United States: A Primer On Antitrust Law Fundamentals

Last Updated: July 1 2015
Article by Howard Feller

I. OVERVIEW

A. Antitrust Policy

The basic objective of the antitrust laws is to eliminate practices that interfere with free competition. They are designed to promote a vigorous and competitive economy in which each business has a full opportunity to compete on the basis of price, quality, and service.

"The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition." Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).

B. The Principal Antitrust Statutes

  1. The principal federal antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act. The Sherman Act has particularly widespread application.
  2. The Sherman Act prohibits:
  1. Contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Sherman Act § 1 (15 U.S.C. §  1).
  2. Monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. Sherman Act § 2 (15 U.S.C. § 2).
  1. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) contains two prohibitions:
  1. "Unfair methods of competition," which have been held to encompass not only all Sherman and Clayton Act violations, but also restraints of trade contrary to the policy or spirit of those laws. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
  2. "Unfair or deceptive acts or practices," which prohibits false or misleading advertisements or representations as well as practices which are "unfair" to consumers. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
  1. The Clayton Act (including the Robinson-Patman Act amendments) declares certain specific actions or practices to be illegal:
  1. Section 2 of the Clayton Act (popularly known as the Robinson-Patman Act) declares unlawful discrimination in prices between different purchasers in the sale of a commodity, where the discrimination may lessen competition. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
  2. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits exclusive dealing arrangements, tying arrangements and requirements contracts involving the sale of commodities, where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
  3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers, joint ventures, consolidations, or acquisitions of stock or assets where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18.

C. Enforcement and Penalties

  1. The federal antitrust laws are enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, by the Federal Trade Commission, and by suits brought by private parties. States can be private parties for purposes of federal antitrust law. In addition, states have their own antitrust laws.
  2. The Department of Justice has responsibility for enforcement of the Sherman Act (under which it can bring criminal or civil actions and recover damages suffered by the United States Government) and the Clayton Act (under which it can obtain civil injunctions and recover damages suffered by the United States Government).
  1. Criminal violations of the Sherman Act are felonies punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years and/or fines of up to $1,000,000 for individuals and $100 million for corporations per violation. Under an alternative provision, a defendant may be fined up to twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss if any person derives pecuniary gain from the offenses or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant.
  2. Department of Justice enforcement actions, either civil or criminal, are brought in federal district courts.
  1. The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division jointly must be notified of certain proposed mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and tender offers.
  2. The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act and, with the Department of Justice, the Clayton Act, as well as numerous other specific statutes dealing primarily with such matters as product labeling, consumer credit, and consumer warranties.
  1. Commission enforcement proceedings are brought in an administrative setting: a trial is held before an Administrative Law Judge with a right of appeal by either the Commission staff (the Complaint Counsel) or the party sued (the Respondent) to the full Commission. Commission decisions adverse to the Respondent can be appealed to a federal court of appeals. Commission decisions adverse to the Commission's staff cannot be appealed.
  2. If the Commission determines a particular practice to be illegal, it enters a cease and desist order, which may not only require that the practice be stopped but may also require affirmative action by the violator. Violations of cease and desist orders are punishable by a civil penalty of over $13,000 per violation.
  3. The Commission also has authority to promulgate rules defining acts or practices which either are unfair or deceptive or are unfair methods of competition. Depending on the manner in which the rule was promulgated, a knowing violation of the rule may subject a party to civil penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (m)(1)(A).

II. BASIC ANTITRUST CONCEPTS

A. Market Power

  1. Definition: The ability of a market participant to increase prices above levels that would be charged in a competitive market. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984).
  2. Proof of market power.
  1. Identification of relevant product market.
  2. Identification of relevant geographic market.
  3. Determination of market share in relevant markets.
  4. Conduct consistent with exercise of market power.

B. Monopoly Power

  1. Definition: "The power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
  2. Proof of monopoly power.
  1. Identification of relevant product and geographic markets.
  2. Direct evidence of the power to control price or of actual exclusion of competitors.
  3. Indirect proof of monopoly power through evidence of high market share.

(1) Exception possible for regulated industries.

(2) Low barriers to entry may counterbalance market share data.

C. "Horizontal" Agreements or Conduct

Concerted conduct is characterized as "horizontal" when it involves market participants occupying the same level in the chain of distribution. Thus, an agreement by two competing manufacturers to charge X dollars per unit for a commodity that they sell is a horizontal agreement. Similarly, an agreement by two competing suppliers to charge no greater than X dollars for a specific service they perform is a horizontal agreement.

D. "Vertical" Agreements or Conduct

An agreement between parties occupying different levels in the chain of distribution is characterized as "vertical." For example, an agreement between a manufacturer and a reseller that the reseller will not sell the manufacturer's product at less than X dollars per unit is a vertical agreement. Also, an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor that the distributor will only sell certain equipment within a specific metropolitan area is a vertical agreement.

E. "Rule of Reason"

The "rule of reason" is the fundamental rule of antitrust analysis. The Sherman Act, despite its facial prohibition of all restraints of trade, is interpreted to prohibit only those restraints which are unreasonable. Under the rule of reason, a court weighs the pro-competitive benefits of the defendant's challenged conduct against the anticompetitive consequences of that conduct, only prohibiting conduct that, on balance, is anticompetitive. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).

F. Per Se Violations

Per se violations of the antitrust laws are carved out from the general application of the rule of reason. Judicial experience has shown that certain types of conduct are so pernicious, and so lacking in pro-competitive justification, that they are conclusively presumed to be illegal. Such conduct is held to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

G. A Middle Standard

Under certain circumstances, where "horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all", the restraint will be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than under the per se rule. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

  1. In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), a group of dentists conspired to withhold x-rays requested by dental insurers for evaluating benefit claims. The Supreme Court refused to invoke the per se rule by forcing the dentists' policy into the "boycott pigeonhole". The court noted that the use of the per se approach in boycott cases generally has been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor. The Court further justified the application of the rule of reason analysis because of judicial reluctance "to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se, see National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and, in general, to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)."

III. HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT ___

A. "Naked" Restraints

As a general rule, "naked" restraints of trade agreed to between competitors, particularly those which tamper, even indirectly, with pricing are per se illegal. If competitors can make a clear showing that their agreement is a "market creating" mechanism that provides a product or service that could not exist absent cooperation, they may persuade a court to examine their conduct under the rule of reason.

B. Proof

Proof of a contract, combination or conspiracy is a prerequisite to establishing a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital, 945 F.2d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 1991). A combination or conspiracy is established by proof of a "a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). It is unnecessary to prove an overt, formal agreement among wrongdoers; a mere understanding can suffice. See Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 704 (1969).

  1. Conspiracy may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. However, where defendants have no rational economic motive to conspire, and their conduct is consistent with other equally plausible explanations, an inference of conspiracy may not arise. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-7 (1986); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 1991).
  2. The doctrine of "conscious parallelism" suggests that one or more companies may intentionally act in parallel fashion with the certain knowledge that their concurrent behavior will achieve an anticompetitive objective. Generally, this type of behavior alone is not enough to support a finding of conspiracy. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954). However, if other factors in addition to consciously parallel action can be established, such as conduct contrary to the independent self-interest of the alleged conspirators, or opportunities for meetings among the alleged conspirators, such factors may be sufficient to permit an inference of conspiracy. See Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust, 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969). In Cooper v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that mere contacts and communications among the defendants were insufficient evidence from which a conspiracy could be inferred.

C. Per Se Violations

  1. These violations are the most common targets for criminal prosecutions, and must be avoided at all costs.
  2. Price fixing in its many forms, including express agreements on prices and bidrigging, is the most egregious of all antitrust violations. The Supreme Court has stated:

Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).

  1. Joint efforts to increase market prices are condemned. United States v. Socony-Vacuum; FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
  2. Agreements to establish minimum or maximum prices are also condemned. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982).
  3. Efforts to stabilize prices. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
  4. Agreements to establish uniform discounts or terms of sale. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
  5. The price-fixing prohibition is not limited to tampering with price alone. Thus, efforts to limit output or product quality which are utilized as means to indirectly affect price have been attacked successfully, as have limitations on hours of retailer operation or other activities indirectly affecting price. See National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); Detroit Auto Dealers Association, Inc. v. FTC, 1992-1 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 69,696 (6th Cir. 1992).
  1. Agreements among competitors to divide markets or customers are illegal per se. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
  2. Concerted refusals to deal by competitors.
  1. Agreements among competitors to deny the provision of goods or services to a common buyer are illegal per se. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
  2. An agreement among competitors to exclude another competitor from the market or to combine with entities at another level of distribution to exclude a competitor from the market, is illegal per se. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
  3. Other refusals to deal for which some justification might be asserted are increasingly analyzed under the rule of reason (see Section III(E) discussion below).

D. Conduct Which Raises Concerns Over Possible Per Se Treatment

  1. Trade association activity, including membership restrictions and restrictions on advertising. California Dental Assn., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,007 (March 25, 1996).
  2. Exchanges of data, particularly price information, among market competitors. See FTC Staff Advisory Opinion from Robert F. Leibenluft, Assistant Director, Health Care Division, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, to Kirk B. Johnson, Esq., American Medical Association (March 26, 1996).
  3. Group selling and purchasing activities.
  4. Joint ventures among competitors, including joint research and development.
  5. Standard setting and certification programs. Poindexter v. American Board of Surgery, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Ga. 1996)

E. Emerging Limitations on Application of the Per Se

Doctrine to Horizontal Conduct

  1. Certain activities which traditionally fell within the classic per se rule have received favorable treatment from the courts in recent decades. In its analysis of a blanket license agreement among composers, the Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule, despite the fact that the agreement literally constituted price fixing, because the agreement was essential to the creation of a market and the production of a product which would not otherwise exist. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see also NCAA V. Board of Regents, 458 U.S. 85 (1985).
  2. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985), the Supreme Court determined that the per se rule should not be applied to the expulsion of a competitor from a purchasing cooperative because the group did not possess "market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition."

F. Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine

Intra-enterprise conspiracy refers to the legal ability of constituent parts of a single enterprise to conspire for purposes of Section 1. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring as a matter of law. The Court specifically avoided the question of whether a parent and a less than wholly-owned subsidiary could conspire. Nevertheless, the Court's rationale in support of its decision sheds some light on how such a question might be resolved. Where there is "complete unity of interest" or where "there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests," there is unlikely to be a combination of independent competitors. Radford Community Hospital, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,152 (4th Cir. 1990)(two wholly-owned subsidiaries of the same parent are incapable of conspiring for purposes of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act). While corporate divisions and employees are incapable of conspiring with the corporation, joint venturers usually are capable of conspiring both among themselves and with the venture. Key Enterprises v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).

To continue reading click here

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Authors
 
In association with
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Tools
Print
Font Size:
Translation
Channels
Mondaq on Twitter
 
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
 
Email Address
Company Name
Password
Confirm Password
Position
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Accounting
 Anti-trust
 Commercial
 Compliance
 Consumer
 Criminal
 Employment
 Energy
 Environment
 Family
 Finance
 Government
 Healthcare
 Immigration
 Insolvency
 Insurance
 International
 IP
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Litigation
 Media & IT
 Privacy
 Real Estate
 Strategy
 Tax
 Technology
 Transport
 Wealth Mgt
Regions
Africa
Asia
Asia Pacific
Australasia
Canada
Caribbean
Europe
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
U.K.
United States
Worldwide Updates
Registration
Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:
  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.
  • Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.
    If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here
    If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq you may opt out by clicking here

    Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

    Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

    Use of www.mondaq.com

    You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.

    Disclaimer

    Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

    The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.

    Registration

    Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

    • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
    • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
    • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

    Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

    Information Collection and Use

    We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

    We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

    Mondaq News Alerts

    In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.

    Cookies

    A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

    Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

    Log Files

    We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.

    Links

    This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

    Surveys & Contests

    From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.

    Mail-A-Friend

    If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.

    Emails

    From time to time Mondaq may send you emails promoting Mondaq services including new services. You may opt out of receiving such emails by clicking below.

    *** If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of services offered by Mondaq you may opt out by clicking here .

    Security

    This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

    Correcting/Updating Personal Information

    If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

    Notification of Changes

    If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

    How to contact Mondaq

    You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

    If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.

    By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions