United States: Stadia Mania: The Business, Civic, And Legal Issues Of New Stadium Construction

By John R. Middleton, Jr., Esq., Scott L. Walker, Esq., and Matthew Savare, Esq.

Reprinted with permission of The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Vol. 16, Nos. 2 And 3

The New Economics Of Sports And The Boom Of New Sports Facilities

When the National Hockey League’s ("NHL’s") New Jersey Devils took the ice in their state-of-the-art $365 million Prudential Center in downtown Newark, New Jersey in October 2007, they became the sixty-fifth and most recent franchise in the United States’ four "major" professional sports (i.e., football, baseball, basketball, and hockey) to open a new or substantially renovated facility since 1996. At least thirteen other teams have begun construction on or announced plans to build their own new facilities that are scheduled to open by 2012. While new stadia have been and continue to be introduced in markets throughout the United States, this "stadium boom" is particularly evident in the New York metropolitan area, where in addition to the Prudential Center, major league franchises have recently undertaken no fewer than five significant development projects: next April both the Yankees and Mets are scheduled to begin play in ultramodern, yet classically-inspired new stadia; in 2010 the soon-to-be Brooklyn Nets plan to open their Frank Gehry-designed Barclays Center, the anchor of the $3.5 billion Atlantic Yards development project; the Red Bulls of Major League Soccer ("MLS") have broken ground on a 25,000 seat soccer-specific stadium in Harrison, New Jersey; and the NFL’s Jets and Giants have jointly begun work on a new $1.3 billion New Jersey stadium that will feature as its centerpiece a 40 x 400 feet video "frieze" of panels visible through an eight-level louvered exterior.

Several key factors have driven the recent spate of professional sports facility construction. Most importantly, player salaries and other costs continue to rise exponentially. This economic reality has fueled franchise owners’ pursuit of new buildings that—with their modern fan amenities, licensing and sponsorship opportunities, and luxury suites and other premium seating—provide substantial additional revenue streams frequently absent from older facilities. Owners claim that these revenue sources are necessary for them to compete and survive economically in today’s sports business environment. Furthermore, while some observers remain dubious, owners and other supporters of these projects have in many cases successfully convinced government officials, potential investors, and key community leaders that new stadia—particularly those built in urban centers—generate additional economic activity, create new jobs, and encourage commercial and residential development in the surrounding area.¹ Owners have also skillfully leveraged many cities’ desire to have professional sports teams—and to enjoy the perceived related prestige, prominence, and enhanced reputation—to obtain "sweetheart" stadia deals by threatening to relocate, or, in some cases, in fact departing one market for another city offering a better stadium arrangement.

The process of securing approval and funding for these stadium projects, as well as the acquisition of the necessary land, management of the construction itself, and maximization of revenue from the new facilities raise myriad economic, political, and legal issues. In part one of this article, we will briefly discuss two of the most prominent of these: (1) public financing of new stadia and (2) the use of eminent domain to acquire all or part of the proposed stadium site at a lower price than might otherwise be paid in a free-market transaction. Part two of this article, to be published in the next issue of the Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, will address two strategies available to franchise owners seeking to capitalize on the financial opportunities that new stadia offer: the sale of naming rights to new facilities and the introduction of suites and other high-end seating targeted to new and existing corporate clientele.

Facility Financing: A Public-Private Partnership

Notwithstanding the significant expansion in the number of major league sports franchises over the past two decades, demand for professional teams in metropolitan areas continues to exceed the supply.² Due to this relative scarcity, a fierce bidding war continuously rages among cities to secure or retain a professional franchise.³ Frequently, teams are enticed to move or remain in a particular city through large public subsidies, such as extravagant new stadia built at the taxpayers’ expense and leased at low or no rent; tax holidays; and generous concession, parking, and luxury box rights.⁴ Indeed, as a final inducement, many cities pay huge "signing bonuses" to the teams in the form of direct payments.

For example, the proposed financing plan for the Mets’ new stadium included the following terms, many of which are common in new stadium and arena deals:

1. The project will be subsidized by granting the Mets access to tax exempt bond financing, which will save the team approximately $105 million over the next forty years.⁵
2. New York City will invest $105 million for infrastructure and capital improvements, including site preparation, demolition of Shea Stadium, and the paving of parking lots. Like most public projects, the city will raise this money by issuing bonds and paying the principal and interest with general city revenues.
3. The State of New York will contribute $70 million for infrastructure.
4. The new stadium will be exempt from the city’s property tax.
5. The stadium will be exempt from city, state, and Metropolitan Transportation Authority sales tax on purchases of construction material, fixtures, and equipment.
6. The city will forgo a portion of the stadium’s parking revenue.
7. The Mets will receive increased rent credits.
8. The city and the state will both make direct "capital replacement" payments into a reserve fund for the stadium.
9. The city has granted the Mets a mortgage-recording tax exemption.
10. Finally, the Mets will pay no rent for the use of the new stadium, although the team will pay for its maintenance. Given the dilapidated status of the current stadium and the obligation of the city to pay for its upkeep, the city projects that it will save $31 million under this new arrangement. ⁶

In total, the direct subsidies, exemptions, and bond financing will save the Mets approximately $276 million, while costing New York City $155 million in lost revenue and the State of New York $89 million.⁷ The Yankees received a very similar financial package from the city and the state, with the team receiving $276 million in benefits over a thirty-year period, at a cost to the city and state of $170 million and $85 million, respectively.⁸

This Land Is My Land; This Land Was Your Land: Eminent Domain

In addition to the various incentives noted above, the government’s power of "eminent domain" is a tool often used by the public-private partnerships formed to develop new stadia and arenas. That power—if successfully exercised—usually involves a government condemnation of privately-owned land in order to allow that land to be developed for a "public use," so long as the private owner receives "just compensation" from the government.⁹ At a minimum, the exercise of the power of eminent domain allows stadium construction to occur on privately-owned land that would otherwise likely be unavailable for development for such a project. Moreover, eminent domain can significantly reduce the project costs borne by the team by allowing developers to secure necessary land at a lower price than might otherwise be paid on the open market.¹⁰

Perhaps the most famous example of a government’s successfully exercising this power for the benefit of a sports franchise occurred in 1957 when the City of Los Angeles condemned 300 acres of prime real estate in Chavez Ravine in order to lure the Brooklyn Dodgers out of New York. The most recent example of the use of eminent domain to benefit a New York metropolitan sports team¹¹ involves the New Jersey Nets, who are currently embroiled in a bitter contest with Brooklyn residents related to the team’s efforts to build the Barclays Center. The Nets case provides a good example of how courts analyze—or at least should analyze—a government taking related to the construction of a sports arena.

Although there are multiple litigations that relate to the Nets’ project, it is the case now on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that most squarely addresses the government’s eminent domain power.¹² In the trial court, United States District Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis dismissed the challenge brought by plaintiffs—all of whom own or rent land in the area condemned by the government— finding that the project met the public use requirement. In reaching his decision, Judge Garaufis noted that, under the relevant precedent, "a taking fails the public use requirement if and only if the uses offered to justify it are ‘palpably without reasonable foundation,". . . such as if (1) the ‘sole purpose’ of the taking is to transfer property to a private party."¹³ Applying that standard to the proposed Atlantic Yards development, the court found that plaintiffs’ challenge failed because their complaints "when examined carefully, concern only the measure of a public benefit – as opposed to its existence."¹⁴ And on this point, the judge stressed—relative to the Nets and the Barclays Center in particular—that plaintiffs failed to "allege that having a professional team in Brooklyn is not in itself a benefit to the public."¹⁵ Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ notion that the government’s offered public uses are "mere pretexts" for a desire to "bestow a private benefit" on the development corporation, noting that plaintiffs’ allegations were implausible given their concession that the "[p]roject will create large quantities of housing and office space, as well as a sports arena, in an area that is mostly blighted."¹⁶ In sum, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge because of the project’s acknowledged benefits to the public. Other public-private partnerships contemplating development of a new stadium should take heed of the benefits discussed in Judge Garaufis’ decision as they plan their projects.

The current wave of stadium construction shows little sign of waning. The financial bonanza that new facilities promise and the inevitable rise in player salaries and other costs ensure that owners of sports franchises will continue to pursue more modern and more lucrative new stadia. And the limited number of major league teams in the United States strongly suggests that there will almost always be some city whose government and civic officials are prepared to subsidize new stadium development projects at substantial public cost in order to retain an existing team or lure a new one. In part two of this article, we will briefly examine two important ways that the franchise owners who most directly profit from new stadium projects reap the economic benefits made possible by the current stadia mania.

Cashing In: Economic Benefits Of New Sports Facilities

Above, we briefly examined two of the most prominent issues related to the successful completion of new sports facilities projects: public financing of new stadia; and the use of eminent domain to acquire all or part of the proposed stadium site at a lower price than might otherwise be paid in a free-market transaction. We now turn our attention to two important ways that sports franchise owners exploit their teams’ new stadia and arenas to maximize the additional revenue: the sale of naming rights to new facilities and the introduction of suites and other high-end seating typically targeted to new and existing corporate clientele.

The (Lucrative) Name Game: Naming Rights Deals

While there often appears to be no limit to sports marketers’ ability to create new sponsorship opportunities, one of the most important first steps is the sale of naming rights for the new stadium, which frequently occurs before the facility is actually built.

In 1991, only five professional teams in the major American sports played in facilities with a naming rights deal, and the average annual price tag for such sponsorship was less than $1.25 million.¹⁷ By 2005, the number of such deals had skyrocketed, with 63% of Major League Baseball ("MLB") teams, 83% of National Basketball Association ("NBA") teams, 58% of National Football League ("NFL") teams, and 90% of National Hockey League ("NHL") teams playing in facilities with naming sponsors.¹⁸ In 2006 alone, thirteen naming rights deals were negotiated among the MLB, the NFL, the NBA, the NHL, and Major League Soccer ("MLS"), totaling more than $4.5 billion.¹⁹

Several factors have contributed to this meteoric rise in the number and size of these deals. For sponsors, entering into long-term sponsorships of sports facilities—particularly new stadia or arenas—enables them to build an immediate and sustainable awareness of their brands.²⁰ In addition, unlike the naming deals from years ago—which consisted primarily of the sponsor’s associating its corporate name with the facility—more recent transactions contemplate a wider array of sponsor benefits. Although deals vary based on a number of factors,²¹ such additional benefits often include advertising time during telecasts, signage both inside and outside the facility, luxury suites, tickets to events, and preferred parking.²² For teams and facility owners,²³ the primary benefit is self-evident: money, and lots of it.

Recent deals struck by several teams in the greater New York metropolitan market are a microcosm of this trend. For example, in November 2006, in the most lucrative naming deal in the history of professional sports, Citigroup invested $20 million per year over a twenty-year period—with an option to extend the contract an additional fifteen years—to name the Mets’ new stadium Citi Field.²⁴ The deal also includes the right for Citi to place its brand throughout the new park, use the Mets’ logos, advertise on the Mets’ cable network, and jointly develop business opportunities with the club boasting the third-highest revenues in all of baseball behind the Yankees and the Red Sox.²⁵ Similarly, in January 2007, the Nets reached a twenty-year, $400 million naming rights contract with Barclays Bank for the team’s planned arena in Brooklyn, while Prudential Financial agreed to pay $105.3 million over twenty years for the right to name the Devils’ new Newark arena the Prudential Center.²⁶

Thus, in a span of less than three months, three New York area teams from different sports generated almost $1 billion in sponsorship fees.²⁷ Such astronomical numbers can be attributed not only to the location of the facilities, but also to the pent-up demand for such agreements. Indeed, prior to this string of deals, the last naming rights agreement in the New York area had been in 1996 when Continental Airlines put its name on the former Brendan Byrne Arena in New Jersey’s Meadowlands sports complex.²⁸

The prospects for future naming deals look even brighter in the New York area. Many believe that the planned 82,500 seat stadium at the Meadowlands for the Giants and the Jets will garner the most lucrative naming rights deal ever.²⁹ Given the Giants’ improbable victory in Super Bowl XLII; the immense popularity of the NFL and of the two teams; the size, location and planned cutting-edge technology and amenities of the new stadium; and the opportunity for the sponsor to showcase its name at least sixteen days each year on national television, it is very likely that the deal will be extremely lucrative.³⁰ Similarly, although the Yankees do not plan (at this time) on renaming their new $800 million palace—as the Yankee Stadium moniker is as sacrosanct as names can be in sports—they do plan on selling naming rights for each gate at the stadium.³¹ In light of the history, popularity, and importance of the New York Yankees, these mini naming rights deals should prove very profitable as well.

Hanging With The High Rollers: Luxury Boxes, Premium Seating, And PSL’s

Sports franchise owners seeking public support and financing for new stadia and arenas frequently assert that their current facilities are "outdated." However, those facilities rarely are no longer safe or functional, but instead simply lack any (or enough of) the luxury boxes and other premium seating that generate substantial revenue from corporate customers willing to pay top dollar in order to wine and dine their own clients and associates or reward employees.

Luxury suites at professional sports facilities typically cost more than $100,000-$300,000 per year to rent, and boast amenities and services unavailable to the typical fan. For example, at the newly-opened Prudential Center in Newark, each of the 79 luxury suites features high-end food and liquor, touch-screen ordering, multiple flatpanel televisions, Wi-Fi internet access, plush seating, and granite countertops. The suites offer side-view locations with exceptional sightlines to game action, and three rows of open seating. Patrons with luxury suite tickets also have access to a private entrance, VIP parking, and a full-service concierge staff.

Similarly, one of the biggest reasons behind the Yankees’ decision to demolish the "House that Ruth Built," and move across the street to their new ballpark late this year, is the opportunity a new stadium presents for introducing a wide range of high-end services and seating that the original facility entirely lacked. For example, the new Yankee Stadium will boast 51 luxury suites, two large outdoor suites, and eight party suites with seating for up to 410 people in total; a conference area with video conferencing; party suites; a members-only restaurant; a martini bar; and a concierge available to procure theater tickets or restaurant reservations for corporate patrons. As Yankees’ chief operating officer Lonn Trost flatly admits, "We tried to reflect a five-star hotel and put a ballfield in the middle."³²

Club seating sections are a second level of premium seating that are typically substantially less expensive than luxury suites, generally costing less than $10,000 per year. Unlike suites, which are usually confined to a separate area of the stadium or arena to which other fans have no access, club seating is usually located in special sections among the general seating areas in the facility. However, club seating sections typically feature wait service, a broader menu of higher-quality food and beverages, video screens, wider seating and aisles, and prime locations. The amount of revenue generated from these offerings can be astounding. For example, in the 2003 season, the Washington Redskins’ revenue from their 2,500 club seats was $33 million.³³ And the Minnesota Twins hope to generate $20-30 million per season from premium seating in their new open-air stadium due to open in 2010.³⁴

In certain instances, sports franchise owners have required fans and corporations to pay a one-time up-front fee for a Personal Seat License ("PSL") granting them the right to purchase season tickets in a new facility. The Carolina Panthers became the first U.S. professional sports team to require PSL’s when it entered the NFL as an expansion team in 1993. Since then, a number of franchises have used PSL’s to help defray costs of new stadia, particularly where no direct public funding was available. Most prominently, the St. Louis Cardinals raised approximately $40 million by selling lifetime PSL’s for 10,500 of the best seats in the new Busch Stadium, which opened in 2006, and the San Francisco Giants raised $50-60 million through the sale of 15,000 PSL’s for seats in their new ballpark when it opened in 2000.³⁵ However, the use of PSL’s is somewhat controversial, since long-time season ticket holders may resent having to pay an additional one-time "user fee" to have the right to renew their seats. Also, government officials may not react favorably where a team owner seeks to introduce PSL’s at a new facility that has also received substantial public funding. These are two key reasons why neither the New York Mets nor Yankees plan to require the purchase of PSL’s for their new stadia, even though it is conservatively estimated that by doing so each team could raise more than the Cardinals’ $40 million. As David Howard, the Mets’ executive vice president of business operations told Bloomberg, "We had a visceral feeling it would not be well received by our fan base, which was confirmed by our market research."³⁶

The business, civic, and legal issues surrounding the construction of new stadia and arenas are diverse and complicated, requiring experts in disciplines ranging from site planning and construction to intellectual property and lobbying. However, despite such complexities and the long lead times, inevitable cost overruns, and frequent lawsuits associated with such projects, the financial, economic, and social benefits emanating from new sports facilities will continue to be championed as the current wave of construction continues.

Footnotes

1. Notably, however, many observers who have analyzed the issue are highly skeptical of this argument. See, e.g., NEIL DEMAUSE AND JOANNA CAGAN, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT (REVISED AND EXPANDED) (University of Nebraska Press, 2008); Andrew Zimbalist and Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the Cost? THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Summer 1997 available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1997/summer _taxes_noll .aspx?p=1 (last visited January 9, 2008).

2. An examination of the antitrust issues raised by the conduct of these sports leagues—whether under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, or various other relevant federal and state statutes—is beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that many critics charge that the leagues abuse their inherent monopoly power by unnecessarily and unfairly keeping the number of franchises low, thus increasing the competition among cities for sports teams.

3. As noted above, some of the reasons cited to justify public expenditures for new stadia include job creation, increased tax revenue, enhanced economic activity, and quality of life benefits. Jordan Rappaport and Chad Wilerson, What are the Benefits of Hosting a Major League Sports Franchise? Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (First Quarter 2001).

4. PAUL C.WEILER AND GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 530, 542 (West Group 1998).

5. Because the interest income from tax exempt bonds is not subject to state or federal income tax, investors are willing to accept a lower rate of interest, which in turn lowers the project financing costs for the team. However, in granting this subsidy, the state and federal government lose tax revenue. George Sweeting, Financing Plan for the Proposed Stadium for the Mets (Revised), The City of New York Independent Budget Office (April 21, 2006).

6. Id.

7. Id.

8. Testimony of Ronnie Lowenstein Before the City Council Finance Committee on Financing Plans for the New Yankee Stadium (April 10, 2006).

9. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders I, 32 Cal.3d 60 (1982) (citing to requirement that an eminent domain condemnation be for a "public use" with "just compensation."). These requirements are embodied in the constitutions of most states and in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Typically, of course, governments use their power of eminent domain in relation to real property and for the purpose of trying to retain or attract sports franchises. But there have been attempts to use it to condemn property other than real estate in order to prevent a team from moving. For example, the City of Oakland attempted—albeit unsuccessfully—to condemn and operate the Raiders football franchise to prevent the team from leaving town. Note, however, that the California Supreme Court initially found that neither the state nor federal constitutions precluded the City of Oakland from condemning and operating the team. See Oakland Raiders I, 32 Cal.3d 60. But on remand, a lower Court rejected the proposed taking on the grounds that such action would impermissibly burden interstate commerce. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, II, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1985).

10. For instance, a municipality can condemn land and then lease the land to the team, thereby eliminating the need for the team to buy-off the land owners. This is what Springfield, Massachusetts recently tried to do for a minor league baseball team—albeit unsuccessfully in that case. See Citizens of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., 2000 Mass. Super LEXIS 131 (Mass. Super Ct., Feb. 25 2000). 11. New Jersey’s most prominent sports facility was the product of a quasi-eminent domain action in which the state passed a statute that enabled the development of the Meadowlands sports complex. See New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580 (NJ Superior Ct. 1971), aff’d in pertinent part, 292 A.2d 545 (NJ 1972).

12. In addition to the case in federal court, there have been several other legal challenges to the Nets project. See Nicholas Confessore, Judge Rejects Main Argument of Effort to Stop Atlantic Yards Project in Brooklyn, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 7, 2007 (detailing decision in Federal court and making reference to several other court challenges to the project), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/nyregion /07yards.html?scp=3&sq=nets+arena+environmental+impact+Brooklyn (last visited January 9, 2008). Most notable among those other cases is the litigation challenging the environmental impact statement that relates to the project. On January 11, 2008 the New York State court hearing the matter dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge, thereby further clearing the way for the project to move forward. See Judge Dismisses Brooklyn Arena Foes’ Petition, Associated Press, Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/brooklyn/2008/01/11/2008-01-11_judge_dismisses_brooklyn_arena _foes_peti.html (last visited January 11, 2008)

13. Goldstein v. Pataki, Docket No. 06-cv-5827, at 56 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2007) (citations omitted), available at http://www.dddb.net/documents/legal/eminentdomain/motiontodismiss/court/GaraufisOrder12b6.pdf (last visited January 12, 2008).

14. Id. at 57.

15. Id. at 59.

16. Id. at 64.

17. Maidie Oliveau, What’s in a Name? (Or, Why Pay Millions to Name a Building), ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAWYER, Volume 23, Number 1, Spring 2005, at 29.

18. Id.

19. Howard Bloom, Location, Location, Location – the sports naming rights bar is raised again thanks to the Big Apple, SPORTS BUSINESS NEWS, January 22, 2007, available at http://sportsbiznews.blogspot.com/2007/01/location-location-location-sports.html (last visited January 6, 2008).

20. Elise Neils, Brand Value Plays a Role in Stadium Naming Rights, ABSOLUTE BRAND, August 11, 2002, available at http://www.absolutebrand.com/RESEARCH/Default.asp?dismode=article&artid=115 (last visited January 6, 2008).

21. The benefits afforded to sponsors obviously depend upon the value of the naming rights deal. There are a host of factors impacting how much a sponsor is willing to invest, including: the team’s record and attendance, the facility’s location, the audience’s financial demographic, and the popularity of the sport. Id.

22. Jeffrey B. Gewirtz, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industries, The Sports Revenue Game: Latest Developments in Media, Sponsorship, and Licensing, (October 13, 2007).

23. Teams and facilities are not always under common ownership, which complicates the nature and scope of these transactions.

24. Bloom, supra, note 6.

25. Ben Klayman, Stadium Naming Rights Deals Make Rebound, COMMERCIAL ALERT, November 24, 2006, available at http://www.commercialalert.org/news/archive/2006/11/stadium-naming-rights-deals-makerebound (last visited January 6, 2008).

26. Bloom, supra, note 6.

27. Id.

28. Kurt Badenhausen, Mets Break The Bank, FORBES, November 14, 2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/14/baseball-mets-citigroup-biz_cz_kb_1114naming.html (last visited January 6, 2008). On October 11, 2007, the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority ("NJSEA") announced that it had selected IZOD as its new naming rights partner for the Meadowlands arena. The deal, which is a five-year commitment, was in place in time for the New Jersey Nets to open their season against the Chicago Bulls in the newly-named IZOD Center. NJSEA, Press Release, IZOD Selected as Arena Naming Rights Partner - Arena to be Named IZOD Center, available at http://www.izodcenter.com/ (last visited February 10, 2008).

29. Janet Frankston Lorin, Prices of Stadium Name Sponsorships Soar: Stadium Naming Rights Deals Grow Pricier; New Giants, Jets Stadium Could Set Record, NEWSWEEK, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/109778/page/1 (February 10, 2008).

30. Id.

31. Bloom, supra, note 6.

32. Associated Press, Martini Bar, Other Amenities Help Drive Cost of Yanks' New Home to $1.3B, February 8, 2008, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3235847 (last visited February 10, 2008).

33. Adam Brenner, Welcome to the Club, FORBES, September 2, 2004, available at http://www.forbes.com/2004/09/02/cz_ab_0902nflclubseats.html (last visited February 8, 2008).

34. John Vomhof Jr., Ballpark Suites Going Fast to Minnesota Companies, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUSINESS JOURNAL, February 1, 2008, available at ttp://twincities.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2008/02/04/story2.html (last visited February 8, 2008).

35. Danielle Sessa, Yankees, Mets Won't Sell Seat Licenses; Stadium Funds in Place, May 11, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601079&refer=home&sid=afsBin7aRTDA (last visited February 11, 2008).

36. Id.

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