We use cookies to give you the best online experience. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies in accordance with our cookie policy. Learn more here.Close Me
The Supreme Court of the United
States recently held in Southern Union Company v. United
States that the Sixth Amendment requires juries to determine
facts that increase maximum criminal fines. By requiring
the U.S. government to prove additional facts to juries,
Southern Union will affect how the government prosecutes
corporate defendants, who cannot be imprisoned and frequently face
criminal fines.
On June 21, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held in
Southern Union Company v. United States, 2012 WL 2344465
(2012), that the Sixth Amendment requires juries to determine facts
that increase maximum criminal fines. In a 6–3
decision, the Supreme Court overturned a U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit ruling upholding an $18 million criminal penalty
against Southern Union Company. By requiring the U.S.
government to prove additional facts to juries, Southern
Union will affect how the government prosecutes corporate
defendants, who cannot be imprisoned and frequently face criminal
fines. Yet as noted by the dissent, most criminal cases
are resolved through plea bargaining. Whether
Southern Union will strengthen or weaken each
party's bargaining position in such contexts might depend
on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.
Background
Southern Union, a natural gas
company, was indicted in 2007 for multiple counts of violating
federal environmental statutes, including the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). Violations of the RCRA
are punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of
violation. The first count of the indictment alleged that
Southern Union had violated the RCRA by knowingly storing liquid
mercury without a permit at its Pawtucket facility.
Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Rhode Island, a jury convicted Southern Union of unlawfully
storing liquid mercury "on or about September 19, 2002 to
October 19, 2004."
At sentencing, Southern Union noted
that the verdict form did not specify which dates the violations
occurred and thus the conviction could have arisen from a one-day
violation. It argued that imposing any fine greater than
the single-day penalty of $50,000 would require judicial
fact-finding in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), which reserved to juries the determination of any
fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases a criminal
defendant's maximum potential sentence.
Although the district court agreed that Apprendi applied,
it concluded that the jury had found a 762-day violation, which
would have resulted in a maximum fine of $38.1 million.
The court imposed a fine of $6 million and a community service
obligation of $12 million.
On appeal, the First Circuit
affirmed, rejecting the lower court's conclusion that the
jury had found a 762-day violation and instead holding that
Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines.
Because the Second and Seventh Circuit had previously held that
Apprendi applies to criminal fines, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the split.
The Supreme Court's
Decision
Writing for the majority, Justice
Sotomayor explained that Apprendi's "core
concern" is to reserve to the jury "the determination of
facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory
offense." Accordingly, a jury must determine facts
that set the maximum amount of a criminal fine.
The majority emphasized that the
relevant question is not related to the form of punishment, but to
whether the maximum punishment triggers a right to a trial by
jury. "Where a fine is so insubstantial that the
underlying offense is considered 'petty,' the Sixth
Amendment right of a jury trial is not triggered, and no
Apprendi issue arises." But where a fine is
substantial enough to trigger a right to a jury trial,
Apprendi guards against "judicial factfinding that
enlarges the maximum punishment a defendant faces beyond what the
jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions
allow."
In contrast, writing for the
dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that Apprendi "does
not encompass every kind of fact-related sentencing decision that
increases the statutory maximum." Rather, the Sixth
Amendment permits a sentencing judge "to determine sentencing
facts—facts that are not elements of the crime but are
relevant only to the amount of the fine the judge will
impose." The dissent further argued that
"nothing in early American practice suggests that the Framers
thought that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right encompassed a
right to have a jury determine fine-related sentencing facts"
and that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States
v. Tyler, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 285 (1812), supported this
position.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general
guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought
about your specific circumstances.
To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.
Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.
In its first public Policy Statement regarding the treatment of cooperation in investigations, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board provided guidance on how it will consider a firm’s or associated person’s "extraordinary cooperation".
After a two-week trial before United States District Court Judge Edward Chen of the Northern District of California, David Nosal was convicted of three counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Walsh ruled that the defendant could not use the proceeds from the sale of his house to fund his criminal defense because he used tainted funds to obtain the home.
In Commonwealth v. Nies, No. 5793-2012 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl, Apr. 18, 2013), the Honorable John A. Boccabella of the Berks County Court of Common Pleas applied a somewhat rare exception to the requirement that those who do not submit to a blood test in connection with a DUI investigation are subject to enhanced sentencing requirements.
Last week, Liverpool striker Luis Suarez was suspended for 10 games for biting a Chelsea player during a globally broadcasted English Premier League game.
On March 26, 2013, the Office of Inspector General published much-awaited guidance on physician-owned medical device distributorships (commonly known as "PODs") in the form of a Special Fraud Alert.
