On March 24, 2014, multiple coal companies filed suit against the Administrator of EPA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. Murray Energy Corp. v. McCarthy, No. 5:14-CV-39. The plaintiffs alleged that EPA failed to comply with § 321(a) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), which requires EPA to "conduct continuing evaluations of potential loss or shifts of employment which may result from the administration or enforcement of the provision of [the CAA] and applicable implementation plans, including where appropriate, investigating threatened plant closures or reductions in employment allegedly resulting from such administration or enforcement." 42 U.S.C. § 7621(a).

EPA originally filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to articulate a statutory waiver of EPA's sovereign immunity. In September 2014, the district court rejected EPA's argument. In denying the motion, the court held that the coal companies adequately had pled that that the CAA imposes a nondiscretionary duty on EPA to evaluate potential job loss or shifts of employment resulting from enforcement of the CAA. Because that duty was nondiscretionary, § 304 of the CAA authorized plaintiffs to file suit against EPA.

In December 2014, EPA filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. On March 27, 2015, the district court denied that motion, finding that plaintiffs satisfied the standing elements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.

With respect to injury-in-fact, the court noted that "economic injury from business competition created as an indirect consequence of agency action can serve as the required 'injury in fact.'" As summarized by the court, plaintiffs argued that, had EPA complied with the requirements of § 321(a), then "the information would document the threatened business closures and consequent unemployment, which could be used to convince the EPA, the Congress, and/or the American public that the actions of the EPA have been harmful and must be changed." The court, accordingly, found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient injury-in-fact.

With respect to causation, the court stated that:

the causation element of standing is satisfied not just where the defendant's conduct is the last link in the causal chain leading to an injury, but also where the plaintiff suffers an injury that is "produced by [the] determinative or coercive effect" of the defendant's conduct "upon the action of someone else."

The court found that the plaintiffs' allegations "that the actions of EPA have had a coercive effect on the power generating industry, essentially forcing them to discontinue the use of coal" were sufficient to show that the alleged injuries "are fairly traceable to the actions of EPA" and its failure to conduct the evaluations required by § 321(a).

In discussing redressability, the court noted that the plaintiffs were asserting procedural and informational injury as a basis for standing. When a party alleges procedural injury, the party need not "prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive result would have been altered," just that "the procedural step was connected to the substantive result." In addition, a party has informational standing when "denied information that must be disclosed pursuant to a statute." The court held that the alleged injuries were redressable because, if the court issued an injunction requiring EPA to comply with § 321(a), "the results of the inquiry may have the effect of convincing EPA, Congress, and/or the American public to relax or alter EPA's prior decisions."

On April 10, 2015, the United States filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that EPA has conducted the evaluations required by § 321(a). On April 22, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery, extend the deadline for fact discovery, and hold the United States's motion for summary judgment in abeyance pending completion of discovery, arguing that they need discovery before being able to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The court has not yet ruled on these motions.

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