Addressing the issue of whether a district court erred in finding an appellant in contempt for violating an injunction that prohibited infringement of the plaintiff’s patent and in the same order dissolved the injunction based on newly raised claims of the patent’s invalidity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal of the contempt ruling for lack of jurisdiction and held that the district court properly dissolved the injunction. Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., Case No. 06-1374 (Fed. Cir., June 13, 2007)(Moore, J.).
Entegris, now d.b.a. Mykrolis, initially brought suit against Pall alleging infringement of two patents related to liquid filters used in the semiconductor industry. The district court granted Mykrolis’ motion for a preliminary injunction, but Pall then commenced selling a modified version of the filter. After subsequent motions by the parties, the district court held Pall in contempt for violating the junction but, in the same order, dissolved the injunction based, in part on a newly raised invalidity challenge to the asserted patents.
On appeal, Pall argued that the district court’s finding of contempt was improper and that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over its appeal of the contempt order as an interlocutory appeal under §1292(a). The Federal Circuit, citing Supreme Court precedent, narrowly construed §1292(a), stating that the contempt order Pall appealed did not grant, continue, modify, refuse or deny an injunction, nor did it refuse to dissolve or modify an injunction. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court expressly indicated that it was not modifying the original injunction when it found that Pall’s sales were a violation. Because the contempt order was only an interpretation of the preliminary injunction and not a "modification" of the injunction within the meaning of §1292(a), the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court explained that the contempt order cannot be characterized as "continuing" the preliminary injunction within the meaning of §1292, because it did not prolong, extend, or in any other way impact its duration. As the contempt order did not fall into any of the enumerated categories of appealable interlocutory orders under §1292(a), and because Pall did not sufficiently allege that it would face "irreparable consequence" if it was unable to appeal the contempt order at this time, the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over Pall’s appeal.
The Federal Circuit also held that it did not have jurisdiction over Pall’s appeal under the final judgment statute, §1295(a). Under §1295(a), parties may only appeal final decisions of a district court, defined by the Supreme Court as a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Although Pall argued that the contempt order was final within the meaning of §1295(a), because a fine had been assessed against it that must be paid immediately, the Federal Circuit rejected the notion that a civil contempt order is final. Rather, the Court reasoned that the district court order holding Pall in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction did not end the litigation on the merits as it remained pending. Thus, the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over Pall’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1295(a).
Lastly, the Court addressed Pall’s argument that it may properly exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over its appeal of the contempt order because it has jurisdiction over Mykrolis’ cross-appeal of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. However, the Court stated that exercising pendent jurisdiction is not appropriate because the contempt order was not "inextricably intertwined" with the remaining appealed issues.
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