UK: Time Bars In An International Context

Last Updated: 26 November 2015
Article by Jeremy Glover

Under most formal contracts it is necessary for the contractor to give notice of various matters before becoming entitled to extensions of time and loss and expense. As Jeremy Glover discusses, depending on its terms, such a provision may be treated as a condition precedent which if not followed could mean you lose your right to make a claim.

It is fair to say that, increasingly notices clauses are expressed as conditions precedent. In other words, a failure to comply with the requirements of the clause will result in a party being prevented from making what might otherwise be a perfectly valid claim.

The traditional view at common law

Generally, in the UK the courts will take the view that timescales in construction contracts are directory rather than mandatory,[1] unless that is, the contract clause in question clearly states that the party with a claim will lose the right to bring that claim if it fails to comply with the required timescale. In the case of Bremer Handelgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne Izegem nv[2] the House of Lords held that a notice provision should be construed as a condition precedent, and so would be binding if:

(i) it states the precise time within which the notice is to be served; and

(ii) it makes plain by express language that unless the notice is served within that time the party making the claim will lose its rights under the clause.

Here, sub-clause 20.1 expressly makes it clear that:

"If the contractor fails to give notice of a claim within such period of 28 days, the Time for Completion shall not be extended, the contractor shall not be entitled to additional payment, and the employer shall be discharged from all liability in connection with the claim."

Further the English courts have confirmed their approval for conditions precedent, provided they fulfil the conditions laid out in the Bremer case. For example, in the case of Multiplex Construction v Honeywell Control Systems,[3] Mr Justice Jackson (as he then was) held that:

"Contractual terms requiring a contractor to give prompt notice of delay serve a valuable purpose; such notice enables matters to be investigated while they are still current. Furthermore, such notice sometimes gives the employer the opportunity to withdraw instructions when the financial consequences
become apparent."

The civil law approach

The position of time bars in construction contracts in civil law countries is different. Unlike common law, where non-adherence to a time bar provision may render a contractor's claim invalid, many, but not all, civil codes may, take a more lenient approach.

Primarily, parties are to perform their obligations under the contract. To take the example of the UAE, Article 243 (2) of the UAE Civil Code states:

"With regard to the rights (obligations) arising out of the contract, each of the contracting parties must perform that which the contract obliges him to do."

Further Article 265 (1) of the UAE Civil Code deals with contract interpretation and states:

"If the wording of a contract is clear, it may not be departed from by way of interpretation to ascertain the intention
of the parties."

From the above and in the absence of any other circumstances, the contractor may be required to conform with any time bars in the construction contract. However, in circumstances where it appears that the strict interpretation and imposition of the time bars would seriously prejudice the contractor, the contractor may rely on certain provisions of the UAE Civil Code to argue a more lenient approach be adopted. These include:

Good faith obligation

Article 246 (1) states, "The contract must be performed in accordance with its contents, and in a manner consistent with the requirements of good faith."

So for example, if an employer was made aware of the contractor's intention to claim in such manner, the employer could be seen as acting in bad faith if he later argues that the contractor did not meet the contractual timeframe. Alternatively, a time bar provision may not be relied upon by an employer in circumstances where he is in breach and was fully aware that his breach would cause delay to the project.

Unlawful exercise of rights

Article 106 provides that the exercise of a right shall be unlawful if it is disproportionate to the harm suffered by the other party. In particular, Article 106 (1) states:

"A person shall be held liable for an unlawful exercise of his rights."

Further Article 106 (2) (c) provides:

"The exercise of a right shall be unlawful: (c) if the interests desired are disproportionate to the harm that will be suffered by others."

In view of the above and subject to the circumstances of the particular case, it may be unlawful for the contractor's otherwise meritorious claim to be disallowed on the basis of a purely technical breach. Therefore, the employer's reliance on the technical breach may be seen as an unlawful exercise of his rights.

Unjust enrichment

Articles 318 and 319 provide that unjust enrichment is unlawful. Particularly, Article 318 of the UAE Civil Code states:

"No person may take the property of another without lawful cause, and if he takes it he must return it."

Article 319 (1) provides:

"Any person who acquires the property of other person without any disposition vesting ownership must return it if that property still exists, or its like or the value thereof if it no longer exists, unless the law otherwise provides."

Therefore, an employer may be prevented from relying on a time bar provision to avoid payment to the contractor for works performed and for works from which the employer has benefitted particularly if the only reason for withholding payment is the lateness of the contractor's claim.

However, as with the common law, everything depends on the circumstances of the case. That said, courts in the UAE would be reluctant to uphold strict terms of the contract where it can be seen that either the requirement for a notice was complied with in a different form or that strict imposition of the time bar would be an unlawful exercise of the employer's rights or cause unjust enrichment.

As noted above, the position can vary from code to code. To take another example: article 2 of the Turkish Civil Code imposes an obligation of good faith, and Article 77 provides that unjust enrichment is unlawful. However, the Turkish Courts tend to take a strict view on time bars by virtue of Article 193 of the of Civil Code,[4] which provides that a party may not initiate a claim in a manner which is not set down in the contact or which is against the manner set out in the contract.

Are there ways round the condition precedent?

Is there the possibility that a DAB or arbitral tribunal might decline to construe the time bar as a condition precedent, having regard to the particular circumstances of the matter before it and the impact of the applicable Law?[5] On the strict wording of the Contract, the answer is no and contractors should always try and work on this basis.

That said, it is often suggested that in civil code jurisdictions it can be possible to raise a successful challenge to time bars under the mandatory laws of that country on the basis of the time bar being contrary to the notion of good faith[6] or some other similar legal principle. For example, it has been suggested that a German court might interpret the contractor's duty to give notice not as a condition precedent to give notice but an obligation ("obliegenheit") of the contractor. This would mean that the contractor does not lose the right to make a claim but that the contractor must prove that his claims are valid and are not affected by his failure to meet his notice obligation in time.[7]

The general point being that it is wrong that a party who has genuinely suffered a loss might be prevented from bringing a claim in respect of that loss for a technical procedural breach. Remember Article 246(1) of the UAE Civil Code says that:

"The contract must be performed in accordance with its contents, and in a manner consistent with the requirements of good faith."

Indeed most civil codes contain a provision confirming the importance of what has actually been agreed between the parties.

The Scottish case of City Inn Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd[8] suggests that there may well be certain ways round the condition precedent. The core element of the dispute was whether or not the contractor was entitled to an extension of time of 11 weeks and consequently whether or not the employer was entitled to deduct LADs. Clause 13.8 (of the JCT form of Contract) contained a time bar clause, requiring the contractor to provide details of the estimated effect of an instruction within ten days.

However, the Scottish courts noted that the Architect and employer had the power, to waive or otherwise dispense with any procedural requirements. This was what happened here. Whilst the employer (in discussions with the contractor) and the Architect (by issuing delay notices) both made it clear that the contractor was not entitled to an extension of time, neither gave the failure to operate the condition precedent at clause 13.8 as a reason.

The point made by the Judge is that whilst clause 13.8 provided immunity, that immunity must be invoked or referred to. At a meeting between contractor and employer, the EOT claim was discussed at length. Given that the purpose of clause 13.8 was to ensure that any potential delay or cost consequences arising from an instruction was dealt with immediately, the Judge felt that it would be surprising if no mention was made of the clause unless the employer, or Architect, had decided not to invoke it. Significantly, the Judge held that both employer and Architect should be aware of all of the terms of the contract. Employers and certifiers alike should certainly therefore pay close attention to their conduct in administering contracts in order to avoid the potential consequences of this decision.

The Inner House agreed with Lord Osbourne saying:

"silence in relation to a point that might be taken may give rise to the inference of waiver of that point. In my view, that equitable principle can and should operate in the circumstances of this case."

A new approach under common law?

In April 2014 Mr Justice Akenhead had to consider a case arising from disputes relating to a project to build a tunnel at Gibraltar airport. The case, Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty's Attorney General for Gibraltar,[9] was unusual because the contract in question was in the FIDIC Form. Usually disputes under the FIDIC Form are heard in private, in arbitration proceedings. Needless to say the case raised a number of interesting issues, not least about the sub-clause 20.1 condition precedent.

Amongst a number of claims, OHL sought an extension of time of 474 days. The Judge decided that the contractor, OHL was entitled to no more than seven days extension of time (rock and weather). However, this was subject to compliance with sub-clause 20. It was accepted by OHL that sub-clause 20.1 imposed a condition precedent on the contractor to give notice of any claim. The Judge held that properly construed and in practice, the "event or circumstance giving rise to the claim" for extension must occur first and there must have been either awareness by the contractor or the means of knowledge or awareness of that event or circumstance before the condition precedent bites. Importantly Mr Justice Akenhead said that he could see:

"...no reason why this clause should be construed strictly against the Contractor and can see reason why it should be construed reasonably broadly, given its serious effect on what could otherwise be good claims for instance for breach of contract by the Employer."

In coming to this conclusion, the Judge, made reference to Sub-Clause 8.4 of the FIDIC conditions, which sets out the circumstances, in which the contractor is entitled to an extension of time. Sub-Clause 8.4 states that:

"The Contractor shall be entitled subject to Sub-Clause 20.1... to an extension of the Time for Completion if and to the extent that the completion for the purposes of Sub-Clause 10.1...is or will be delayed by any of the following causes..."

Sub-clause 20.1 did not call for the notice to be in any particular form and it should be construed as allowing any claim provided that it is made by notice in writing to the engineer, that the notice describes the event or circumstance relied on and that the notice is intended to notify a claim for extension (or for additional payment or both) under the contract or in connection with it. It must be recognisable as a "claim". The onus of proof was on the employer if he should want to establish that the notice was given too late.

An Australian alternative

In Australia the situation might be slightly different. There was a High Court decision, Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, which although it related to the enforceability or otherwise of a banking overdraft facility, caused many commentators[10] to suggest that it might signal a possible end to the use of time bars in construction contracts. At the moment, as far as I understand, it is something that has only been written about, rather than decided in the courts.

The key paragraphs of the decisions were 10 and 12. These stated as follows:

"10  In general terms, a stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty on a party ("the first party") if, as a matter of substance, it is collateral (or accessory) to a primary stipulation in favour of a second party and this collateral stipulation, upon the failure of the primary stipulation, imposes upon the first party additional detriment, the penalty, to the benefit of the second party. In that sense, the collateral or accessory stipulation is described as being in the nature of a security for and in terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation. If compensation can be made to the second party for the prejudice suffered by failure of the primary stipulation, the collateral stipulation and the penalty are enforced only to the extent of that compensation. The first party is relieved to that degree from liability to satisfy the collateral stipulation.

12   It should be noted that the primary stipulation may be the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event which need not be the payment of money. Further, the penalty imposed upon the first party upon failure of the primary stipulation need not be a requirement to pay to the second party
a sum of money."

In the ANZ bank case, the court said that a clause can still be a penalty even though there has been no actual breach to bring it into effect. So how does that apply to time bars in construction contracts? Well it has not been to date. However the reasoning goes that, with such a short notification period – seven days – a contractor is very unlikely to be able to put together the necessary information to justify the entitlement or even show that the delay is on the critical path in time. Therefore it would be a penalty to enforce the strict condition precedent and deny the contractor's right to additional time and potential compensation. It would be unfair, especially in circumstances where the actual loss caused by the alleged late notification would be minor in nature, especially in contrast with the delay damages the contractor might become liable for. In fact they may even be nil if the employer has caused the delay in any event.

And that actually brings us back to the Obrascon case and the words of Mr Justice Akenhead who, it will be recalled noted that he could see:

 "...no reason why this clause should be construed strictly against the Contractor and can see reason why it should be construed reasonably broadly, given its serious effect on what could otherwise be good claims for instance for breach of contract by the Employer."

And what about the employer?

Under the FIDIC form, the employer is treated somewhat differently when it comes to bringing claims. Sub-clause 2.5 states that:

"If the Employer considers himself to be entitled to any payment under any Clause of these Conditions or otherwise in connection with the Contract ... the Employer or the Engineer shall give notice and particulars to the Contractor. ...

The Notice shall be given as soon as practicable after the Employer became aware of the event or circumstances giving rise to the claim. ... The particulars shall specify the Clause or other basis of the claim, and shall include substantiation of the amount and/or extension to which the Employer considers himself to be entitled in connection with the Contract.

The Employer shall only be entitled to set off against or make any deduction from an amount certified in a Payment Certificate, or to otherwise claim against the Contractor, in accordance with this Sub-Clause."

This in itself is unusual as most contracts do not impose similar restrictions on employers.

That said, there is no similar provision to sub-clause 20.1 which says that any claim to time or money will be lost if there is no notice within the specified time limit.

Therefore it had been considered that unlike with sub-clause 20.1, where a contractor has 28 days to give notice, there was no strict time limit within which an employer must make a claim, although any notice relating to the extension of the Defects Notification Period had of course to be made before the current end of that period. However, employers should take note of a 2015 Privy Council decision[11] where the court said that the purpose of sub-clause 2.5:

"is to ensure that claims which an Employer wishes to raise, whether or not they are intended to be relied on as set-offs or cross-claims, should not be allowed unless they have been the subject of a notice, which must have been given 'as soon as practicable'. If the Employer could rely on claims which were first notified well after that, it is hard to see what the point of the first two parts of clause 2.5 was meant to be. Further, if an Employer's claim is allowed to be made late, there would not appear to be any method by which it could be determined, as the Engineer's function is linked to the particulars, which in turn must be contained in a notice, which in turn has to be served 'as soon as practicable."

Although no definition of "as soon as practicable" was provided, this decision suggests that employers too might to subject to a time bar, under the FIDIC form at least. employers should further note that the case also highlights the requirement to provide particulars or other substantiation: again the absence of these could prove fatal to the right to assert a right of set-off.

Conclusion

There are a number of steps parties can take to avoid the adverse effects of time bars. They include the following:

(i)   Parties should take care when concluding contracts to check any time bar clauses governing claims they might make;

(ii)  Parties should appreciate the risks they then run of not making a claim (even if to maintain goodwill) unless the other party agrees to relax the requirements or clearly waives them. This is perhaps especially the case where time bar clauses, if cautiously operated, may generate a proliferation of claims;

(iii)  Remember that the courts see the benefits of time bar provisions and support their operation. A tribunal might bar an entire claim for what seems like a technical reason by which time it will usually be too late to make a new, compliant claim; and

(iv)  Indeed even where the contract contains a clause such as sub-clause 20.1(a) of the FIDIC Gold Book 2008, potential claimants should not necessarily rely upon the other party already having the information they are required to provide.

Equally those considering making claims, should consider the following:

(i)   When is notice required?

(ii)  Who has to give notices?

(iii)  To whom should notice be given?

(iv)  In what form must the notice be given?

(v)   What information must be provided with the notice?

(vi)  What are the response times?

(vii)  Are there any continuing notice obligations?

(viii) Is there an agreement in place not to serve notices?

(ix)   What happens if you fail to serve a notice?


Footnotes:
1. Temloc v Errill Properties (1987) 39 BLR 30, CA per Croom LJ.
2. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 113
3. [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC). The Judge's words were endorsed in the Scottish case of Education 4 Ayrshire Ltd v South Ayrshire Council [2009] ScotCS CSOH 146 where Lord Glennie was wholly unsympathetic to the suggestion that allowance should be made for the fact that notices given in compliance with conditions precedent might have been drafted by businessmen rather than lawyers, noting that: "It is within judicial knowledge that parties to contracts containing formal notice provisions turn immediately to their lawyers whenever there is a requirement to give notice in accordance with those provisions. But even if that were not the case, there is nothing in clause 17.6.1 [of a Public Private Partnership or PPP Contract] that would not readily be understood by a businessman unversed in the law".
4. Freedom of contract rules: Article 26 says that parties may freely determine the contents of a contract within the limits prescribed by law.
5. It is my own experience that a DAB is more likely of the two to try and find a way round the condition precedent. Of course, it would be dangerous to rely on this.
6. See for example the comments of Michael E. Schneider and Matthias Scherer (taken from the Switzerland Chapter of FIDIC – An Analysis of International Construction Contracts- www.lalive.ch/files/mes_msc_analysis_of_construction.pdf) who note that by the adoption of Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code (Good Faith Rule) and the principle of "venire contra factum proprium" the employer could be deemed to have waived his right to insist on the 28-day rule if he has not clearly insisted on a strict adherence to the rule in a consistent manner.
7. FIDIC's clause 20.1 – a civil law view, Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, Construction Law International Volume 4 No 1 March 2009.
8. [2007] CSOH 190 and, on appeal, [2010] ScotCS CSIH 68. The dispute related to the construction of a hotel under a contract incorporating the JCT Standard Form (Private Edition with Quantities) 1980 as amended.
9. [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC). The case was considered by the Court of Appeal in 2015, but the appellate court made no comment on this part of Mr Justice Akenhead's decision, [2015] EWCA Civ 712.
10. See for example Philip Davenport, 'Andrews v ANZ and Penalty Clauses' (2012) 147 ACLN 32, 35.
11. NH International (Caribbean) Ltd v National Insurance Property Development Company Ltd (Trinidad and Tobago) [2015] UKPC 37.


This article is taken from Fenwick Elliott's 2015/2016 Annual Review. TO read further articles go to www.fenwickelliott.com/research-insight/annual-review/2015

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Authors
Jeremy Glover
 
In association with
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Tools
Print
Font Size:
Translation
Channels
Mondaq on Twitter
 
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
 
Email Address
Company Name
Password
Confirm Password
Position
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Accounting
 Anti-trust
 Commercial
 Compliance
 Consumer
 Criminal
 Employment
 Energy
 Environment
 Family
 Finance
 Government
 Healthcare
 Immigration
 Insolvency
 Insurance
 International
 IP
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Litigation
 Media & IT
 Privacy
 Real Estate
 Strategy
 Tax
 Technology
 Transport
 Wealth Mgt
Regions
Africa
Asia
Asia Pacific
Australasia
Canada
Caribbean
Europe
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
U.K.
United States
Worldwide Updates
Check to state you have read and
agree to our Terms and Conditions

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of www.mondaq.com

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.

Disclaimer

Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.

Registration

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.

Cookies

A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.

Links

This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.

Mail-A-Friend

If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.

Security

This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.