UK: European Arrest Warrant

Last Updated: 18 January 2010

By Anand Doobay, Partner in the Fraud and Regulatory Department, Peters & Peters Solicitors

1. Human Rights

1.1 Article 3

Chyba v District Court in Strakonice, Czech Republic [2008] EWHC 3292 (Admin)

1. The appellant was serving a sentence in the Czech Republic, having been surrendered pursuant to a European arrest warrant. Subsequently, the District Judge gave his consent under section 55(6) for the appellant to serve another sentence following a request from the respondent authority.

2. The appellant submitted that the 'consent' violated his article 3 ECHR rights in the light of his circumstances in prison in the Czech Republic. The following factors were submitted in support of his claim:

  • inadequate diet, which has caused a dramatic weight loss;
  • prison overcrowding (fourteen people in a single cell with only two toilets for their use);
  • only sporadic provision for proper exercise;
  • inadequate medical treatment (he suffers from hepatitis and has not been given appropriate medication);
  • severe punishment for infringing the rules and subjection to solitary confinement.

3. The Court held that pursuant to section 34 there was no right of appeal against a decision under section 55(6). However, had the appellant raised a credible case that article 3 might be violated, the Court would have been prepared to entertain an application for judicial review.

4. The Court referred to Kalashnikov v Russia1 as the leading authority on whether prison conditions violate Article 3. The Court there found that there had been a breach of Article 3 where the prison conditions included:

  • severe overcrowding;
  • shift-sleeping due to the overcrowding (aggravated by the constant lighting and television);
  • lack of privacy in the use of a toilet in full view of other inmates and guards;
  • lack of ventilation and passive smoking;
  • infestation of cockroaches;
  • contraction of a variety of skin diseases, fungal infections and exposure to the risk of contraction of tuberculosis and syphilis.

5. The Court also cited finding in Kalashnikov that treatment in prison was inhuman because, inter alia, it was premeditated; it was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering; and it was degrading because it was such as to arouse in the victims a feeling of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them.

6. In the instant case, the Court found that appellant's contentions were unsupported by any evidence and were contradicted by the responses received from the respondent.

7. The Court also relied on an extract from a report to the Czech Government carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in March, April and June 2006. Although the report did not include the prison where the appellant was detained, it made it clear that the Committee found nothing that could remotely approach any breach of article 3.

8. Thus the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that, as Category 1 territory, the Czech Republic must be taken to act in good faith and it would not violate the appellant's rights in accordance with its international obligations.

Kalniets v District Court of Ogre, Latvia [2009] EWHC 534 (Admin)

9. The appellant appealed against the decision of the District Judge to order his extradition.

10. The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence as to prison conditions in Latvia on appeal.

11. The Court dismissed the appeal.

12. The court applied the section 29(4)(a) interpretation in Hungary v Fenyvesi to section 27(4), namely evidence that was "not available at the extradition hearing" meant evidence which either did not exist at the time of the extradition hearing, or which was not at the disposal of the party wishing to adduce it and which he could not with reasonable diligence have obtained, and that if it was at the party's disposal, or could have been so obtained, it was available.2

13. The appellant did not meet the criteria as no witness statement was advanced to explain why the fresh evidence was not put before the District Judge and the suggestion that it might have been the fault of the appellant's previous lawyers was only speculative.

14. In considering the fresh evidence de bene esse, the Court held that it did not meet the test in ex parte Ullah3 of showing "strong grounds for believing that the person, if returned, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The 2004 Report of the Committee for Prevention of Torture was found to be too old to reflect the risk posed by Latvian prison conditions in 2009.

Baranauskas v Lithuania [2009] EWHC 1859 (Admin)

15. Similarly to Kalniets the Court dismissed the appeal because the Report relied on by the applicant was published in 2004 which was found to be too old to be reliable evidence of the current conditions.

16. In addition, in this case the Ministry of Justice in Lithuania had guaranteed that "in case of surrender of [the appellant] to Lithuania he will be treated with full respect to his human rights during execution of the sentence in correctional institutions of Lithuania".4

1.2 Article 6

Atkinson v Cyprus [2009] EWHC 1579 (Admin)

17. The appellants were charged in Cyprus with criminal offences but acquitted following a trial and subsequently left Cyprus. Following an appeal by the prosecution they were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The District Judge ordered their extradition. The Court dismissed the appeal.

18. The Court found that, the appellants had deliberately absented themselves from their trial. The Supreme Court hearing was part of the trial process in Cyprus because the acquittal by the first instance court was not final. Any inaccurate information given by a legal adviser would not prevent that individual's decision to absent himself from a trial from being deliberate.

19. The article 6 argument failed because it was premised on the assumption that the appellants' trial under section 20(3) was the hearing before the Supreme Court where there was no right to call evidence or to examine or cross-examine witnesses.

20. However, the appellants had a full article 6 compliant hearing before the first instance court in Cyprus. This was sufficient to find no breach of the article because the Supreme Court only considered whether the findings of fact made by the first instance court ought, as a matter of law, to have resulted in a conviction. The appellants could play no part in that process, other than through their legal representatives who could make representations on the issue before the Supreme Court.

Symeou v Greece [2009] EWHC 897 (Admin)

21. The respondent public prosecutor of the requesting state had sought the extradition of the appellant to face a charge equivalent to manslaughter arising out of an assault in a Greek nightclub in July 2007. The appellant appealed against the decision of the District Judge ordering his extradition to Greece.

22. The appellant made three submissions. First, his extradition would be an abuse of process because of (i) the way the Greek police had investigated the offence (it was contended the police, through violence and intimidation, had obtained statements from two of the appellant's friends which wrongly incriminated him and that the police also manufactured or manipulated other statements from British nationals who had been in the night club at the time, which incriminated the appellant, and that these would be admissible against him at trial) and (ii) a defect in its domestic procedure invalidated the Greek domestic warrant and therefore also the EAW.

23. Secondly, the passage of time made it unjust or oppressive to extradite him.5

24. Thirdly, that extradition would breach articles 6 and 8 ECHR because of the risk that evidence would be admitted which had been obtained by coercion, and because the offence could be tried in the UK.

25. The Court dismissed the appeal on all grounds.

26. The Court held that the abuse of process argument failed because the abuse jurisdiction of the requested state does not extend to considering misconduct or bad faith by the police of the requesting state. The residual jurisdiction concerns abuse of the extradition process by the prosecuting authority. The defective domestic warrant argument also failed because the Court held that issues relating to the criminal law of the requesting state are outside the district judge's jurisdiction.

27. The reason for the distinction was said to lie in the respective functions of the courts of the requested and requesting state under the EAW framework. The former are entitled to ensure that their duties and the functions under the 2003 Act are not being abused. However, it is the exclusive function of the latter to try the issues relevant to the guilt or otherwise of the individual, including deciding what evidence is admissible, and what weight should be given to particular pieces of evidence having regard to the way in which an investigation was carried out.

28. The Court observed that it would be very difficult to show that there was a real risk of a total denial of Article 6 rights through extradition and trial by a member of the European Union, and a signatory to the ECHR. The evidence about the way the police may sometimes behave in an investigation did not come close to this high hurdle.

29. Moreover it could be assumed, in the absence of the most cogent contrary evidence, that Greek courts would deal fairly with arguments about the admissibility or weight to be given to statements if found by them to have been obtained by manipulation or violence. The Courts of Greece are required by law to exclude evidence obtained in the way it is alleged the statements of witnesses were obtained, and it is to be assumed in a Framework case, that they will apply that law conscientiously.

30. If the evidence would be admitted, it would have been found by the relevant court not to have been so obtained. It is not sensible to ask whether there is a real risk that it might make an error in that decision since this is a risk to which all Courts are prey.

31. Regarding Article 8 the Court observed that the only point of any substance was that the appellant could be tried in the UK, where he lived, as did most of the witnesses and victim's family. There was jurisdiction to try him because the victim was a UK national. Nonetheless, the argument failed because the local police had expressed no interest in prosecuting the appellant, whereas the Greek authorities were intending to pursue the matter and they had a legitimate interest to do so.

1.3 Article 8

W v Provincial Court of Katowice, Poland [2008] All ER (D) 273 (Oct)

32. The appellant and his then wife had been the subject of criminal proceedings in Poland regarding various alleged offences of fraud. Those proceedings were adjourned and two years later he left Poland to live in the UK with his wife. The appellant subsequently split from his wife and thereafter two of his teenage daughters lived with him and his new partner. His youngest daughter, aged 5, lived with his former wife.

33. The district judge decided that it was disproportionate to extradite the appellant's former wife because the youngest daughter would either be taken into care or returned to Poland where the availability of care was uncertain. However, the judge found that it was not disproportionate to extradite the appellant.

34. In dismissing the appeal the Court held that it was important to consider not just the appellant's family life, but the life of the family itself. The position of the family had improved following the discharge from extradition of the appellant's former wife (on Article 8 grounds) who could look after their children.

35. The Court's findings were not affected by the report of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, which was not before the district judge, to the effect that the appellant's children enjoyed a better rapport with him than with their mother.

Dirsyte v Lithuania [2008] EWHC 3331 (Admin)

36. The appellant appealed against a decision of a district judge to order her extradition to the respondent requesting state. It was alleged that the appellant gave statements to the police in Lithuania advancing a false explanation for a fracture that she had suffered, which it was alleged had been caused by the firing of a gun by another individual, but which she contended had been suffered as a result of a fall. It is alleged that this was done with a view to helping the man concerned to escape prosecution for possessing a firearm.

37. In dismissing the appeal the Court held that the appellant's pregnancy and separation from her boyfriend did not constitute "striking and unusual facts" as explained in Jaso.6

38. In addition the time since she had settled in the UK was comparatively short (since August 2005); she had no family in the UK; whether her Algerian boyfriend would not be able to visit her in Lithuania was uncertain; it was also uncertain that the appellant would be convicted or that she would receive a custodial sentence and in any event the extradition would not prevent her from seeking to return to England in the not too distant future.

39. The Court also rejected the appellant's submissions that the offence was trivial on the ground that the 2003 Act did not refer to such a matter as a legitimate consideration in deciding whether or not an application for extradition should be granted. In addition, the offence was not to be regarded as trivial because the maximum sentence for the alleged offence in Lithuania is 2 years' imprisonment, twice the minimum specified in section 64(3)(c), and it was an offence which would warrant prosecution in the UK.

Jansons v Latvia [2009] EWHC 1845 (Admin)

40. The appellant appealed against a decision of a district judge ordering his extradition for the theft of two mobile phones. The day after the order the appellant had attempted to commit suicide and very nearly succeeded. The appeal was allowed on Article 8 and section 25 grounds.

41. Two psychiatric reports submitted before the Court stated that the appellant suffered from a depressive illness and post-traumatic stress disorder and that sending him back to Latvia would aggravate those conditions, making it very likely that he would attempt to kill himself again.

42. Written material from the requesting state district court outlined medical and other arrangements which the Latvian prison authorities had in place which would continue the kind of treatment and care the appellant had been receiving in the UK to restrain him from suicide or self-harm.

43. The Court held that it would be oppressive, under section 25, to order the appellant's return where the evidence established a substantial risk that the appellant would commit suicide if extradited.

44. Regarding Article 8, the Court was satisfied that the "striking and unusual facts" test was met and that the risk of suicide, which the doctor described as certainty, outweighed the seriousness of the offences, the need to honour international treaties and the finding that the Latvian authorities would take all reasonable steps to protect the appellant.

45. The Court found difficulties with the Article 3 argument because not all the elements in the test invoked by Dyson LJ in J v Secretary of State for the Home Department could be met.7 The relevant issues are:

1. The severity of the treatment, which it is said the applicant would suffer if removed. The Court held that this ground was not established since the treatment simply consisted of removal of the appellant to Latvia.

2. There must be a causal link between the act, or threatened act, of removal and the inhuman treatment relied on as violating the applicant's Article 3 rights. In the context of J v Secretary of State that was inhuman treatment which was alleged to take place on arrival. In the instant case the Court held that the evidence did not establish treatment of that kind, it being the fact of removal and its effect upon the appellant's mental state.

1. In "a foreign case" the Article 3 threshold is particularly high.8 In this respect the Court observed that the statement applies in any article 3 case.

2. An article 3 claim can in principle succeed in a case where there is a high risk of suicide. This consideration was said to come closer to the instant case.

3. In deciding whether there is a real risk of breach of Article 3 in a case with a risk of suicide, an important question is whether the applicant's fear of ill-treatment in the receiving State upon which the risk of suicide is said to be based is objectively well founded. If not that would tend to weigh against there being a real risk that the extradition will breach article 3. In the present case, the Court observed, whether the applicant's fear of ill treatment was objectively well founded was more or less obliterated by the fact that well founded or not, the evidence was that the appellant will commit suicide if he was returned.

4. Does the removing and/or the receiving State have effective mechanisms to reduce the risk of suicide? If there are effective mechanisms that will weigh heavily against an applicant's claim that removal will violate his or her article 3 rights. The Court was satisfied that, on the material available before it, the prison arrangements in Latvia were such that all proper steps would be taken to treat the appellant's illness and to prevent his suicide.

2. Bars to extradition

2.1 Passage of time

Gomes v Trinidad and Tobago; Goodyer v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21

46. The appellants appealed in conjoined appeals against the decision of a district judge that it would not be unjust or oppressive within the meaning of section 82 of the 2003 Act to return them to the respondent state to face trial on drugs charges.

47. Both appellants had fled Trinidad and Tobago in breach of their bail conditions. Each had been arrested in the United Kingdom following a delayed extradition request. The delay in both cases was a combination of the offenders having evaded arrest and inaction by the requisitioning state. Both had unsuccessfully argued that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite them by reason of the passage of time since their alleged offences.

48. The Divisional Court had allowed the appeals in August 2007, finding that culpable delay on the part of the requesting state had to be taken into account in the same way as delay that was the fault of the offenders themselves and it remitted the case to the district judge for determination in light of its finding.

49. Before the remitted hearing had taken place, another constitution of the Divisional Court ruled in Krzyzowski v The Circuit Court of Gliwice, Poland9 that the views expressed by the Divisional Court in the instant case were inconsistent with those in Kakis v Cyprus10 and were therefore wrong and that once a suspect had been found guilty of deliberate flight, he could not rely on the passage of time except in the most exceptional circumstances.

50. The district judge at the remitted hearing of the instant case relied on Krzyzowski instead of on the guidance given by the Divisional Court and held that the appellants were classic fugitives and could not rely on the bar to extradition in section 82 and that it would not be unjust or oppressive to extradite them.

51. The Divisional Court certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved in the case.

52. The point of law was, whether the law on the passage of time bar to extradition as set out in sections 14 and sections 82 of the Extradition Act 2003 is correctly stated in Goodyer and Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago11 or whether Krzyzowski v The Circuit Court of Gliwice, Poland which considers Goodyer and disapproves of its approach should be followed. The Court dismissed the appeal.

53. The Court followed Kakis and overruled Goodyer in holding that any delay in the commencement of extradition proceedings which was brought about by the accused fleeing the country or evading arrest could not be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him.

54. Only a deliberate decision communicated to the accused by the requesting state not to pursue him, or some other circumstance instilling a similar sense of security, could properly allow an accused to assert that the effects of further delay were not "of his own choice and making" within the meaning of Lord Diplock's speech in Kakis.

55. The concept of oppression within the meaning of section 82 cannot be easily satisfied and so hardship, a commonplace consequence of an order for extradition, is not enough.

56. The concept of injustice within the meaning of section 82 requires one to ascertain whether a fair trial is possible. The test cannot be easily satisfied even in relation to countries where extradition arrangements were more "ad hoc". The presumption should be that justice would be done despite the passage of time and that the burden should be on the accused to establish the contrary.12

2.2 Speciality

R. v Seddon (Neil) [2009] EWCA Crim 483

57. The defendant pleaded guilty to an offence of blackmail in the UK, was released on bail and absconded to Spain. The European arrest warrant for his surrender stated, "for failing to answer bail in respect of the offence of blackmail"; and in a separate section that the defendant was "unlawfully at large after conviction". Upon surrender the defendant received sentence that included four months' imprisonment for breach of bail conditions.

58. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal holding that there was no jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant for breach of bail conditions.

59. An English court could proceed after surrender against the surrendered person for a lesser offence which was included within the extradition offence, but it could not for an offence that was wholly extraneous to and additional to the extradition offence and to which there was the merest passing reference in the EAW.13

2.3 Refugee status

Poland v Dytlow [2009] EWHC 1009 (Admin)

60. The appellant Polish court appealed against an order discharging the respondents in respect of whom extradition had been sought. The respondents were Polish nationals of Roma ethnicity who had claimed asylum in the UK on the basis of persecution in Poland by reason of their ethnicity. They had been granted refugee status and indefinite leave to remain. Some seven years after their arrival in the UK, European Arrest Warrants were issued in respect of them for low-value robbery before they left Poland.

61. The district judge discharged the respondents on the single ground that their extradition would be a disproportionate interference with their rights under the article 8 ECHR. The judge accepted that there were "striking and unusual facts" in this case namely, the racist attacks on the family in Poland because of their Roma ethnicity, the insufficiency of protection in Poland, and the refugee status of the two brothers.

62. The judge also referred to certain other factors, such as the relatively young age of the brothers at the time of the alleged offence, the fact that it took place nine years earlier and the impact of extradition on their parents, and in the case of the first respondent, his partner and children.

63. The judge rejected an objection to their extradition based on their refugee status, finding that they would no longer be at real risk in Poland. He had described the judgment of an immigration adjudicator dated 1 September 2001 in the respondents' favour, and the Home Office letter dated 16 November 2002 formally granting the respondents refugee status, as "historic reasons for their having been granted refugee status", and said that they were of "no real assistance now to a determination as to whether their life or freedom would be threatened on return to Poland because of their Roma ethnicity". In addition the judge found a report from an expert on Poland, who concluded that there was still a real risk of persecution, not convincing.

64. In resisting the appeal against the decision, the respondents submitted that their refugee status was a complete obstacle to extradition.

65. The Court dismissed the appeal.

66. The Court held that although the 2003 Act did not expressly address the situation the legal position was that once refugee status had been granted, the refugee could not be extradited to his country of nationality while the status persisted.

67. The Court observed that sections 39 and 40 provided a statutory scheme in Part 1 cases whereby a person could not be extradited to the territory of which he was a national or citizen while his asylum claim remained pending. The Court held that it was therefore implicit that if the asylum claim was eventually granted, the refugee could not then be extradited – if he could, little purpose would be served by the inherently temporary restriction imposed by section 39. The finding was also consistent with article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

68. Secondly, the Court held that the decision to revoke a person's refugee status was not something to be undertaken either lightly or on the basis of what may prove to be merely temporary changes in the country from which that person has fled.

69. In this context the Court relied on the statement of Lord Brown in R (Hoxha) v the Special Adjudicator14 to the effect that "the reason for applying a 'strict' and 'restrictive' approach to the cessation clauses ... is surely plain. Once an asylum application has been formally determined and refugee status officially granted, with all the benefits both under the Convention and under national law which that carries with it, the refugee has the assurance of a secure future in the host country and a legitimate expectation that he will not henceforth be stripped of this save for demonstrably good and sufficient reason."

70. All this had implications for the procedures to be followed if revocation is contemplated. The withdrawal of refugee status was governed by Directive 2005/85 and the Immigration Rules para.339A. As such it was a matter for the Secretary of State or for the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and was not a matter for a judge in extradition proceedings.

71. In rare cases, where there was factual basis for regarding the refugee status as questionable, it would be appropriate to adjourn the extradition hearing pending a determination by the secretary of state of the continuation of refugee status.

72. The following factors were said to constitute such factual basis: if the Secretary of State had indicated that she wished to reconsider the respondents' refugee status; there was compelling evidence from an appropriate body that there had been such an enduring change of circumstances in their home country that persons of their ethnicity were no longer at risk of persecution (for example, a new country guidance being issued by the AIT to such an effect).

73. There could be other circumstances where an adjournment would be appropriate for such a purpose, though they would be rare. Such an adjournment would not be appropriate as a matter of routine merely because extradition is being sought of the refugee to his home country.

74. Thirdly, to order the extradition of a person who enjoyed the status of a refugee in the UK would amount to an abuse of process.

3. Appeals/Judicial Review

3.1 Judicial Review

Ignaoua and others v. Judicial Authority of the Courts of Milan [2008] EWHC 2619 (Admin)

75. The Court held that section 34 of the 2003 Act excludes habeas corpus in circumstances where the statutory right of appeal was available. The appropriate course of action in such circumstances is by way of an application to re-open the determination of the Divisional Court under CPR 52.17.

R. (on the application of Navadunskis) v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2009] EWHC 1292 (Admin)

76. The applicant could not bring the case under CPR 52.17 because there was no valid appeal, there having been a failure to serve the CPS within the relevant time limit.

77. The Court acknowledged that in a rare case there may be a supervening event, following the exhaustion of the statutory procedures under the 2003 Act, which necessitates a further consideration by way of judicial review, particularly on human rights grounds.

78. It was further held that any representations of exceptional supervening human rights circumstances should be addressed to SOCA which, upon receipt of any such representations, is to advise the potential claimant to seek relief by way of an urgent application for permission to apply for judicial review and urgent relief.

79. On the availability of judicial review under section 55(6), where there is no right of appeal pursuant to section 34, see discussion of Chyba above in section 1.1 Article 3.

3.2 Timing

Mucelli v Albania; Moulai v France [2009] UKHL 2

80. In both cases the appellants had filed their notice of appeal against the extradition order with the court within the specified times as set out in section 26(4) and section 103 of the 2003 Act, within seven days under the former section and within fourteen days under the latter. In both cases the respective recipients of the notice argued that the notice had not been served within the specified time.

81. The Court held that the 2003 Act envisaged a relatively strict timetable for proceeding with extradition and this implied that the time limit in section 26(4) included both filing and service of the notice of appeal. In addition, it was not open to the court under section 26(4) to extend time or to dispense with service of the notice of appeal. 15The same considerations applied to section 103.

4. Whether warrant is defective

82. Between October 2008 and October 2009 several appeals challenged the validity of European arrest warrants under section 2(4) of the 2003 Act.16 Two of these appeals were allowed, one of which was only in part.17 In dismissing the appeals the Court found warrants to have sufficient information to tell the appellants what they were alleged to have done wrong, when and where they had done it.

83. In Owens the Court held that when the alleged offence is committed alongside other individuals it was not necessary to particularise the precise acts performed by the appellant in the joint enterprise.18

84. In Louca the Court confirmed that reference to "any other warrant" in section 2(4)(b) was to any other domestic rather than European warrant. The requirement is necessary for the requested state to be satisfied that there is judicial basis for the EAW. In Moulai the Court held that warrant cannot be held invalid merely because it did not state whether it was a conviction or an accusation warrant.19

85. In Trenk the appeal was allowed because the warrant was vague as to whether the appellant was sought for prosecution or investigation.20 In Lacorre the appeal was allowed in respect of the allegations of importing drugs into France as the warrant was silent about appellant's relevant conduct in that country.21


1. (2006) 36 EHRR 587.

2. [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin).

3. [2004] UKHL 26.

4. Other 2009 cases on article 3 are Danut Atilla Pieknyi v The Hunedoara County Court, Romania [2009] EWHC 1056 (Admin); Kolanowski v Circuit Court in Zielona Gora, Poland [2009] EWHC 1509 (Admin).

5. On this point the Court observed that one year was not the sort of period which would normally lead to allegation of culpable delay.

6. [2007] EWHC 2983 (Admin).

7. [2005] EWCA Civ 629.

8. "foreign case" means the case where it is not claimed that the state complained of has violated the applicant's ECHR rights within its own territory, but where it is said that the conduct of the state in removing a person from its territory to another territory will lead to a violation of the person's ECHR rights in that other territory.

9. [2007] EWHC 2754 (Admin).

10. [1978] 1 WLR 779 HL.

11. [2007] EWHC 2012 (Admin).

12. Other recent cases that consider the passage of time bar are Owens v Spain [2009] EWHC 1243 (Admin); Von Der Pahlen v Austria [2009] EWHC 383 (Admin).

13. Other recent cases that consider speciality are R. (on the application of Hilali) v. Westminster Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 2892 (Admin); Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 1 December 2008 — Criminal proceedings against Artur Leymann, Aleksei Pustovarov (C-388/08 PPU).

14. [2005] UKHL 19.

15. Mucelli applied in Henderson v France [2009] EWHC 1701 (Admin).

16. Lacorre v High Instance Court of Paris [2008] All ER (D) 309 (Oct); Mohammad v France [2008] EWHC 3238 (Admin); Fabian v District Court of Prague [2008] All ER (D) 64 (Dec); Louca v Germany; Kaba v France [2008] EWHC 2907 (Admin); Von Der Pahlen v Austria [2009] EWHC 383 (Admin); Owens v Spain [2009] EWHC 1243 (Admin); Gabriel v Spain [2009] EWHC 1282 (Admin); Moulai v Deputy Public Prosecutor of Creteil, France [2009] EWHC 1030 (Admin); Tazbir v Regional Court In Gdansk, Poland [2009] EWHC 838 (Admin); Trenk v District Court in Plzen-Mesto [2009] EWHC 1132 (Admin).

17. Lacorre v High Instance Court of Paris [2008] All ER (D) 309 (Oct); Trenk v District Court in Plzen-Mesto [2009] EWHC 1132 (Admin).

18. [2009] EWHC 1243 (Admin).

19. [2009] EWHC 1030 (Admin). The issue arose because the appellant was convicted in absentia and hence had the right to retrial in France.

20. [2009] EWHC 1132 (Admin). Contrast with Gabriel v Spain [2009] EWHC 1282 (Admin) where the Court found that there was nothing on the face of the warrant to indicate that appellant was wanted for questioning rather than prosecution.

21. [2008] All ER (D) 309 (Oct). There was however sufficient evidence for conspiracy to commit substantive offence.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.


A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.


This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.


If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.


This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.