Co-authored by Katie Colvin & Jim Petrie

Originally published in Labor Law Bulletin, June 2002

In our last issue (Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2002) we summarized five of the many employment cases on the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket. The Court has since decided four of those cases. Two of them (Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002), and Hoffman Plastic Compound, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275 (2002)) are discussed in detail elsewhere in this issue. Two others are summarized below (Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002), and EEOC v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002)). The fifth case (Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.) is still pending. We’ve also included in this article a couple of added starters, Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002), which was decided in March, and Echazabal v. Chevron USA, in which oral argument was heard in February involving the "direct threat" defense under the ADA.

Toyota. An assembly line worker claimed that she was entitled to reasonable accommodation under the ADA because carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments limited her ability to perform the range of repetitive manual tasks associated with her job. The Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that she was disabled within the meaning of the Act. To prove a substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, one must demonstrate an impairment that prevents or restricts "activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives." In the Court’s opinion, manual tasks unique to a particular job are not as central to most people’s daily lives as performing household chores, bathing and brushing one’s teeth.

Although a victory for Toyota, this decision may mean that in determining its obligation to provide reasonable accommodation, in some instances an employer will have to consider what an employee can do away from work as well as on the job.

Waffle House. The Court held that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate employment disputes has no effect on the EEOC’s right to sue the employer in federal court for injunctive or victim-specific relief (e.g., back pay and damages). The Court noted that Title VII unambiguously gives the agency the right to obtain such remedies with no suggestion that this right is foreclosed by the existence of an arbitration agreement between private parties. The Court also looked at the Federal Arbitration Act and concluded that while it insures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, only the parties to such agreements are bound.

Although appearing to be a defeat for employers, Waffle House should have little practical impact. EEOC enforcement actions are rare. They constituted less than 2% of all discrimination claims filed in federal court during fiscal year 2000.

As to the new kids on the block, the Court’s recent decision in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002), upholds the EEOC’s regulation allowing complainants to timely file an unverified charge and supply verification after the statutory time limit for filing charges has passed. The verification "relates back" and is properly treated as if it had been made on the date the charge was filed.

Lastly, the Court has heard oral argument in Chevron USA, which involves the "direct threat" defense to alleged discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff Echazabal twice applied for employment at a Chevron refinery, and both times Chevron withdrew conditional job offers after medical exams showed that he had Hepatitis C and that his liver might be damaged by exposure to solvents and chemicals present at the refinery. Echazabal sued in federal district court, claiming discrimination on the basis of a disability. Chevron countered that it had acted properly because Echazabal would pose a direct threat to his own health if he worked in the refinery. The district court granted summary judgment for Chevron and Echazabal appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, relying on the language of the ADA, which states that an employer may impose as a qualification standard that an employee not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of "other individuals in the workplace." In the appellate court’s opinion, the ADA’s direct threat defense means what it says and does not apply to employees for whom employment poses a direct threat only to their own health or safety.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron, Moran and other pending litigation of general interest will be discussed in subsequent issues of our newsletter.

Ms Gordon joined the New York office of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz in the Litigation/Labor and Employment Practice Areas as an associate in 1999.

Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz is a national, full-service law firm with approximately 200 attorneys in Chicago, New York City and New Jersey.

Copyright 2001 © Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz. The Labor Law Newsletter is intended to keep our clients and interested parties generally informed on labor law issues and developments. It is not a substitute for professional advice.