The United States Supreme Court issued a decision Tuesday in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries which holds that Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unequivocally provides for claims of retaliation to be brought by individuals claiming race and color discrimination. As a result, employers with any number of employees now are exposed to a longer statute of limitations period (4 years) during which a race or color retaliation (in addition to a discrimination) lawsuit may be filed as well as uncapped damages if an employee prevails in such a suit. Employees also can assert race or color retaliation claims in federal court without having to go through the EEOC using Section 1981.
Section 1981 provides that "any person within the jurisdiction of the United States" has equal rights to "make and enforce contracts, regardless of their skin color." Despite its seemingly rather narrow language, since the employment relationship itself is considered "contractual" in nature, Section 1981 has been interpreted over the years as applying to many aspects of this relationship. Retaliation, however, is not specifically referenced in Section 1981, with the focus of the statute, at least on its face, being the protection of employees from discrimination based upon race or color. Nevertheless, employees have attempted to bring retaliation claims under Section 1981, arguing that "retaliation" is just another form of conduct that "interferes with an individual's right to make and enforce contracts" - until now with mixed degrees of success. (Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling Tuesday, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals already had agreed with this argument and recognized a claim for retaliation under Section 1981.)
In the Humphries case decided Tuesday, the plaintiff/employee is an African-American who worked as an assistant manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant in Bradley, Illinois. He was terminated by his district manager following his complaints about the allegedly racially discriminatory actions of his general manager, including the wrongful termination of another African-American employee.
The resulting lawsuit alleged violations of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1981. The federal district court dismissed the Title VII claim on procedural grounds and the Section 1981 claim based upon Mr. Humphries' failure to establish a prima facie case. Mr. Humphries appealed this decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Section 1981 retaliation claim, concluding that "there can be no doubt that a retaliatory discharge is indeed a termination of the employment contract."
Following the employer's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, agreeing that Section 1981 does include claims for race or color retaliation. In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court closely examined case law interpreting Section 1982 (a companion statute to Section 1981) and its own decisions prior to the enactment of Title VII, which it found had recognized retaliation claims under Section 1981. The fact that these statutes might overlap in their coverage of certain claims not only did not concern the Supreme Court but was deemed "necessary" and "clearly intended by Congress". The fact that so many of the federal Courts of Appeals already recognized retaliation claims under Section 1981 also weighed heavily in favor of the Supreme Court's similar recognition in the Humphries decision.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
