United States: Antitrust Compliance Programs: Time To Recalibrate Your Risk-Benefit Analysis?
Last Updated: August 11 2012
Article by Andrea Hamilton and Joseph F. Winterscheid

Recent developments in the global legal landscape point to the inevitable conclusion that having an effective antitrust compliance program in place is now more important than ever.

The marked increase in cooperation and coordination between antitrust enforcement agencies around the globe over the last decade has been widely reported.  So it is surely no coincidence that we have witnessed an unprecedented chorus of commentary on the importance of antitrust compliance programs by a number of antitrust enforcement agencies over the last several months.  In November 2011, the European Commission issued its first-ever guidance on competition law compliance programs entitled "Compliance matters: What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules."  In February 2012, the French Competition Authority released its "Framework Document on Antitrust Compliance Programmes."  And on June 11, 2012, the Chilean Competition Agency published its "Guidelines on Competition Law Compliance Efforts."  These most recent examples of the antitrust enforcement community's new preoccupation with antitrust compliance programs followed publications on the same subject by the enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom and Canada in 2010. 

The issuance of these guidance notes is reason enough for companies to revisit the sufficiency of their antitrust compliance efforts to assess how they measure up to the enforcers' views on "best practices."  But these recent enforcement agency pronouncements are just the tip of the iceberg.  Over the past few years, there have been numerous developments in the global legal landscape that have impacted the risk-benefit analysis associated with antitrust compliance programs.  On the one hand, these changes have dramatically heightened the risks associated with antitrust violations.  At the same time, certain developments have underscored the benefits of effective antitrust compliance programs.  Collectively, these developments point to the inevitable conclusion that having an effective antitrust compliance program in place is now more important than ever.

Antitrust Compliance: Risks and Benefits

Antitrust compliance programs benefit companies by helping their employees avoid antitrust violations, the devastating consequences of which include heavy fines, criminal prosecution of the company and individual employees, and private damage actions—and, very often, all of the above.  Apart from avoiding inadvertent antitrust violations in the first place, antitrust compliance training also has other salutary effects.  These include facilitating early detection of possible antitrust violations and assisting company personnel to identify situations where the company itself might be the victim of antitrust violations.  Antitrust awareness can also be an important business tool both in assisting employees to know what they can do and in providing legal "cover" in business negotiations (e.g., when major customers seek to obtain preferential pricing in contravention of price discrimination rules).

Heightened Risks

As noted above, the risks associated with non-compliance with the antitrust laws are severe.  But these risks are even more pronounced today, especially in the area of cartel enforcement.  First, companies have been tagged with unprecedented fines in the United States (with a record-setting $1 billion in fines assessed in 2009 and on track to eclipse that record this year), the European Union (over €2.8 billion in fines assessed in 2010) and EU Member States, such as France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, which have a long record of aggressive antitrust enforcement.  Similarly, the 90 criminal antitrust cases filed by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2011was the largest number in more than two decades, and the average jail time for defendants sentenced in criminal antitrust cases (just under 17 months) was more than double the average jail time served in the 1990s.

Moreover, these serious antitrust risks are no longer confined to the United States and Western Europe.  To the contrary, antitrust enforcers around the globe are now aggressively enforcing their antitrust laws, whether newly enacted (e.g., China) or historically largely ignored (e.g., Japan).  And the enforcement tools being brought to bear by enforcement agencies in a growing number of jurisdictions—including the United Kingdom, Brazil, Denmark, Ireland, Japan and Korea —now include potential criminal prosecution and jail time for individuals.  The international enforcement community is also actively supporting the pursuit of follow-on civil damage actions—including class action-like "collective redress" actions—by the victims of antitrust violations, a phenomenon that had heretofore been largely confined to the United States.

But perhaps the most profound change in the antitrust risk calculus is the dramatically heightened risk of detection brought about by the increasing prevalence of leniency programs around the world.  Under these programs, a cartel member is insulated from fines and/or criminal prosecution if it discloses the existence of the cartel to the enforcement agency and thereafter cooperates with the agency in prosecuting the remaining members of the cartel.  In the 1990s, only the United States and a handful of other jurisdictions had leniency programs in place.  Today, however, there are antitrust leniency programs in place in more than 50 countries around the world.  Cartel members are therefore now at risk of being "flipped" by one of their co-conspirators in return for immunity from prosecution in virtually every industrialized nation around the globe. 

The impact that leniency programs have had on cartel detection and prosecution cannot be overstated.  In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division reported that of the approximately 50 international cartel investigations pending at that time, over half had been initiated, or were being advanced, by information received from a leniency applicant.  Perhaps even more striking is the fact that in 2011, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission received 143 leniency applications—more than 10 applications a month—surely an unsettling statistic for companies that erroneously assume cartel activity continues to be an accepted business practice in Japan.  And the effectiveness of these national leniency programs in detecting and prosecuting cartels has been turbo-charged by the increasingly close cooperation among the international antitrust enforcement agencies. 

Enhanced Benefits

On the other side of the coin, recent developments have also enhanced the potential benefits of having an effective antitrust compliance program in place.  First, the existence of such a program may be taken into account as a "mitigating factor" that may result in a reduction in the level of fines in the event that an antitrust violation does occur.  This has long been the case under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and similar policies have now been adopted in numerous other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, Israel and India. 

Second, the proliferation of leniency programs around the globe puts an even greater premium on the value of early detection that is facilitated by antitrust compliance programs.  Companies with proactive compliance training and internal reporting mechanisms will most often be in the best position to be the first company to get a leniency "marker" down so as to achieve the maximum benefits available to the first mover under these programs.  Conversely, companies that fail to detect violations at an early stage are likely to face exposure to substantially higher fines.

Conclusion

Given these developments, companies that have been "on the fence" about the need for a comprehensive antitrust compliance program should surely take a fresh look at their risk-benefit math.  Moreover, companies that have antitrust compliance programs in place should re-examine them, both to ensure that they take account of the potential impact of new antitrust legislation and changes in enforcement policy on their international operations and to ensure that they are hitting the mark vis-ŕ-vis their effectiveness.  As to the latter point, the enforcement agencies' fine reduction policies discussed above make clear that it is not enough to simply go through the motions.  Rather, these policies variously confine qualifying compliance programs to programs that are "effective," "credible, " "bona fide" and/or "genuine."  The elements of an "effective" antitrust compliance program are variously described in the antitrust enforcement agencies' individual guidance notes and policy statements, and they consistently emphasize that there is no "one size fits all" solution.  The common key elements, however, include: 

  • Senior management involvement and support
  • Corporate compliance policies and procedures
  • Training and education
  • Monitoring, auditing and reporting mechanisms
  • Consistent disciplinary procedures and incentives

Unless an antitrust compliance program includes these basic elements, it is unlikely that the program would be taken into account in considering a possible fine reduction.  But even more to the point, antitrust compliance programs that lack these essential attributes are unlikely to achieve their primary objective: avoiding antitrust violations in the first instance.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

More Popular Related Articles on Anti-trust/Competition Law from USA
An interesting and growing debate in the antitrust arena is whether most favored nation ("MFN") pricing provisions are pro-competitive or anticompetitive. For many years, MFN provisions have been considered a fairly noncontroversial contract term included by purchasers in an attempt to assure that other buyers do not receive a more favorable price.
A well-attended program on antitrust treatment of "bundled pricing" and "loyalty discounts" at the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Spring Meeting highlighted the confusion generated by the antitrust law implications.
In remarks made this week at the International Competition Network annual conference, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stated that health care will continue to be a top priority for the FTC.
An EU General Court (GC) judgment has considered the difficult issue of independent parallel behaviour by competitors under EU competition law, and in particular when this strays into a "concerted practice".
The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has reached a settlement with Anheuser-Busch InBev ("ABI") and Grupo Modelo S.A.B. de C.V. ("Modelo"), requiring ABI to divest Modelo’s entire U.S. business to Constellation Brands Inc. ("Constellation").
Microsoft v. Motorola is precedential only in the Western District of Washington, but at 207 thorough and well-reasoned pages, it provides a valuable roadmap and will likely be quite influential in future RAND cases in other U.S. and foreign jurisdictions.
Nearly a year ago the Kansas Supreme Court issued a ruling that boldly separated Kansas, and its state antitrust law, from prevailing federal antitrust precedent in matters of resale price agreements.
Earlier this week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued its Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) report for fiscal year 2012.
 
In association with
Tools
Print
Font Size:
Translation
Channels
Mondaq on Twitter
 
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert
Email Address
Company Name
Password
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
Accounting and Audit
Anti-trust/Competition Law
Consumer Protection
Corporate/Commercial Law
Criminal Law
Employment and HR
Energy and Natural Resources
Environment
Family and Matrimonial
Finance and Banking
Food, Drugs, Healthcare, Life Sciences
Government, Public Sector
Immigration
Insolvency/Bankruptcy, Re-structuring
Insurance
Intellectual Property
International Law
Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration
Media, Telecoms, IT, Entertainment
Privacy
Real Estate and Construction
Strategy
Tax
Transport
Wealth Management
Regions
Africa
Asia
Asia Pacific
Australasia
Canada
Caribbean
Europe
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
U.K.
United States
Worldwide Updates

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of www.mondaq.com

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.

Disclaimer

Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.

Registration

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.

Cookies

A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.

Links

This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.

Mail-A-Friend

If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.

Security

This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.