United States: What Matters Is Motive: Religious Accommodation Need As A "Motivating Factor" In Employment Decisions

Last Updated: June 4 2015
Article by Jane Ann Himsel

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.1 resulted in an expected outcome but provided an unexpectedly small amount of practical guidance for employers. The Court held that to avoid summary judgment in a religious accommodation case, a job applicant with a bona fide need for religious accommodation must prove only that a prospective employer's desire to avoid the accommodation was a motivating factor in its decision not to hire her. She need not prove the employer had actual knowledge of her need for religious accommodation. In an 8-1 decision, the Court definitively establishes:

  • Title VII "affirmatively obligates" employers to make exceptions to neutral employment policies to accommodate employees' religious beliefs and practices;
  • A failure to make such an exception is a form of disparate treatment: it is intentional discrimination "because of" religious practice2;
  • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit erred when it inserted an "actual knowledge" requirement into Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment on the basis of religious practice; and
  • An employer who makes an employment decision "with the motive of avoiding [a religious] accommodation" violates Title VII, even if the applicant or employee needing accommodation never requested accommodation and the employer lacks actual knowledge that accommodation is needed because of religion.

But the decision provides no explicit practical guidance to employers about how best to handle a suspicion that a particular candidate may need a religious accommodation to do a job. Instead, the Court simply says:

Thus the rule for disparate treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward. An employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions. For example, suppose that an employer thinks (although he does not know for certain) that a job applicant may be an orthodox Jew who will observe the Sabbath, and thus be unable to work on Saturdays. If the applicant actually requires an accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer's desire to avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII.3

Unfortunately, as explained below, the facts of Abercrombie allowed the Court to cease its analysis before explaining what sort of fact pattern – other than an unheeded request for accommodation or a manager's admission – might form a sufficient basis from which to infer improper motivation for an employment decision. Accordingly, while some best practices are articulated below, a discussion of the specific facts Abercrombie presents is warranted.

What Happened in Abercrombie?

The Interview. The Abercrombie case began when a young Muslim woman interviewed for a salesperson/model job at defendant's store wearing a hijab (headscarf) that covered her hair but not her face, neck or shoulders. The hiring manager testified she assumed the applicant was Muslim when she interviewed her because of her headscarf. There was some discussion about the defendant's dress and grooming requirements in the interview, but neither the hiring manager nor the applicant mentioned the scarf. The manager thought the applicant was a good candidate for the position, but she did not know if the applicant could work for defendant while wearing a scarf. She consulted her district manager, advising him that she had a Muslim applicant who had worn a headscarf to her interview. The district manager, who claimed the hiring manager did not mention the candidate was Muslim, said the defendant could not make any exceptions to defendant's "Look Policy," which prohibited employees from wearing "caps" in the workplace. He testified he would have said the same thing if he had known the religious reason for wearing the scarf. The hiring manager never called the applicant back.

The District Court. The EEOC sued on applicant's behalf, claiming failure to accommodate. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Among other things, the defendant argued the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the applicant had not explicitly requested a religious accommodation.4 While recognizing the Tenth Circuit had not yet held whether something other than a direct, explicit request from an employee or applicant could trigger the duty to accommodate, the district court relied on cases from the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and the Southern District of Florida to conclude the duty to accommodate arises when the employer has enough information, either from the employee or applicant or from some other source, to be aware a conflict exists between the employee's or applicant's religious observance or practice and a job requirement.5 The district court found that the hiring manager's testimony demonstrated she had adequate notice of the applicant's need from the applicant's appearance at the interview. No formal request was necessary. After drawing this conclusion, the district court rejected the defendant's undue hardship defense and granted the EEOC summary judgment on liability, leaving nothing to resolve except damages. The applicant had obtained another, higher-paying job, so back pay was not at issue. A jury awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages.

The Tenth Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit not only reversed the grant of summary judgment to the EEOC, but it also ordered the district court to grant summary judgment to the defendant. The court's opinion focused entirely on the second prong of the plaintiff's prima facie case:

In reaching our conclusion that [the company] is entitled to summary judgment, we resolve a question vigorously contested by the parties; specifically, whether, in order to establish a prima facie case under Title VII's religion-accommodation theory, a plaintiff ordinarily must establish that he or she initially informed the employer that the plaintiff adheres to a particular practice for religious reasons and that he or she needs an accommodation for that practice, due to a conflict between the practice and the employer's neutral work rule. We answer that question in the affirmative. Consequently, because [the applicant] did not inform [the company] prior to its hiring decision that she engaged in the conflicting practice of wearing a hijab for religious reasons and that she needed an accommodation for it, the EEOC cannot establish its prima facie case.6

The Tenth Circuit supported its conclusion with its own prior precedent, its interpretation of cases from other circuits, select language from EEOC regulations, and certain cases addressing the interactive process in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The Tenth Circuit's extremely detailed reasoning was, however, far less important than the starkness of its conclusion: an accommodation claim could not move past summary judgment unless the plaintiff personally informed the employer that he or she: (1) engaged in a particular practice; (2) did so for religious reasons; and (3) needed an accommodation to do (or continue to do) the job in question—in other words, that the practice was "inflexible" and conflicted with work.7 An employer was neither expected, nor allowed, to assume—as the interviewer in the Abercrombie case did—that an employee's dress or grooming practice had a religious motivation and might need to be accommodated—even if the need for accommodation seemed obvious at the time of the interview.8

This strict notice requirement created a split in the circuits as the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits allow an applicant or employee to establish the second prong of a prima facie case of religious failure to accommodate if he or she can show the employer was aware of a conflict between the employee's religious practice and a job requirement, regardless of how or from whom the employer gathered the knowledge. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit described the level of notice required to meet the second prong of the prima facie case by saying, "[a]n employer need have 'only enough information about an employee's religious needs to permit the employer to understand the existence of a conflict between the employee's religious practices and the employer's job requirements.'"9

The Supreme Court. The EEOC sought certiorari on the following question:

[W]hether an employer can be liable under Title VII for refusing to hire an applicant or for discharging an employee based on a "religious observance and practice" only if the employer has actual knowledge that a religious accommodation was required and the employer's actual knowledge resulted from direct, explicit notice from the applicant or employee.10

The Supreme Court answered the question presented in the negative. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began with the basic fact that Title VII's disparate treatment provision makes discrimination "because of" religion an unlawful employment practice.11 An employee or applicant establishes the existence of such an unlawful employment practice if he or she demonstrates religion, which includes religious practice, was a "motivating factor" in an employer's decision.12 However, unlike the ADA, Title VII does not "impose a knowledge requirement" on the decision-maker.13 To the contrary, Title VII's intentional discrimination provision "prohibit[s] certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor's knowledge."14 For example, a manager could know with certainty an applicant would need a religious accommodation, but decide not to hire the applicant for completely unrelated reasons. The same manager could merely suspect another applicant would need a religious accommodation and refuse to hire the applicant because he does not wish to go through the hassle of accommodating. Assuming the applicant really did need a religious accommodation, the manager with knowledge would not have violated Title VII, but the manager acting on his speculation would have violated the statute. In simplest terms, Title VII's "disparate treatment provision prohibits actions taken with the motive of avoiding the need for accommodating a religious practice. A request for accommodation, or the employer's certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary condition of liability."15

In Abercrombie, the hiring manager admitted that the no-hire decision was based on a series of assumptions about a possible need for a religious accommodation. No inference of improper motive was necessary. By securing the admission, the EEOC demonstrated the applicant's need for accommodation was a motivating factor in the decision not to offer her a job. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit erred in granting the company summary judgment.

Justice Scalia devotes the final paragraphs of the majority opinion to rejecting the company's alternative argument that religious accommodation should be treated as a matter of disparate impact rather than disparate treatment,16 and stating in unequivocal terms that Title VII's religious accommodation provision "requires otherwise-neutral employment polices to give way to the need for an accommodation."17

Where Do Employers Go From Here?

The only additional information Justice Scalia provides about how an applicant or employee who has been deprived of a reasonable accommodation would go about proving motive is in a footnote:

While a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the motive requirement, it is arguable that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice – i.e. that he cannot discriminate "because of" a religious practice unless he knows or suspects it to be a religious practice. That issue is not presented in this case, since Abercrombie knew – or at least suspected – that the scarf was worn for religious reasons. The question therefore has not been discussed by either side, in brief or oral argument. It seems to us inappropriate to resolve this unargued point by way of dictum, as the concurrence would do.18

The assertion about this point being unargued is curious in the wake of an oral argument that focused on multiple hypotheticals designed to ferret out exactly how an employer should react when an applicant presents in dress suggesting the need for religious accommodation. The above proclamation certainly leaves open more questions than it answers:

  • Should the prima facie case for religious accommodation claims change?
  • Exactly how much and what kind of motive evidence will a plaintiff need to escape summary judgment in the absence of either an explicit request for accommodation or an admission from a manager?
  • To what extent will the employer's articulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for hiring someone other than the applicant with a religious accommodation need trump evidence of improper motive?
  • Should employers go out of their way to hire supervisors who are religiously illiterate in order to avoid accommodation claims based on what supervisors "suspected"?

The first three questions will need to be answered in future litigation, but we believe the fourth must be answered in the negative. To the contrary, while employers need not educate their managers on the finer points of religious beliefs and practices, they do need to educate them about the obligation to provide religious accommodation. Now is the time to foster a culture that is receptive to religious accommodation.

The Abercrombie decision leaves no doubt that Title VII requires employers to work actively to make exceptions to their neutral employment policies in order to accommodate religious practices. When faced with a possible need for accommodation, an employer needs to focus first and foremost on whether accommodation is possible – not how to avoid making the accommodation. And employers should turn to the issue of undue hardship only after considering reasonable accommodation possibilities. If an employer currently lacks a comprehensive policy on religious accommodation and a procedure for implementing the policy's assurances, now is the time to adopt both.

Managers charged with hiring for jobs in which many different types of religious dress and scheduling needs could be accommodated – and that is most jobs – need to be trained to think about a need for religious accommodation, whether known or suspected, the same way they think about an applicant's race, color, sex, or national origin – as a non-issue. If an applicant requests an accommodation during the interview, the manager needs to be prepared to ask only enough questions to understand the request and either make note of it for his or her own future post-hire consideration or pass on to Human Resources for further analysis.

If a manager suspects – based on the employee's garb or some other non-verbal cue – that an employee may need a religious accommodation, the manager should be well informed about the obligation to provide such accommodation so that he or she can truthfully testify the suspicion was no more than a fleeting thought that did not impact the hiring decision. If the company selects another candidate, the manager or Human Resources should carefully document the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the selection. Finally, either the manager or Human Resources should work hard to close the loop with each and every rejected candidate, providing appropriate, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision not to hire.

Hiring for jobs where common types of religious accommodation might be difficult or impossible poses a tougher challenge. While all of the principles articulated in the last two paragraphs remain true, the employer should take particular care in drafting both the job description and the posting for the position. For example, if the position requires an employee to work a minimum of eight hours between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. each day of every weekend, and shift swapping, shift splitting, the use of paid time off and other similar accommodations are not viable options, then both the job description and the posting should clearly reflect these scheduling requirements.

The hiring manager should also consider specifically informing each applicant of the scheduling requirements during the interview and asking whether the applicant "has a problem" with them. Both Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor used this question during the Abercrombie oral argument. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests it is inappropriate. If an applicant responds by raising a religious accommodation issue, the hiring manager needs to know what to do: namely, either speak briefly with the applicant about exactly what religious accommodation would be needed, or let the applicant know the manager will pass the need along to Human Resources for further consideration and follow up.

If the employer hires the applicant who has expressed a need for accommodation, then the groundwork will already be set for the accommodation process. If the employer does not select the applicant, then either the manager or Human Resources can reject the applicant, providing the true reason for the rejection, be it another's superior qualification or the undue hardship involved with accommodating religion. Either way, the employer will have treated the applicant with respect and minimized any concerns about improper motivations.

Footnotes

1. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86 (U.S. June 1, 2015).

2. Abercrombie, slip op. at 6-7. An employer can, of course, prove the affirmative defense of undue hardship in a Title VII case by demonstrating that accommodation would place more than a de minimis burden on its business. Transworld Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) and establishing a "de minimis" standard for undue hardship in Title VII religion cases). But the Abercrombie decision "for brevity's sake" discusses the accommodation requirement "as though it is absolute." Abercrombie, slip op. at 3, n.1.

3. Abercrombie, slip op. at 5.

4. Historically, to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on failure to accommodate, a plaintiff has been required to demonstrate he or she: (1) has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) informed his or her employer of the conflict; and (3) was disciplined, discharged, not hired, or subjected to some other adverse employment action for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement. See, e.g., Lubetsky v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., 296 F.3d 1301, 1306 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits); Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2013); Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir. 2013); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985).

5. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1285 (N.D. Okla. 2011), rev'd, 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995) ("It would be hyper-technical ... to require notice of the Plaintiff's religious beliefs to come only from the Plaintiff"); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993); Hellinger, v. Eckard Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1999)).

6. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch LLC, 731 F.3d 1106, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2013).

7. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1115–16, 1122, 1142–43.

8. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1133–34.

9. Brown, 61 F.3d at 654.

10 . Brief of Petitioner at (I); Brief of Respondent at Question Presented.

11. Abercrombie, slip op. at 3-4 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)).

12. Abercrombie, slip op. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m)).

13. Abercrombie, slip op. at 4-5 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A) as defining discrimination "to include an employer's failure to make 'reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations' of an applicant.")

14. Abercrombie, slip op. at 5.

15. Abercrombie, slip op. at 5-6.

16. Justice Thomas' dissent demonstrates that he alone found this argument viable.

17. Abercrombie, slip op. at 6-7.

18. Abercrombie, slip op. at 6, n. 3.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Authors
Jane Ann Himsel
Similar Articles
Relevancy Powered by MondaqAI
 
In association with
Related Topics
 
Similar Articles
Relevancy Powered by MondaqAI
Related Articles
 
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Tools
Print
Font Size:
Translation
Channels
Mondaq on Twitter
 
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
 
Email Address
Company Name
Password
Confirm Password
Position
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Accounting
 Anti-trust
 Commercial
 Compliance
 Consumer
 Criminal
 Employment
 Energy
 Environment
 Family
 Finance
 Government
 Healthcare
 Immigration
 Insolvency
 Insurance
 International
 IP
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Litigation
 Media & IT
 Privacy
 Real Estate
 Strategy
 Tax
 Technology
 Transport
 Wealth Mgt
Regions
Africa
Asia
Asia Pacific
Australasia
Canada
Caribbean
Europe
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
U.K.
United States
Worldwide Updates
Registration (you must scroll down to set your data preferences)

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including your content preferences, for three primary purposes (full details of Mondaq’s use of your personal data can be found in our Privacy and Cookies Notice):

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting to show content ("Content") relevant to your interests.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, news alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our content providers ("Contributors") who contribute Content for free for your use.

Mondaq hopes that our registered users will support us in maintaining our free to view business model by consenting to our use of your personal data as described below.

Mondaq has a "free to view" business model. Our services are paid for by Contributors in exchange for Mondaq providing them with access to information about who accesses their content. Once personal data is transferred to our Contributors they become a data controller of this personal data. They use it to measure the response that their articles are receiving, as a form of market research. They may also use it to provide Mondaq users with information about their products and services.

Details of each Contributor to which your personal data will be transferred is clearly stated within the Content that you access. For full details of how this Contributor will use your personal data, you should review the Contributor’s own Privacy Notice.

Please indicate your preference below:

Yes, I am happy to support Mondaq in maintaining its free to view business model by agreeing to allow Mondaq to share my personal data with Contributors whose Content I access
No, I do not want Mondaq to share my personal data with Contributors

Also please let us know whether you are happy to receive communications promoting products and services offered by Mondaq:

Yes, I am happy to received promotional communications from Mondaq
No, please do not send me promotional communications from Mondaq
Terms & Conditions

Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd (Mondaq). Mondaq grants you a non-exclusive, revocable licence to access the Website and associated services, such as the Mondaq News Alerts (Services), subject to and in consideration of your compliance with the following terms and conditions of use (Terms). Your use of the Website and/or Services constitutes your agreement to the Terms. Mondaq may terminate your use of the Website and Services if you are in breach of these Terms or if Mondaq decides to terminate the licence granted hereunder for any reason whatsoever.

Use of www.mondaq.com

To Use Mondaq.com you must be: eighteen (18) years old or over; legally capable of entering into binding contracts; and not in any way prohibited by the applicable law to enter into these Terms in the jurisdiction which you are currently located.

You may use the Website as an unregistered user, however, you are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the Content or to receive the Services.

You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these Terms or with the prior written consent of Mondaq. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information from the Content. Nor shall you extract information about users or Contributors in order to offer them any services or products.

In your use of the Website and/or Services you shall: comply with all applicable laws, regulations, directives and legislations which apply to your Use of the Website and/or Services in whatever country you are physically located including without limitation any and all consumer law, export control laws and regulations; provide to us true, correct and accurate information and promptly inform us in the event that any information that you have provided to us changes or becomes inaccurate; notify Mondaq immediately of any circumstances where you have reason to believe that any Intellectual Property Rights or any other rights of any third party may have been infringed; co-operate with reasonable security or other checks or requests for information made by Mondaq from time to time; and at all times be fully liable for the breach of any of these Terms by a third party using your login details to access the Website and/or Services

however, you shall not: do anything likely to impair, interfere with or damage or cause harm or distress to any persons, or the network; do anything that will infringe any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights of Mondaq or any third party; or use the Website, Services and/or Content otherwise than in accordance with these Terms; use any trade marks or service marks of Mondaq or the Contributors, or do anything which may be seen to take unfair advantage of the reputation and goodwill of Mondaq or the Contributors, or the Website, Services and/or Content.

Mondaq reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to take any action that it deems necessary and appropriate in the event it considers that there is a breach or threatened breach of the Terms.

Mondaq’s Rights and Obligations

Unless otherwise expressly set out to the contrary, nothing in these Terms shall serve to transfer from Mondaq to you, any Intellectual Property Rights owned by and/or licensed to Mondaq and all rights, title and interest in and to such Intellectual Property Rights will remain exclusively with Mondaq and/or its licensors.

Mondaq shall use its reasonable endeavours to make the Website and Services available to you at all times, but we cannot guarantee an uninterrupted and fault free service.

Mondaq reserves the right to make changes to the services and/or the Website or part thereof, from time to time, and we may add, remove, modify and/or vary any elements of features and functionalities of the Website or the services.

Mondaq also reserves the right from time to time to monitor your Use of the Website and/or services.

Disclaimer

The Content is general information only. It is not intended to constitute legal advice or seek to be the complete and comprehensive statement of the law, nor is it intended to address your specific requirements or provide advice on which reliance should be placed. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the Content for any purpose. All Content provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers hereby exclude and disclaim all representations, warranties or guarantees with regard to the Content, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. To the maximum extent permitted by law, Mondaq expressly excludes all representations, warranties, obligations, and liabilities arising out of or in connection with all Content. In no event shall Mondaq and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use of the Content or performance of Mondaq’s Services.

General

Mondaq may alter or amend these Terms by amending them on the Website. By continuing to Use the Services and/or the Website after such amendment, you will be deemed to have accepted any amendment to these Terms.

These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and you irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these Terms. If you live outside the United Kingdom, English law shall apply only to the extent that English law shall not deprive you of any legal protection accorded in accordance with the law of the place where you are habitually resident ("Local Law"). In the event English law deprives you of any legal protection which is accorded to you under Local Law, then these terms shall be governed by Local Law and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with these Terms shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts where you are habitually resident.

You may print and keep a copy of these Terms, which form the entire agreement between you and Mondaq and supersede any other communications or advertising in respect of the Service and/or the Website.

No delay in exercising or non-exercise by you and/or Mondaq of any of its rights under or in connection with these Terms shall operate as a waiver or release of each of your or Mondaq’s right. Rather, any such waiver or release must be specifically granted in writing signed by the party granting it.

If any part of these Terms is held unenforceable, that part shall be enforced to the maximum extent permissible so as to give effect to the intent of the parties, and the Terms shall continue in full force and effect.

Mondaq shall not incur any liability to you on account of any loss or damage resulting from any delay or failure to perform all or any part of these Terms if such delay or failure is caused, in whole or in part, by events, occurrences, or causes beyond the control of Mondaq. Such events, occurrences or causes will include, without limitation, acts of God, strikes, lockouts, server and network failure, riots, acts of war, earthquakes, fire and explosions.

By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions