 947, 950 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (plaintiffs "cannot recover under the Statute which only creates a public duty"); Doe "A" v. Special School District, 637 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (the Statute "creates a duty owed to the general public, not to specific individuals"); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602, 611 (W.D. Mo. 1982) ("the applicable [reporting] provisions of the Missouri Child Abuse statute cannot be said to support a private cause of action in favor of individuals").

New Hampshire: Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 278 (N.H. 1995) ("imposition of civil liability for all reporting violations would represent a sharp break from the common law and neither the statute nor the legislative history directly reveal any such intent, we are unwilling to say that violation of the child abuse reporting statute supports a private right of action"). Cf. Gauthier v. Manchester School Dist., 123 A.3d 1016, 1021 (N.H. 2015) ("declin[ing] . . . to create a duty to report bullying").

New Jersey: J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 934 (N.J. 1998) ("we do not conclude that the Legislature intended that the child-abuse reporting statute constitute an independent basis for civil liability or that its violation constitute negligence per se"); Zelnick v. Morristown-Beard School, 137 A.3d 560, 568 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. 2015) ("Child abuse reporting statutes do not typically create a duty of care or a basis for civil liability.").

Oklahoma: Paulson v. Sternlof, 15 P.3d 981, 984 (Okla. App. 2000) ("the child abuse reporting statutes do not create a private right of action. Knowing and willful failure to report is a criminal misdemeanor. There is no provision, however, for civil liability.").

South Carolina: Doe v. Marion, 645 S.E.2d 245, 249 (S.C. 2007) ("the statute in question is concerned with the protection of the public and not with the protection of an individual's private right").

Tennessee: Ham v. Hospital of Morristown, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) ("the common law of Tennessee does not impose a duty on a treating physician to either report suspected child abuse or to prevent any such child abuse"). However, Ham allowed a statutory cause of action (see below).

Texas: Perry, supra; Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282, 289-90 (Tex. App. 1995) (rejecting civil liability for failure to report child abuse before Perry); Doe v. S & S Consolidated I.S.D., 149 F. Supp.2d 274, 299 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (following Perry), aff'd, 309 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2002).

Utah: Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Utah 1989) ("Although the statute is intended to address the problem of child abuse, we are not persuaded that it can be read to create a legally enforceable duty on the part of the [mandated reporter] to protect all children from child abuse in all circumstances").

West Virginia: Barbina v. Curry, 650 S.E.2d 140, 145-46 (W. Va. 2007) (Arbaugh rationale precludes common-law negligence action for failure to report); Arbaugh v. Board of Education, 591 S.E.2d 235, 241 (W. Va. 2003) (the law "does not give rise to an implied private civil cause of action . . . for failure to report suspected child abuse where an individual with a duty to report under the statute is alleged to have had reasonable cause to suspect that a child is being abused and has failed to report suspected abuse").

Wisconsin: Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (D. Mich. 1995) ("find[ing] nothing to indicate that the Wisconsin legislature intended to authorize a private cause of action for failure to report") (applying Wisconsin law).

There are a number of states where the mandated reporting statute expressly includes a statutory right of action for non-reporting (Arbaugh listed Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New York and Rhode Island, 591 S.E.2d at 239 n.3). While not all of those states appear to have considered the issue, those that have hold the there isn't any common-law liability for failure to report beyond the scope of the statutory action. See:

Arkansas: First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 915 S.W.2d 262, 268 (Ark. 1996) (affirming defense verdict on statutory failure to report claim) (note: private cause of action repealed in 2009, and there have been no further failure to report claims).

Michigan: Murdock v. Higgins, 559 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Mich. 1997) (predicates to statutory cause of action "serve as deliberate limits to the scope" of civil liability); Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Mich. App. 1993) ("the Legislature intended that liability under the statute be limited to claims for damages" meeting statutory requirements); Brent v. Wenk, 555 F. Appx. 519, 537, 2014 WL 486192 (6th Cir. 2014) (no liability for failure to report except for what statute allows).

New York: Heidt v. Rome Memorial Hospital, 724 N.Y.S.2d 139, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) ("Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the proposition that a physician has a common-law duty to report actual child abuse, let alone suspected child abuse. There are good reasons for the absence of such a duty."); Diana G-D v. Bedford Central School Dist., 932 N.Y.S.2d 316, 329 (N.Y. Sup. 2011), aff'd, 961 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) ("there is simply no evidence that defendants' failure to make such a report was knowingly and willful," which was required for civil liability under child abuse reporting statute).

A few states have allowed private persons (usually in distinguishable situations) to bring civil actions seeking damages for failure to report child abuse. Most notable – no surprise for its receptivity to novel claims – is:

California. In Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976), the plaintiff sued a doctor who had treated her in the emergency room for negligently failing to diagnose, and thus to report, her medical condition as "battered child syndrome." Id. at 405-06. The court recognized a private cause of action exists for intentional violation of the reporting statute.

If plaintiff wishes to satisfy that requirement [violation of statute], it will be necessary for her to persuade the trier of fact that defendant . . . treating doctor[] actually observed her injuries and formed the opinion they were intentionally inflicted on her.

Id. at 397-98. The statutory language in Landeros, however, was amended to express "the Legislature's . . . intent to create an objective standard in order to broaden the circumstances under which reporting is required." People v. Davis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 100 (Cal. App. 2005). Thus the private cause of action originally recognized in Landeros has also been broadened. Pipitone v. Williams, 198 Cal. Rptr.3d 900, 917 (Cal. App. 2016) (applying lesser standard of amended statute to civil action). See Garcia v. Clovis Unified School Dist., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (mandated reporter statute "may form the basis of a negligence per se claim").

Other states allowing private suits for failure to report child abuse are:

Kentucky: Vanhook v. Somerset Health Facilities, LP, 67 F. Supp. 3d 810, 826 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (finding liability for failure to report child abuse based on unique Kentucky statute codifying negligence per se). Note: As we discussed at length here, the same statute precludes negligence per se statute for violations of federal enactments, so no failure to report analogy can help drug/device plaintiffs.

Nebraska: Chapa v. United States, 2005 WL 2170090, at *5 (D. Neb. Sept. 7, 2005) (a medical malpractice claim incorporating a duty to report was allowed; "the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the applicable standard of care required the Physicians to report suspected child abuse"). This decision disregards Erie to create liability never recognized by any state court.

Ohio: Yates v. Mansfield Board. of Education, 808 N.E.2d 861, 871 (Ohio 2004) ("a board of education may be held liable when its failure to report the sexual abuse of a minor student by a teacher . . . proximately results in the sexual abuse"). Yates is a holdover from the Ohio dark ages when a pro-plaintiff high court majority was recognizing novel liability theories right and left. Whether Yates would be decided the same way today is doubtful.

Pennsylvania: In K.H. v. Kumar, 122 A.3d 1080, 1095-96 (Pa. Super. 2015), the court allowed a medical malpractice claim predicated on a doctor's failure to report child abuse. In Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp.2d 742, 763-64 (M.D. Pa. 2007), a similar claim was allowed against the clergy. Failure-to-report has not been recognized in Pennsylvania outside the context of professional liability. Even there, a contrary line of Pennsylvania precedent exists with respect to the duty of doctors to report to the state their patients' medical conditions that would disqualify the patients from driving. No liability for failure report has been recognized in those circumstances. See Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 1999); Hospodar v. Schick, 885 A.2d 986, 989-90 (Pa. Super. 2005); Crosby v. Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337, 1345 (Pa. Super. 1991). See also Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 2015 WL 13240267, at *7 (Pa. C.P. June 30, 2015) ("members of a group of people harmed by the diversion of controlled substances" could not sue drugstore for failure to report thefts of such substances because "these reporting requirements are intended to protect the interests of the general public").

South Dakota: Aman v. Cabacar, 2007 WL 2684866, at *2-3 (D.S.D. Sept. 6, 2007) (violation of mandatory abuse reporting statute can be negligence per se). As with Chapa, above, Aman is another episode of a federal court predicting liability well beyond what any state court has done.

Tennessee: Doe v. Coffee County Board of Education, 852 S.W.2d 899, 909 (Tenn. App. 1992) ("teachers . . . have a non-discretionary duty to report students' complaints of child sexual abuse. Their failure to do so can give rise to liability."); Ham v. Hospital of Morristown, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 531, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (following Doe).

Washington: Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 374 P.3d 121, 126 (Wash. 2016) (applying Beggs rationale to reporting statute concerning vulnerable adults); Beggs v. State, Dept. of Social & Health Services, 247 P.3d 421, 424 (Wash. 2011) ("the mandatory child abuse reporting statute, implies a cause of action against a professional named in the statute who fails to report suspected abuse"); Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 167 P.3d 1193, 1201 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2007) ("it is reasonable to imply an intended remedy for child victims of sexual abuse when those required to report the abuse fail to do so").

That completes what we've found on failure-to-report claims under child abuse/elder abuse mandated reporting statutes. But that's not all that's out there for counsel tasked with debunking failure-to-report claims.

Various other statutes exist that require persons to report things to government entities. One that popped up fairly often recently is the federal Bank Secrecy Act, which requires that certain financial transactions be reported. This statute, being federal, is analogous in that respect to the FDCA. These banking cases are good place to look for favorable precedent rejecting alleged reporting violations of a federal statute when asserted as negligence per se, or otherwise actionable, under state law. "[I]t is now well settled that the anti-money-laundering obligations of banks, as established by the Bank Secrecy Act, obligate banks to report certain customer activity to the government but do not create a private cause of action permitting third parties to sue for violations of the statute." El Camino Resources, LTD. v. Huntington National Bank, 722 F. Supp. 2d 875, 923 (W.D. Mich. 2010), aff'd, 712 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying Michigan law). Accord, e.g., Belle Meade Title & Escrow Corp. v. Fifth Third Bank, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2017 WL 4837474, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2017) (applying Tennessee law); Towne Auto Sales, LLC v. Tobsal Corp., 2017 WL 5467012, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2017) (applying Ohio law); Lundstedt v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2016 WL 3101999, at *5 (D. Conn. June 2, 2016) (applying Connecticut law); Taylor & Co. v. Bank of America Corp., 2014 WL 3557672, at *3 (Mag. W.D.N.C. June 5, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL 3557679 (W.D.N.C. July 18, 2014) (applying North Carolina law); Shtutman v. TD Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 1464824, at *2 (D.N.J. April 15, 2014) (following child abuse reporting cases) (applying New Jersey law); Spitzer Management, Inc. v. Interactive Brokers, LLC, 2013 WL 6827945, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2013) (reporting duty "owed to the government of the United States," not to injured third parties) (applying Ohio law); Public Service Co. v. A Plus, Inc., 2011 WL 3329181, at *7-8 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2011) (applying Oklahoma law); In re Agape Litigation, 681 F. Supp.2d 352, 360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York law); Armstrong v. American Pallet Leasing, Inc., 678 F .Supp.2d 827, 874-75 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (applying Iowa law); Marlin v. Moody National Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 2382325, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (the "obligation under that statute is to the government rather than some remote victim"), aff'd, 248 F. Appx. 534 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Texas law); Aiken v. Interglobal Mergers & Acquisitions, 2006 WL 1878323, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2006) (applying New York law). Both Ohio and Tennessee state law thus reject failure to report under this federal statute as a basis for state-law liability, notwithstanding adverse precedent under state mandated reporting statutes.

Thus, the first takeaway from our look at state-law failure-to-report claims is that most states don't allow them. The second takeaway is that, if one is looking for state-law precedent to oppose the existence of failure-to-report claims, there are multiple, potentially fruitful avenues. Failure to report child (or elder) abuse cases are a good place to start, but there are lots of others, such as financial reporting statutes, the drivers license revocation cases litigated in Pennsylvania, and even requirements to report things such as drug diversion and bullying. If at first we don't succeed, we should keep looking.

This article is presented for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice.

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To Use Mondaq.com you must be: eighteen (18) years old or over; legally capable of entering into binding contracts; and not in any way prohibited by the applicable law to enter into these Terms in the jurisdiction which you are currently located.

You may use the Website as an unregistered user, however, you are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the Content or to receive the Services.

You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these Terms or with the prior written consent of Mondaq. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information from the Content. Nor shall you extract information about users or Contributors in order to offer them any services or products.

In your use of the Website and/or Services you shall: comply with all applicable laws, regulations, directives and legislations which apply to your Use of the Website and/or Services in whatever country you are physically located including without limitation any and all consumer law, export control laws and regulations; provide to us true, correct and accurate information and promptly inform us in the event that any information that you have provided to us changes or becomes inaccurate; notify Mondaq immediately of any circumstances where you have reason to believe that any Intellectual Property Rights or any other rights of any third party may have been infringed; co-operate with reasonable security or other checks or requests for information made by Mondaq from time to time; and at all times be fully liable for the breach of any of these Terms by a third party using your login details to access the Website and/or Services

however, you shall not: do anything likely to impair, interfere with or damage or cause harm or distress to any persons, or the network; do anything that will infringe any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights of Mondaq or any third party; or use the Website, Services and/or Content otherwise than in accordance with these Terms; use any trade marks or service marks of Mondaq or the Contributors, or do anything which may be seen to take unfair advantage of the reputation and goodwill of Mondaq or the Contributors, or the Website, Services and/or Content.

Mondaq reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to take any action that it deems necessary and appropriate in the event it considers that there is a breach or threatened breach of the Terms.

Mondaq’s Rights and Obligations

Unless otherwise expressly set out to the contrary, nothing in these Terms shall serve to transfer from Mondaq to you, any Intellectual Property Rights owned by and/or licensed to Mondaq and all rights, title and interest in and to such Intellectual Property Rights will remain exclusively with Mondaq and/or its licensors.

Mondaq shall use its reasonable endeavours to make the Website and Services available to you at all times, but we cannot guarantee an uninterrupted and fault free service.

Mondaq reserves the right to make changes to the services and/or the Website or part thereof, from time to time, and we may add, remove, modify and/or vary any elements of features and functionalities of the Website or the services.

Mondaq also reserves the right from time to time to monitor your Use of the Website and/or services.

Disclaimer

The Content is general information only. It is not intended to constitute legal advice or seek to be the complete and comprehensive statement of the law, nor is it intended to address your specific requirements or provide advice on which reliance should be placed. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the Content for any purpose. All Content provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers hereby exclude and disclaim all representations, warranties or guarantees with regard to the Content, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. To the maximum extent permitted by law, Mondaq expressly excludes all representations, warranties, obligations, and liabilities arising out of or in connection with all Content. In no event shall Mondaq and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use of the Content or performance of Mondaq’s Services.

General

Mondaq may alter or amend these Terms by amending them on the Website. By continuing to Use the Services and/or the Website after such amendment, you will be deemed to have accepted any amendment to these Terms.

These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and you irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these Terms. If you live outside the United Kingdom, English law shall apply only to the extent that English law shall not deprive you of any legal protection accorded in accordance with the law of the place where you are habitually resident ("Local Law"). In the event English law deprives you of any legal protection which is accorded to you under Local Law, then these terms shall be governed by Local Law and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with these Terms shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts where you are habitually resident.

You may print and keep a copy of these Terms, which form the entire agreement between you and Mondaq and supersede any other communications or advertising in respect of the Service and/or the Website.

No delay in exercising or non-exercise by you and/or Mondaq of any of its rights under or in connection with these Terms shall operate as a waiver or release of each of your or Mondaq’s right. Rather, any such waiver or release must be specifically granted in writing signed by the party granting it.

If any part of these Terms is held unenforceable, that part shall be enforced to the maximum extent permissible so as to give effect to the intent of the parties, and the Terms shall continue in full force and effect.

Mondaq shall not incur any liability to you on account of any loss or damage resulting from any delay or failure to perform all or any part of these Terms if such delay or failure is caused, in whole or in part, by events, occurrences, or causes beyond the control of Mondaq. Such events, occurrences or causes will include, without limitation, acts of God, strikes, lockouts, server and network failure, riots, acts of war, earthquakes, fire and explosions.

By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions