United States: Patent Law and the Supreme Court: Patent Certiorari Petitions Denied in 2016

WilmerHale compiles lists of certiorari petitions that raise patent-law issues. This page contains a consolidated list of all recently denied petitions, organized in reverse chronological order by date of certiorari petition. 

Taş v. Beachy,  No. 15-1089

Questions Presented:

Concerning a patent application claiming a new drug treatment of tumor-bearing human that produces a specific effect in the tumor cells and shrinkage or disappearance of the tumor, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decided that the statement of a paragraph copied from patent disclosures of others about uses of different compounds provides written description despite no evidence in the specification of the application for the claimed treatment and despite express teaching against the claimed effect on the basis of the described findings that teach also against the claimed therapeutic results. PTAB held that stating a disease as being treatable by administering a drug compound without evidence for the treatment and without specifying the conditions under which the claimed therapeutic results can be produced can satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1. On appeal Federal Circuit held that PTAB correctly decided.

The question presented is:

Is not a patent claiming a new drug treatment required to provide evidence for that treatment, and is not a drug treatment patent without evidence of it at discord with the requirement of factual evidence for a proposed new drug treatment under 21 U.S.C. § 355 for its approval and with the required supplying of patent information about it by 21 U.S.C. § 355 and also impediment to the development of the new drug treatments prescribed by the statute?

Cert. petition filed 2/25/16, waiver of respondent Philip A. Beachy, et al. filed 3/11/16, conference 4/15/16. Petition denied 4/18/16.

CAFC Opinion, No CAFC Argument

Hemopet v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc.,  No. 15-1062

Questions Presented:

Section 101 of Title 35 defines patentable subject matter to include "any new and useful process . . . or any new and useful improvement thereof."  Other provisions of Title 35 set forth specific conditions and requirements for the issuance of the patent itself, including that the description in the patent be sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains" to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The invention at issue in this case is a novel method for identifying, formulating, and producing pet food tailored to the genomic characteristics and gene expression of individual dogs and cats.

The questions presented are:

  1. Is an invented method of producing a new class of products patent-eligible under § 101 where it applies a groundbreaking insight of the inventor by using techniques in a novel and previously unknown combination to produce a previously unknown result?
  2. Whether the courts below erroneously conflated the patent-eligibility requirements of § 101 with the "enablement" requirements of § 112(a), thereby avoiding the more detailed analysis required under § 112 and denying overall patent eligibility on grounds not consistent with § 101 or this Court's precedents?

Cert. petition filed 2/18/16, waiver of respondent Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc. filed 2/25/16, conference 4/15/16. Petition denied 4/18/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. , No. 15-993

Question Presented:

In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), this Court noted that, under existing Federal Circuit law, "a method's steps have not all been performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant, either because the defendant actually performed those steps or because he directed or controlled others who performed them." Id. at 2117. This Court then held that, on the assumption that rule was correct, "there has simply been no infringement of the method [at issue in this case], because the performance of all the patent's steps is not attributable to any one person." Id.

After remand, the en banc Federal Circuit reiterated that "[d]irect infringement under § 271(a) occurs where all steps of a claimed method are performed by or attributable to a single entity." App. 25a.  But it nevertheless unanimously held that Limelight could be held liable for direct infringement of Akamai's method patent—despite this Court's prior holding and even though nine out of the ten en banc court judges had previously held that Limelight could not be held liable under that rule. In so ruling, the Federal Circuit adopted a patent-specific conduct-attribution rule divorced from traditional vicarious-liability standards.

The question presented is:

Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for directly infringing a method patent based on the collective performance of method steps by multiple independent parties, even though the performance of all the steps of the method patent is "not attributable to any one person" under traditional vicarious-liability standards. Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117.

Cert. petition filed 1/26/16, conference 4/15/16. Petition denied 4/18/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

WilmerHale represents respondents Akamai Technologies, Inc. et al.

MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC v. State of Vermont , No. 15-988

Question Presented:

Whether, pursuant to this Court's precedent in Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) this case should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Conditional cross-petition filed 1/29/16, conference 4/15/16. Petition denied 4/18/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

State of Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, No. 15-838

Question Presented:

In the America Invents Act, Congress amended the jurisdictional statutes relating to patent cases in response to this Court's decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). In Holmes Group, the Court held that a defendant's compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement did not establish "arising under" jurisdiction for purposes of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295. The America Invents Act amended § 1295(a) to provide Federal Circuit jurisdiction over an appeal from a final decision of a district court "in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents." Here, the Federal Circuit considered whether § 1295(a) afforded jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order remanding this consumer-protection case to state court for the second time. The Federal Circuit interpreted § 1295(a) to provide jurisdiction based solely on a "counterclaim" that asserts federal preemption as a defense to the State's claim. The Federal Circuit reached—and wrongly decided—this jurisdictional issue despite holding that there were no grounds for the defendant's second removal to federal court. The question presented is:

Did the Federal Circuit erroneously take jurisdiction over this appeal of the remand order?

Cert. petition filed 12/28/15, conference 4/15/16. Petition denied 4/18/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Retirement Capital Access Management Co. LLC v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 15-591

Questions Presented:

In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (hereinafter "AIA" or "the Act"), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The Act created three new post-grant administrative proceedings for challenging the validity of patents. It also created within the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") a new tribunal called the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (hereinafter the "Board") to preside over these new proceedings. One of the newly created proceedings is the transitional post-grant review, also known as "covered business method" or "CBM" review, for patents directed to a financial product or service. The AIA limits the Board's jurisdiction with respect to CBM review to challenges based on any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). Paragraph 2 provides that a party may seek to invalidate a patent or claim on any ground specified in part II of Title 35 as a condition for patentability.

The questions presented arise from the Federal Circuit affirming, without comment, the Board's holding that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a ground specified in part II of Title 35 as a condition for patentability and therefore constitutes a proper basis for review in a CBM proceeding, and from the Federal Circuit affirming the Board's application of § 101 to the patent claims at issue. They are:

1. Whether subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a ground specified as a condition for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2).

2. Whether the Board errs when it invalidates issued patent claims posing no risk of preemption under the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility.

Cert. petition filed 11/5/15, conference 4/1/16. Petition denied 4/5/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Lee, No. 15-652

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the Patent and Trademark Office could properly rely on the limitations period for judicial review in denying administrative review to correct its own acknowledged errors, resulting in the loss of rights guaranteed by Congress.

2. Whether the limitations period for judicial review of the Patent and Trademark Office's final agency action is the six-year period made generally applicable by the Administrative Procedure Act, or a 180-day period that Congress established for review of an interim decision..

Cert. petition filed 11/13/15, conference 3/25/16. Petition denied 3/28/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

ParkerVision Inc. v. Qualcomm Incorporated,  No. 15-1092

Question Presented:

Whether and under what circumstances an inconsistency in expert testimony permits a court to set aside a jury verdict and grant the losing party judgment as a matter of law.

Cert. petition filed 2/29/16, waiver of respondent Qualcomm Incorporated filed 3/8/16, conference 3/25/16. Petition denied 3/28/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research, No. 15-607

Question Presented:

Whether the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), eliminated federal district courts' jurisdiction over patent interference actions under 35 U.S.C. § 146.

Cert. petition filed 11/9/15, conference 3/18/16. Petition denied 3/21/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

WilmerHale represents respondents Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research

Morales v. Square, Inc., No. 15-896

Questions Presented:

Whether, The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires judges to recuse themselves not only when actual bias has been demonstrated or when the judges have an economic interest in the outcome of the case, but also when extreme facts create a probability of bias, or create a probability of incompetence to rule.

Whether, The patent claim in this case should be used to constrain the freedom of interpretation of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. [v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)], to find a claim to be invalid under §101.

Cert. petition filed 12/11/15, conference 3/18/16. Petition denied 3/21/16.

CAFC Opinion, No CAFC Argument

Joao Bock Transaction Systems, LLC v. Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. , No. 15-974

Questions Presented:

  1. Did the District Court and Federal Circuit err by not identifying any abstract idea to which the claims-in-suit were directed, thereby misapplying step one of the Mayo/Alice test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
  2. Did the District Court and Federal Circuit err by failing to consider the components recited in the claims-in-suit as an ordered combination, thereby misapplying step two of the Mayo/Alice test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
  3. Did the District Court and Federal Circuit err by ignoring unrebutted evidence that the elements of the claims-in-suit recited specific components that, when viewed in combination at the time of the application, comprised a non-conventional solution to a problem created by internet banking, thereby misapplying steps one and two of the Mayo/Alice test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
  4. Did the District Court and Federal Circuit err by ignoring unrebutted evidence that the inventions of the claims-in-suit do not monopolize any abstract idea, thereby undermining the fundamental premise of the Mayo/Alice test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101?

Cert. petition filed 1/11/16, waiver of respondent Jack Henry & Associates filed 2/22/16, conference 3/18/16. Petition denied 3/21/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Briartek IP, Inc. v. Delorme Pub. Co. Inc.,  No. 15-1025

Question Presented:

Congress has empowered three different entities to resolve patent disputes: the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts. Although all three venues are open to a party ab initio, proceedings before a given venue may limit a party's options throughout all three bodies.  Critically, ITC investigations are often resolved through the entry of consent orders that limit how a party may challenge a patent's validity going forward.

The question presented is as follows:

Whether a binding consent order, entered between the federal government, the ITC, and an ITC respondent, deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, seeking to invalidate the patent at issue, filed by the ITC respondent not against the ITC but rather against the patent holder: a non-party to the consent order.

Cert. petition filed 2/10/16, waiver of respondent DeLorme Publishing Company, Inc. filed 2/17/16, conference 3/18/16. Petition denied 3/21/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Universal Lighting Technologies, Inc. v. Lighting Ballast Control LLC, No. 15-893

Question Presented:

This petition presents the following important and unsettled question of federal patent law on the rules governing construction of patent claims:

When and how can expert testimony or other extrinsic evidence be used to avoid the construction of a patent claim otherwise dictated by the patent's intrinsic record, including in particular to avoid the restrictions imposed by 35 U.S.C. §112 ¶ 6 on functional claiming?

Cert. petition filed 1/11/16, waiver of respondent Lighting Ballast Control LLC filed 1/13/16, conference 2/19/16. Petition denied 2/29/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Alexsam, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., No. 15-736

Questions Presented:

1. Did the Federal Circuit err by considering patent claims over which it had no subject matter jurisdiction?

2. Did the Federal Circuit err by misconstruing the 5th Circuit's standard of review for appeals of a Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL), and, as a result, improperly assumed the role of fact finder and overturned a jury verdict of no anticipation?

Cert. petition filed 12/7/15, conference 2/19/16. Petition denied 2/29/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Media Rights Technologies, Inc. v. Capital One Financial Corp., No. 15-725

Question Presented:

Whether, in accord with the statutory language, historical interpretation, congressional affirmation, and general claim construction principles, there is a strong presumption against construing as subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph 6 claims that do not recite "means"?

Cert. petition filed 12/3/15, waiver of respondents Capital One Financial Corporation, et al. filed 12/29/15, conference 2/19/16. Petition denied 2/29/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 15-639

Questions Presented:

Following a jury trial, the district court permanently enjoined respondent Lawson Software, Inc., from infringing patent claims owned by petitioner ePlus, Inc. Lawson then abandoned its challenge to the validity of the key patent claim (claim 26). The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment that Lawson infringed claim 26, and it upheld the injunction; it reversed with respect to some other patent claims.

Lawson flagrantly violated the injunction, and after a hearing, the district court entered an order of civil contempt. While Lawson's second appeal was pending, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office cancelled claim 26 based on an invalidity ground that Lawson had not pursued in litigation. A divided Federal Circuit panel held that the cancellation order retroactively invalidated the contempt judgment.

The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether civil contempt of a permanent injunction order that has been affirmed on appeal and is binding on the litigants under the law of judgments, may be set aside based on a legal development that came after both the permanent injunction and the contumacious conduct, and that did not call into question the correctness of the injunction when it was entered.

2. Whether, under Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), the PTO, an administrative agency, may issue an order that retroactively overrides a federal court's judgment on a question of law that is not subject to further judicial review, so long as some other part of the litigation is pending.

Cert. petition filed 11/13/15, conference 2/19/16. Petition denied 2/29/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

STC, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies LLC, No. 15-592

Question Presented:

Whether marking the packaging of a patented article with patent notification satisfies the marking provision of 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) where the patented article itself is undisputedly capable of being marked.

Cert. petition filed 11/5/15, conference 2/19/16. Petition denied 2/29/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 15-559

Question Presented:

To be liable for induced or contributory patent infringement, a defendant must "know" that the conduct it induced or contributed to constitutes infringement of a patent. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015). That knowledge requirement (and its equivalent, "willful blindness") is stringent, "surpass[ing] recklessness and negligence." Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011). In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007), this Court held that a defendant does not commit a violation "knowingly" or "recklessly" if its actions are consistent with an understanding of legal requirements that was "not objectively unreasonable," "whatever [its] subjective intent may have been." Id. at 70, n.20. The question presented is:

Whether a defendant may be held liable under a "knowledge" standard where its actions were consistent with an understanding of relevant legal requirements that was not objectively unreasonable.

Cert. petition filed 10/30/15, conference 2/19/16. Petition denied 2/29/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.

Questions Presented:

This petition presents a question raised in another currently pending petition before this Court. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, No. 15-466, Pet. for Cert. (S. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015) (presenting same question as Question 1 herein). One week before this Petition was filed, the Cuozzo petition was distributed for this Court's January 8, 2016 conference.

In 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("Board") in the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), to hear the newly-created Inter Partes Review ("IPR") and Covered Business Method Patent Review adjudicatory proceedings for challenging patents previously issued by the PTO. Since the inception of these proceedings, patent challengers have filed over 4,000 petitions, nine out of ten of them IPRs. The Board has instituted review in over two-thirds of its IPR institution decisions.

Both Cuozzo and the case below involved determinations by the Federal Circuit that it lacks jurisdiction to review claims that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in instituting particular IPRs. In both cases, the Federal Circuit reached this conclusion without due consideration of this Court's precedents establishing a "strong presumption" of judicial reviewability of agency action. In the case below, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal as outside the purview of the courts even though the issue appealed was finally decided in the Board's final written decision, which is expressly reviewable under 35 U.S.C. §319.

The Federal Circuit has denied rehearing en banc in Cuozzo, and has treated the immunity from judicial review of the Board's view of its own authority as settled under Cuozzo and the case below.

The questions presented for review are the following:

  1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, even if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the Board's decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable.
  2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, even if the Board's final written decision in an IPR proceeding readdresses its own earlier determination that it had authority to institute the proceeding, the Board's determination that it had such authority is still judicially unreviewable.

Cert. petition filed 12/29/15. Petition dismissed – Rule 46, 2/9/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Apls South, LLC v. The Ohio Willow Wood Company, No. 15-567

Questions Presented:

This case presents three related questions for review:

1. When post-complaint events establish plaintiff's prudential standing, may plaintiff cure a prudential standing defect existing when the original complaint was filed by filing a supplemental complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), or must it file a new case to assert its claim for relief?

2. If a district court exercises its discretion to allow a supplemental complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), does the supplemental complaint become the operative complaint from which plaintiff's prudential standing to bring the action is determined?

3. Where an exclusive licensee acquires all substantial rights in a patent after bringing an infringement action, and it files a supplemental complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), after acquiring those rights, does the exclusive licensee have prudential standing to proceed with a patent infringement action in only its name, when it did not own all substantial rights in the patent when it originally brought the infringement action?

Cert. petition filed 10/29/15, conference 1/15/16. Petition denied 1/19/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Arunachalam v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 15-691

Questions Presented:

1. Is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") permitted to create a new protected class—a giant corporation—to take private property for public use without any compensation to the inventor, an icon of America Invents (who invented Web applications displayed on a Web browser, in ubiquitous use worldwide, from which the giant corporation has financially benefited excessively), by denying the inventor the protections of the Bill of Rights and 35 U.S.C § 282 of the Patent Act, thereby voiding the judgment?

2. Whether the CAFC erred in not honoring the law, after abridging liberty rights of a citizen, arbitrarily dismissing the appeal without a hearing or an opening brief or clear and convincing evidence from a giant corporation, depriving the citizen of patent property rights, was the citizen deprived of the protections of 35 U.S.C. § 282 of the Patent Act and the Bill of Rights, thereby voiding the judgment?

3. Whether the CAFC erred in not relieving a citizen of a final judgment for misrepresentation by a giant corporation or for any reason that justifies relief for a judge denying the citizen a hearing according to law, depriving the citizen of patent property rights, was Petitioner deprived of the protections of FRCP Rule 60(b)?

4. Whether the CAFC erred in abridging a citizen's liberty rights so that she could not address her medical condition to which the CAFC had been given proper notice, exacerbating her illness and arbitrarily dismissing the appeal without a hearing or an opening brief, depriving her of her patent property rights without any compensation from a giant corporation, was Petitioner deprived of the protections of the Bill of Rights and 35 U.S.C § 282 of the Patent Act, thereby voiding the judgment?

5. Whether the CAFC erred in not requiring a judge to avoid actual impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in denying a citizen a hearing according to law, depriving the citizen of patent property rights without any compensation from a giant corporation, after abridging liberty rights of a citizen, was Petitioner deprived of the protections of 28 U.S.C. § 455, Canons 2 and 3 and the Bill of Rights?

No CAFC opinion or argument. Appeal was dismissed for failure to file opening brief in compliance with the court's rules, waiver of respondent JP Morgan Chase & Co. filed 12/3/15, conference 1/8/16.

Cert. petition filed 11/19/15. Petition denied 1/11/16.

Morgan v. Global Traffic Technologies LLC, No. 15-602

Questions Presented:

As a case of first impression, does the procedure required when a patent, cited as prior art in and accused of infringing a subsequently issued patent, include construction of the scope of the claims of the subsequent patent in light of the prior patent plus comparison of differences between the accused device and the one claimed?

Does the standard set forth in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) apply retroactively in this case, pending on appeal when Teva was decided?

Cert. petition filed 11/5/15, waiver of respondent Global Traffic Technologies LLC filed 11/20/15, conference 1/8/16. Petition denied 1/11/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 15-461

Question Presented:

In Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), this Court confirmed that there are "'uniform federal rule[s]' of res judicata." 553 U.S. at 891. In the decision below, however, the Federal Circuit adopted its own unique form of patent-specific preclusion. This new form of preclusion bars entirely new issues and claims that no court has ever resolved. The Federal Circuit grounded this unique legal doctrine in its reading of Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907), an anti-suit injunction case decided during "the heyday of the federal mutuality of estoppel rule." MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Federal Circuit has directly acknowledged that its departure from generally applicable legal principles is "questionable" (Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1057-1058 (Fed. Cir. 2014)), but the court has nevertheless now twice confirmed that it will not apply traditional preclusion rules "unless and until the Supreme Court overrules [Kessler]." App., infra, 23a; Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1058. The rules of preclusion are accordingly "[dis]uniform" in the Federal Circuit alone.

The question presented is:

Whether, in direct conflict with the Third and Fourth Circuits, the Federal Circuit erred in construing Kessler to bar new issues and new claims that would survive the "uniform" rules of preclusion applied by every other circuit in all non-patent cases.

Cert. petition filed 10/8/15, waiver of respondent Office Depot, Inc. filed 10/14/15, response requested 11/3/15, conference 1/8/16. Petition denied 1/11/16.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC Argument

Patent Law and the Supreme Court: Patent Certiorari Petitions Denied in 2016

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We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.


This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.


If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.


This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.