UK: UK Economic Crime Group: Enforcement Update - October 4, 2018

In this edition of the UK Enforcement newsletter, we provide an update on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2018, which received Royal Assent in May, and the activities of the recently formed House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act. Other updates include developments with Unexplained Wealth Orders, the new National Economic Crime Centre and the UK Crime Overseas Production Orders) Bill, as well as an introductory speech by the UK Serious Fraud Office's new director.

In addition to these topics, we also address recent litigation-related developments involving Güralp Systems Limited, the much-anticipated appeal of Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation and The Queen (on the application of KBR Inc.) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office.

Table of Contents

May »

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018
The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 received Royal Assent on 23 May 2018 and will enable the UK to operate its own sanctions regime, independently from the EU.

House of Lords Select Committee Calls for Evidence on the Bribery Act 2010
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010 was formed in May 2018 to consider the Act's effectiveness. The Committee is due to report its findings by 31 March 2019.

GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018
The General Data Protection Regulation came into force on 25 May 2018 and is implemented in the UK by the Data Protection Act 2018. This new legislation updates data protection laws for the digital age and significantly increases the enforcement powers of the supervisory authorities.

July »

Unexplained Wealth Orders
In our last UK Enforcement Update (May 14, 2018), we reported that the National Crime Agency had, in February 2018, secured the UK's first Unexplained Wealth Orders, which had been available since January 2018 with the enactment of the Criminal Finances Act 2017. An appeal against one of these orders was recently heard in the High Court, with Mr Justice Supperstone dismissing the appeal on 3 October 2018.

August »

Güralp Systems Limited
The US DOJ has released Güralp Systems Limited from a potential prosecution for FCPA and money laundering violations days after the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) announced, on 17 August 2018, its decision to charge both Güralp Systems founder Dr Cansun Güralp and former managing director Andrew Bell with conspiracy to make corrupt payments to a South Korean public official at the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources. Further charges were announced on 28 September 2018 when Güralp Systems' former head of sales was charged with conspiracy to make corrupt payments.

September »

New National Economic Crime Centre
The new National Economic Crime Centre is due to commence operations on 31 October 2018 and will include members from the National Crime Agency, Serious Fraud Office, HM Revenue & Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority, and City of London Police, as well as the private sector.

Lisa Osofsky's Introductory Speech
The new Director of the UK's Serious Fraud Office, Lisa Osofsky, gave an introductory speech at the Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime on 3 September 2018.

ENRC
On 5 September 2018, the Court of Appeal Civil Division delivered its judgment in the much-anticipated appeal of Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation [2018] EWCA Civ 2006. In this important case, the SFO's contention that internal investigations were not protected by legal professional privilege was successfully challenged.

KBR
On 6 September 2018, the Administrative Court delivered judgment in the important judicial review application The Queen (on the application of KBR Inc.) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2018] EWHC 2012 (Admin), which concerns the extent of the SFO's powers to require the production of evidence held outside the UK.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill
On 10 September 2018, the UK Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill concluded the House of Lords Committee Stage. The bill seeks to extend the powers of UK authorities to access electronic communications in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions.

MAY

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018

As the UK prepares for its departure from the EU, measures have been taken to ensure that it has the power to impose sanctions autonomously. Currently, these powers exist only in EU law and to a limited extent, in the UK's anti-terrorism legislation. Having been debated since October 2017, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (the Act) received Royal Assent on 23 May 2018 and is the first significant Brexit-related legislation to be enacted. It will enable the UK to operate its own sanctions regime, independently from the EU.

The Act is expected to come into force in time with Brexit and will enable the UK to impose financial, immigration and trade sanctions against target individuals or groups (designated persons) and countries. In theory, the Act is wider in scope than existing laws and raises the possibility that that the UK will have the power to impose sanctions on a more extensive basis.

Unlike EU law, which requires sanctions to be "necessary," the Act enables the Secretary of State and the Treasury to meet a lower threshold for making sanctions regulations when it is considered "appropriate" to do so for any of the following purposes:

  1. To further compliance with a UN obligation;
  2. To further compliance with any other international obligation; or
  3. For other purposes set out in Section 1(2) of the Act, including purposes that would:
    • Further the prevention of terrorism,
    • Be in the interests of international peace and security,
    • Provide accountability for or be a deterrent to gross violations of human rights, or otherwise promote:
      • Compliance with international human rights law, or
      • Respect for human rights.

The purpose covering human rights abuses is the so-called "Magnitsky Clause" which made an appearance in the bill shortly after the Salisbury attacks earlier this year. It empowers the UK to exert pressure on governments with the aim of tackling widespread human rights abuses. At the time of writing, UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt has called on the EU and the United States to implement further sanctions against Russia, suggesting that the UK will adopt a robust approach when it comes to exercising its own powers in response to "aggressive and malign behaviour."

As with all new legislation, businesses should be familiar with any changes that are introduced to ensure they are compliant when the Act comes into force. For example:

  1. The Act will enable designation of persons not only by name, but also by description. The description must be sufficiently precise such that a reasonable person would be able to identify individuals falling within the description. Whilst in most cases "designated persons" tend to be those in power or with significant wealth, the broad scope of this power could lead to some uncertainty when organisations attempt to identify those that meet the description.
  2. There is an increased potential for more complex and onerous reporting requirements. Currently, only a financial institution is required to make a report when it suspects that a person is a designated person or has committed an offence under the sanctions regulations. Under the Act, this requirement is extended to impose obligations on "certain persons," which may include other industries, such as legal, accounting and tax, to report relevant information, produce documents and create records.
  3. The Act introduces harsher penalties for breaches of sanctions. Under the Police and Crime Act 2017, breaches of financial sanctions could lead to a penalty of the greater of £1 million, or 50 percent of the breach, or criminal prosecution with a maximum penalty of seven years in prison (previously, the maximum penalty was two years' imprisonment).

In order to extract practical guidance for compliance to accompany the Act, its application will require close scrutiny over time. Although the Act is not intended to differ significantly from current legislation, it will be interesting to see whether the UK adopts a tougher stance with sanctions given the wider powers that it will be awarded. Despite its obvious challenges, the Act is noteworthy and represents the UK's first step in filling the legislative voids of the post-Brexit era.

House of Lords Select Committee Calls for Evidence on the Bribery Act 2010

The House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010 was formed in May 2018 to consider the effectiveness of the Bribery Act, and in particular whether the Bribery Act has led to stricter prosecution of corrupt conduct, a higher conviction rate and a reduction in such conduct. In addition, the Committee was intended to consider particular issues around whether the Bribery Act has put UK businesses at a competitive disadvantage and the impact and awareness of the legislation amongst small and medium enterprises. Further, the interaction with Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) was slated to be considered.

The Committee is currently receiving oral evidence and has heard from various interested stakeholders from the government, a variety of businesses in the private sector and anti-corruption organisations. In addition, the Committee has published the written evidence it has received from various interested parties. Throughout the evidence, consideration has been given to the effectiveness of the Bribery Act in terms of enforcement, deterrence and prevention. Particular consideration has been given to the status of the defence of having "adequate procedures" and the question of facilitation payments, particularly in the context of their impact on small and medium enterprises.

The Committee is due to report on its findings in respect of the Bribery Act by 31 March 2019.

GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into force on 25 May 2018, two days after the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) received Royal Assent. The DPA implements the GDPR, updating data protection laws for the digital age. The DPA largely includes all of the provisions of the GDPR and will in effect replace it as and when the UK leaves the EU. Together they will usher in a new era of personal-data regulation in the UK.

The new DPA replaces the Data Protection Act 1998 and aims to modernise data protection laws. In particular, it introduces stricter controls on those who process and store personal data. The main objectives of the DPA are to make UK data protection laws fit for the digital age in which an ever-increasing amount of data is being processed and to empower people to take control of their data. The six data protection principles that must be complied with are:

  1. Processing be lawful and fair;
  2. The purposes of processing be specified, explicit and legitimate;
  3. Personal data be adequate, relevant and not excessive;
  4. Personal data be accurate and kept up to date;
  5. Personal data be kept no longer than is necessary; and
  6. Personal data be processed in a secure manner.

Companies that process personal data need to make sure their policies and procedures comply with the DPA particularly as the Information Commissioner's Office has become more proactive in conducting investigations into potential breaches and has been given greater enforcement powers. Significantly, the financial penalties have greatly increased: for less severe breaches, the maximum fine is €10 million or two percent of a company's annual revenue, whichever is greater; and for more severe breaches, the maximum fine is €20 million or four percent of a company's annual revenue, whichever is greater.

JULY

Unexplained Wealth Orders

In July 2018, the subject of the first UWOs (a lady identified in court only as Mrs A) sought to challenge their imposition before the High Court. Mrs A argued that she is unable to discharge the evidential burden imposed on her to explain the source of her wealth because the details necessary to do this are not within her knowledge or possession. The High Court was told that Mrs A's husband would be capable of providing the necessary information. However, he is currently imprisoned (in an unnamed country outside the European Economic Area) after being convicted of corruption offences, a condition of his imprisonment being that he is held incommunicado.

Despite there being no information heard in court that would allow Mrs A or her husband to be identified, further details of the basis for the UWOs' imposition and the basis on which they are being challenged came to light during the hearing.

The NCA maintains that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr A's income and Mrs A's lavish spending in the UK were consistent with money having been improperly obtained, and that both Mr and Mrs A are politically exposed persons (PEPs).

Mrs A contends that neither she nor her husband is a PEP and that, to the best of her knowledge, her husband's wealth is derived from his legitimate work as a successful and highly paid commercial banker.

The ruling on this appeal is imminent and should provide clarity on issues of general importance for the procedure to be followed in future UWO applications, including: whether the Criminal Finances Act is correct in requiring a person (in this case a spouse) to provide evidence outside their knowledge; the admissibility during the UWO process of convictions said to have been secured unfairly (as it is argued Mr A's conviction was); and the issue of wider importance—how PEPs should be defined.

The ruling on this appeal was handed down on 3 October 2018 and provided clarity on issues of general importance for the procedure to be followed in future UWO applications, including: the fact that the Criminal Finances Act is correct in requiring a person (in this case a spouse) to provide evidence outside their knowledge; the admissibility during the UWO process of convictions said to have been secured unfairly (as it was argued Mr A's conviction was); and the issue of wider importance—how PEPs should be defined. Mrs A has seven days within which to lodge an appeal and this may be the only way she will be able to maintain her anonymity under the current reporting restrictions given Mr Justice Supperstone's indication that he was satisfied that it was in the public interest to report the facts and lift the anonymity order.

AUGUST

Güralp Systems Limited

Güralp Systems Limited, an engineering company that produces seismology testing equipment, has been released from a potential prosecution by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and money laundering violations.

The DOJ's announcement came days after the SFO announced, on 17 August 2018, its decision to charge both Güralp Systems founder Dr Cansun Güralp and former managing director Andrew Bell with conspiracy to make corrupt payments to a South Korean public official at the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM).

The charges follow an SFO investigation that began on 3 December 2015 with the alleged activity spanning a 13-year period between April 2002 and September 2015. KIGAM's former director, Heon-Cheol Chi, was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment on a US money laundering charge related to the bribery scheme.

The DOJ confirmed in its declination letter that it would not prosecute Güralp Systems Limited partly due to "voluntary disclosure of misconduct, significant remedial efforts and substantial cooperation" and because, at the time, the UK's SFO was running parallel investigations. Another important factor in the DOJ's decision not to prosecute was that the company had committed to accepting responsibility for its conduct with the SFO.

Shortly before publication, on 28 September 2018 the SFO announced that Natalie Pearce, Güralp Systems' former head of sales, has also been charged with conspiracy to make corrupt payments.

SEPTEMBER

New National Economic Crime Centre

The new National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) is due to commence operations on 31 October 2018. Announced in December 2017 as part of the government's drive to combat economic crime, the NECC will sit within the National Crime Agency (NCA). While most of the staff will come from within the NCA, there will be additional representatives from the SFO, HM Revenue & Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority, and City of London Police, as well as the private sector. The intention of bringing together these parties is to ensure a single, comprehensive and collaborative response to economic crime in the UK.

The NECC will be responsible for leading UK law enforcement's operational response to illicit finance and economic crime. In addition, the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which is responsible for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence submitted through Suspicious Activity Reports will fall under the auspices of the NECC.

Lisa Osofsky's Introductory Speech

On 3 September 2018, the new head of the UK's SFO, Lisa Osofsky, gave an introductory speech at the Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime 2018. As well as outlining her vast professional experience in US law enforcement, Osofsky set out her plans and the approach we can expect from her tenure.

Osofsky made clear that in order to achieve her goal of ensuring that the UK is a "high-risk place for the world's most sophisticated criminals to operate," she will be employing some of the following strategic measures:

  1. Cooperation—both nationally and internationally. Drawing from her experience as a prosecutor in the US, she states that working collaboratively with other UK law enforcement bodies, as well as strengthening the UK's global relationships, will enable the fight against multi-national, complex crime.
  2. Keeping pace with advancing technology—this will become especially important for the SFO when reviewing high volumes of documents for privileged material. With the use of a new eDiscovery platform and AI-based technology, it is hoped that some of the delays that arise when investigating and bringing a case to prosecution can be avoided.
  3. A continued, careful resolution of corporate matters by way of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA)—the DPA concept originated in the US and Osofsky emphasised their growing application in the UK. However, before entering into a DPA, Osofsky will "want assurance that companies are doing everything they can to ensure the crimes of the past won't be repeated long after the watchful eye of the prosecutor moves on to another target."

Osofsky has a unique background in conducting multinational corporate US prosecutions, as well as working within the private sector in compliance and business intelligence. Undoubtedly, she is likely to draw upon this background and is expected to bring fresh insight to her role as head of the SFO. The US has a long-standing practice of encouraging dialogue with defence lawyers, and it will be interesting to see whether this approach is translated into the practises of the SFO going forward.

ENRC

Court of Appeal Ruling Clarifies Scope of Litigation Privilege in Investigations

The earlier ruling by the High Court (see our June 2017 UK Economic Crime Group: Enforcement Update) left companies in the position that, unless they were aware of a reason why a criminal prosecution should result from an investigation into alleged wrongdoing, litigation privilege would neither protect work done during an internal investigation into whistleblowing nor the early stages of an investigation by the SFO.

Now the Court of Appeal has restored the protection of litigation privilege for companies undertaking investigations into potential criminality raised by whistleblowers, and indicated that there may be future extensions, too, of legal advice privilege to take account of how multinational companies operate.

Below we set out the key points of this judgment and their impact on corporate investigations.

The Principal Issue—Litigation Privilege—When Is Litigation in Reasonable Contemplation?

The Court of Appeal held that (at least) at the point when the SFO began investigating ENRC there existed a real likelihood of a criminal prosecution resulting. The Court of Appeal accepted that when ENRC's lawyers instructed forensic accountants to commence a books and records review, the dominant concern was to know whether the company may have contravened anti-corruption legislation or the Companies Act—this too engaged litigation privilege.

The Court of Appeal pointed out that not every "manifestation of concern" by the SFO into a company's activities would be regarded as "adversarial litigation", but where, as in this case, the SFO repeatedly told a company that it may open a criminal investigation and that the failure to self-report could result in prosecution, then prosecution would be in reasonable contemplation.

Were the Documents Created for the Dominant Purpose of Litigation?

The Court of Appeal disapproved of both the High Court's approach to the legal principles and its application of those principles. In both a civil and criminal context, legal advice given in order to avoid or to settle litigation should be as much protected by litigation privilege as advice given for the purpose of resisting or defending litigation. The documents created during ENRC's lawyers' investigation were created at a time when a criminal prosecution was in reasonable contemplation, and those documents were created for the dominant purpose of resisting or avoiding those proceedings. The fact that ENRC's lawyers indicated to the SFO that they might, in due course, disclose some of these documents to the SFO did not affect that purpose.

ENRC's review of its books and records was also capable of feeding into the investigation being carried out by its lawyers with a view to determining how to approach reporting to the SFO, and so it, too, was done for the dominant purpose of resisting or avoiding criminal proceedings.

As a result of those findings, all of the interviews conducted by ENRC's lawyers during the course of the internal investigation were protected by litigation privilege. The same applied to the documents created by the forensic accountants instructed by ENRC's lawyers.

Legal Advice Privilege

The Court of Appeal was unable for procedural reasons to reconsider the law concerning legal advice privilege (this would require an appeal to the Supreme Court), but indicated that if it were able to, it might have done so.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the world in which companies operate today is not as straightforward as it was in the 19th century when much of the law concerning legal advice privilege developed.

The court expressed the view that multinational corporations should be allowed to seek information from employees in order to advise the parent company; that multinationals should not be prejudiced by their size.

Whilst this is not binding authority on this particular point, it is indicative of the views of three senior Court of Appeal judges and points to the very real prospect that, when this issue next finds its way before the Supreme Court, the narrowly drawn doctrine of legal advice privilege may be expanded to keep step with the development of the common law in other jurisdictions.

Effect on Deferred Prosecution Agreements

The Court of Appeal made clear that nothing within its judgment should be read as impacting adversely on the scheme of deferred prosecution agreements. There remains a clear public interest in prosecutors pursuing deferred prosecutions. If the earlier High Court judgment as to the scope of litigation privilege was allowed to stand, the Court of Appeal considered that companies might simply elect not to investigate allegations at all, which would be contrary to the overall public interest in trying to deal with alleged offending in a proportionate and reasonable manner.

Key points to take from the Court of Appeal's judgment are that:

  • Legal advice given in order to avoid or to settle litigation is protected by litigation privilege.
  • Interviews and forensic accounting work carried out at the direction of lawyers during a corporate investigation into corruption allegations are highly likely to be protected by litigation privilege.
  • To reduce confusion, companies and their lawyers should record clearly the investigation's objectives and the investigation's parameters should be kept under review.
  • Whether to waive privilege in lawyer-led investigations and provide that material to the SFO remains a decision to be taken by the client.

On 2 October 2018, the SFO made a press statement that the Director had decided not to appeal further the Court of Appeal's judgment in this case, noting that the SFO would continue to assess claims made to legal professional privilege and "challenge those that it considers to be ill founded".

Despite the SFO drawing a line under the challenge to ENRC's claim to privilege, the company remains under investigation. It was reported on 3 October 2018 that ENRC has filed an application to the Administrative Court seeking judicial review of the SFO's conduct of the investigation, alleging that the SFO has lost investigation paperwork which ENRC believes would show the investigation to be flawed, as well as destroyed evidence of misconduct by SFO staff. It is understood that ENRC's application will also challenge the SFO's failure to appoint an independent law firm to carry out an investigation into the alleged flaws in the allegations made by ENRC.

KBR

The Queen (on the Application of KBR Inc.) v Director of the SFO

KBR Inc. is a company incorporated in the US and the ultimate parent company of a global network of subsidiaries. One of those subsidiary companies is KBR Ltd., which is under investigation by the SFO due to its business links to Unaoil Group.

The SFO identified that KBR Inc. might be in possession of financial documentation of relevance to the investigation and sought to obtain this by serving a notice pursuant to s.2(3) Criminal Justice Act 1987 (a Section 2 notice). The SFO did this at a meeting at the SFO's premises in July 2017, when two senior officers of KBR Inc. were present, having travelled to the UK at the SFO's request.

The Challenges

KBR Inc. applied to the Court for a declaration that the Section 2 notice requesting the production of material outside the jurisdiction was unlawful. There were three grounds on which this was based:

  1. That the provisions under s.2 Criminal Justice Act 1987 did not entitle the SFO to require the production of material held outside the UK.
  2. That the SFO should have sought the material through a formal request to the United States authorities for mutual legal assistance.
  3. That it was not appropriate to serve the Section 2 notice on officers of KBR Inc. while they were temporarily in the UK at the request of the SFO.

The Court's Decision

As to the first challenge, the Court noted that the purpose for which the SFO was created in 1987 required it to be equipped to investigate serious criminal allegations into sophisticated global businesses; this in turn required the powers in Section 2(3) to have some extraterritorial application. The fact that the business world had advanced and that the transfer of data across continents was now prevalent should not mean that the extraterritorial application of Section 2(3) should have diminished.

The Court held that foreign companies are not exempt from being required to produce material to the SFO, provided that: (i) the material is believed by the SFO to relate to a matter under investigation; (ii) the company has a sufficient connection to the UK; and (iii) the notice requiring production is served within the UK:

(i) In this case, there appears to be no question that the material requested related to an investigation being conducted by the SFO.

(ii) The Court held that the sufficiency of connection to the UK would not be met by a foreign company simply being a parent company of a subsidiary in the UK. Equally, a foreign company could not be said to have sufficient connection to the UK simply by the SFO requiring its officers to come within the jurisdiction; there must be a functional connection between the UK and the foreign company.

(iii) In this case, the question of connection was resolved in the SFO's favour. Certain of the payments under investigation were made on the authority of KBR Inc. employees (notably its general counsel and director of compliance). In addition to this, KBR Inc.'s executive vice president of global sales (previously president of oil and gas) worked from the UK, where he had an office.

Dealing with the second challenge, the Court accepted that the Director of the SFO had the ability to use the international scheme of mutual legal assistance to request evidence through judicial channels in many countries with which the UK has secured treaties. The US is one such country. However, the Court held that, while the Director of the SFO was entitled to consider using mutual legal assistance to secure evidence, he was not required to do so. The Court accepted that the length of time that it can take for requests for mutual legal assistance to be answered was a legitimate reason not to pursue that route in all cases.

In relation to the final challenge, the Court did not accept that there was any failure to effect proper service of the Section 2 notice—it was handed to an officer of a company who had a sufficient connection to the UK and it concerned material that was likely to relate to an ongoing SFO investigation.

However, the Court was critical of the fact that the SFO chose to hand the notice to the representative of KBR at a meeting at which the SFO had required the representative's attendance, noting that: "there are unappealing features of the SFO's decision to give the July Notice to Ms Akerson in the course of attending a meeting to discuss the investigation", and expressed the opinion that this sort of behaviour by investigators might in the future make corporate officers of foreign companies less willing to come to the UK to meet with SFO investigators.

This case has not brought about any change in the law concerning the issuance of Section 2 notices or the powers available to the Director of the SFO. However, it has clarified the law concerning both. Perhaps of most interest is the disapproval expressed by the Court at the manner in which the SFO investigators in this case chose to bring corporate officers into the jurisdiction in order to serve Section 2 notices on them, and the effect this could have on how those in receipt of Section 2 notices respond in future investigations.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill

Increased Powers for UK Enforcement Authorities in Accessing Overseas Data

On 10 September 2018, the UK Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill (the Bill) concluded the House of Lords Committee Stage. The Bill seeks to extend the powers of UK authorities to access electronic communications in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions. The Bill has received little attention outside of Parliament despite the fact that the legislation will vastly increase the powers of UK authorities to obtain access to stored electronic data controlled by providers based outside the UK.

The current system for obtaining access to data stored overseas (for those countries with whom the UK has a mutual legal assistance treaty) involves making a mutual legal assistance request to another country, which can take many months to process. The Bill seeks to expedite the process by permitting UK authorities to obtain a court order for the production of data that can be served on the host country. However, this process is dependent on the UK having signed international cooperation agreements with host countries, which will not necessarily be straightforward. Moreover, there will obviously need to be a form of reciprocal agreement permitting other countries with which the UK signs a cooperation agreement access to data stored in the UK. This could be problematic where the scrutiny applied to an order made overseas may not be as comprehensive as would be expected in a UK court.

The Bill has the same objective as the European Production Order, proposed in the European Parliament in April 2018, and the US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (aka the Cloud Act), namely, the streamlining of the process for obtaining access to data stored in other jurisdictions.

Given the recent high-profile cases concerning data privacy and data protection involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, there is likely to be a great deal of focus on the extent to which individual rights are protected under the Bill before it gains Royal Assent.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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however, you shall not: do anything likely to impair, interfere with or damage or cause harm or distress to any persons, or the network; do anything that will infringe any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights of Mondaq or any third party; or use the Website, Services and/or Content otherwise than in accordance with these Terms; use any trade marks or service marks of Mondaq or the Contributors, or do anything which may be seen to take unfair advantage of the reputation and goodwill of Mondaq or the Contributors, or the Website, Services and/or Content.

Mondaq reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to take any action that it deems necessary and appropriate in the event it considers that there is a breach or threatened breach of the Terms.

Mondaq’s Rights and Obligations

Unless otherwise expressly set out to the contrary, nothing in these Terms shall serve to transfer from Mondaq to you, any Intellectual Property Rights owned by and/or licensed to Mondaq and all rights, title and interest in and to such Intellectual Property Rights will remain exclusively with Mondaq and/or its licensors.

Mondaq shall use its reasonable endeavours to make the Website and Services available to you at all times, but we cannot guarantee an uninterrupted and fault free service.

Mondaq reserves the right to make changes to the services and/or the Website or part thereof, from time to time, and we may add, remove, modify and/or vary any elements of features and functionalities of the Website or the services.

Mondaq also reserves the right from time to time to monitor your Use of the Website and/or services.

Disclaimer

The Content is general information only. It is not intended to constitute legal advice or seek to be the complete and comprehensive statement of the law, nor is it intended to address your specific requirements or provide advice on which reliance should be placed. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the Content for any purpose. All Content provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers hereby exclude and disclaim all representations, warranties or guarantees with regard to the Content, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. To the maximum extent permitted by law, Mondaq expressly excludes all representations, warranties, obligations, and liabilities arising out of or in connection with all Content. In no event shall Mondaq and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use of the Content or performance of Mondaq’s Services.

General

Mondaq may alter or amend these Terms by amending them on the Website. By continuing to Use the Services and/or the Website after such amendment, you will be deemed to have accepted any amendment to these Terms.

These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and you irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these Terms. If you live outside the United Kingdom, English law shall apply only to the extent that English law shall not deprive you of any legal protection accorded in accordance with the law of the place where you are habitually resident ("Local Law"). In the event English law deprives you of any legal protection which is accorded to you under Local Law, then these terms shall be governed by Local Law and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with these Terms shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts where you are habitually resident.

You may print and keep a copy of these Terms, which form the entire agreement between you and Mondaq and supersede any other communications or advertising in respect of the Service and/or the Website.

No delay in exercising or non-exercise by you and/or Mondaq of any of its rights under or in connection with these Terms shall operate as a waiver or release of each of your or Mondaq’s right. Rather, any such waiver or release must be specifically granted in writing signed by the party granting it.

If any part of these Terms is held unenforceable, that part shall be enforced to the maximum extent permissible so as to give effect to the intent of the parties, and the Terms shall continue in full force and effect.

Mondaq shall not incur any liability to you on account of any loss or damage resulting from any delay or failure to perform all or any part of these Terms if such delay or failure is caused, in whole or in part, by events, occurrences, or causes beyond the control of Mondaq. Such events, occurrences or causes will include, without limitation, acts of God, strikes, lockouts, server and network failure, riots, acts of war, earthquakes, fire and explosions.

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