Over the past three years, Indian jurisprudence on international commercial arbitration ("ICA(s)") has advanced by leaps and bounds, only to be matched by major legislative developments on the same front. India has seen increased instances of the enforcement of foreign awards. Further, some interesting questions of law have also arisen in connection with ICAs, seated in India.
Our previous article on the subject, which may be accessed here, has analysed the legislative and judicial developments pertaining to the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act") and ICA, after the equally lauded and criticised amendment to the Act in 2015 ("2015 Amendment"), and has extensively covered the Indian judiciary's attitude towards the enforcement of foreign awards, as well as its views on the applicability of Part I of the Act ("Part I") to ICAs. This three-part update shall attempt to chart the progress made on these frontiers starting from the second half of 2017, as well as trace the recent developments in other contentious issues in ICA in India over the past three years. (I) The first part of our series will cover two topics: (a) flagging out the portions of the recent amendment made to the Act in August 2019 ("2019 Amendment"), in so far as they relate to ICA; and (b) an analysis of the trends in Indian courts in determining the applicability of Part I to ICAs, and the exceptions to the rule, as introduced in the 2015 Amendment. (II) The second part of this series will discuss the ongoing debate between the concept of 'seat', 'venue' and 'place' of arbitration, as expounded in a recent spurt of rulings by the Supreme Court of India ("SC"). (III) Lastly, the third part of this series shall trace the progress in the law pertaining to the enforcement of foreign awards, with emphasis on some grey areas which have arisen due to recent conflicting judicial precedents.
The 2019 Amendment
Before we delve into any other judicial trends or analyses, it is necessary to flag out that the Act was significantly overhauled vide the 2019 Amendment. Many sections thereof were notified, and many significant provisions such as the setting up of the Arbitration Council of India are yet to be notified. The most significant notified provisions of the 2019 Amendment, in so far as they pertain to ICA are as follows:
- Revised timeline for the submission of pleadings: Section 23 of the Act, which dealt with the submission of pleadings by the parties to an arbitration (including an ICA), was revised to include a specific timeline, i.e., the claimant must file its statement of claim, and the respondent must file its statement of defence within 6 months of the date on which the arbitral tribunal is notified of its appointment.
- Revised timeline for passing of an arbitral award: Before the 2019 Amendment, arbitral tribunals were required to deliver the arbitral award within 12 months of the date on which the tribunal was appointed. This timeline has been extended, such that the clock starts running from the date on which the pleadings of the parties are completed, with the option of a 6-month extension. However, in case of an ICA, this timeline is not applicable, and the arbitral tribunal need only to "endeavour" to adhere to the same. Therefore, the 2019 Amendment has relaxed this procedural requirement for ICAs, which is probably in light of the greater complexity of the issues and pleadings therein, and a corresponding increase in the difficulty of a tribunal's mandate.
- Confidentiality and Protection of Arbitrators: Sections 42A and 42B of the Act, as inserted by the 2019 Amendment, provide for the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings / the resultant arbitral award for all arbitrations, and the protection of arbitrators from suits and proceedings for acts and omissions committed by them over the course of arbitration proceedings, respectively. These issues have always been a concern in the global arbitration community and India's codification of these protections is one more step towards the goal of aligning India's arbitration regime with globally accepted best practices.
- Applicability of the 2015 Amendment: In an effort to put an end to the debate regarding the retrospective applicability of the 2015 Amendment, the newly inserted Section 87 of the Act clarified that the 2015 Amendment would only be applicable to: (a) arbitrations proceedings which commenced after the date of notification of the 2015 Amendment; and (b) court proceedings in relation to arbitrations which commenced following the 2015 Amendment, and not court proceedings which were in relation to pre-2015 Amendment arbitration proceedings, but which were themselves commenced after the 2015 Amendment. This caused a major hue and cry in the legal community with respect to various issues.
Prior to the 2015 Amendment, one of the key issues concerning ICAs was with respect to the applicability of Part I to foreign-seated arbitrations. While BALCO1 ruled that Part I of the Act will not apply to arbitrations seated outside India, parties to ICAs seated outside India faced challenges in approaching Indian Courts, especially for interim protection, if required. The said gap was answered in the 2015 Amendment, which allowed foreign-seated ICAs to move Indian courts under Sections 9 (interim measures by courts), 27 (the court's assistance in taking evidence), 37(1) (appeals against certain orders of the court), and 37(c) (barring of second appeals). At the same time, the 2015 Amendment gave an option to parties to foreign-seated ICAs to opt out of applicability of Part I completely, by agreeing otherwise.
Thereafter, as stated hereinabove, Section 87, introduced in the 2019 Amendment, sought to clarify that the provisions of the 2015 Amendment will not be applicable to: (a) arbitration proceedings commenced before the 2015 Amendment; and (b) court proceedings in relation to such pre-2015 Amendment arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether they were initiated before or after the 2015 Amendment. In effect, any proceedings initiated under Sections 9 / 27 / 37 which pertained to foreign-seated arbitration proceedings and had commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment would become invalid. Further, this un-did the progress of the 2015 Amendment which deleted the clause in Section 34 (applicable to India-seated ICAs and domestic arbitrations) that allowed for an automatic stay on the operation of an arbitral award if an application was made for setting aside the same, and was consequently responsible for huge delays in the arbitration process.
However, this controversy was effectively put to rest by the SC in the case of HCC,2 which struck down Section 87 of the Act as unconstitutional on grounds of manifest arbitrariness, and clarified that status quo prior to the 2019 Amendment (as reinforced in the BCCI case3) would prevail.
Applicability of Part I of the Act to Foreign-Seated Arbitrations
Analysis of the Court's views on Implicit / Explicit Inclusions
Post-2017, Indian courts across jurisdictions have largely taken a consistent stance regarding the applicability of Part I to foreign-seated arbitrations, in line with landmark cases such as Bhatia International4 (for pre-2012 arbitrations), BALCO, Harmony Innovation Shipping,5 and Eitzen.6 This entails that courts have not hesitated to conclusively rule that Part I will not apply to an arbitration, as long as there are some cohesive factors to prove that the juridical seat of the arbitration is outside of India. Even with respect to arbitration agreements concluded prior to Bhatia International, courts have been quick to rule that the wording of the contract indicates that the parties had the implicit / explicit intention to exclude the applicability of Part I. However, what has caused some confusion post the 2015 Amendment, is the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act,7 introduced in the 2015 Amendment, which states that inter alia Section 9 (applications for interim relief from the court before / during / after arbitral proceedings) will be applicable to foreign seated-arbitrations, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
The most prominent of these recent judgments on the overarching issue of the applicability of Part I are summarised below:
|
Judgment Details |
Dispute |
|
International Nut Alliance v Binu John8 Kerala High Court Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.K. Abdul Rehim and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.P. Jyothindranath 20 November 2017 |
The arbitration agreement pre-dated BALCO. The primary dispute was the maintainability of a petition under Section 34 of the Act in a situation where the parties disagreed on whether the seat of the arbitration was London or New York (the respondent asserted that the seat was New York because the appellant had fraudulently inserted a clause wherein London would be the seat). The respondent contended that since the seat was not determined, and the arbitration agreement was prior to the ruling of BALCO in 2012, Part I was automatically applicable. However, the court ruled that both the possible juridical seats were outside India, which was clearly an "implicit intention to exclude the applicability of Part I", as per the ruling in Bhatia International. Therefore, Part I was not applicable and a Section 34 petition arising out of the subject arbitration was not maintainable, and if the arbitral award is to be challenged, only Section 48 of the Act would be applicable. |
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Archer Power Systems v Kohli Ventures9 Madras High Court Bench: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee and Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Sundar 16 November 2017 |
The arbitration agreement was captured in various agreements executed post-BALCO. The substantive law of the contracts was Indian law, but the arbitration was to be seated in London as per the International Chamber of Commerce's ("ICC") Arbitration Rules, and it specifically stated that the Act shall not apply to arbitration proceedings. One of the main disputes was regarding the maintainability of an application under Section 9 of the Act. The respondent argued that the same was maintainable and need not be vacated in light of the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act, which stipulates that while Part I will not be applicable to foreign seated arbitrations, the same shall still be subjected to Sections 9, 27, 37(1) and 37(3) of the Act, unless the parties have excluded the same. The court ruled that the Section 9 orders have to be vacated because (a) the implied exclusion of the applicability of the Act in arbitration proceedings, (b) the designation of London as the seat and (c) the ICC Rules as the curial law indicate an intention to exclude the operation of Section 9 of the Act in this regard. |
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GMR v Doosan10 Delhi High Court Bench: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mukta Gupta 14 November 2017 |
The arbitration agreement was pre-BALCO. The governing law of the contract was Indian law, and the arbitration was to take place in Singapore and administered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC"). The primary disputes were regarding (a) the applicability of arbitration proceedings to an alter ego of GMR, the appellant (the court determined that the arbitral tribunal was competent to decide this issue); (b) the applicability of Part I in light of the arbitration agreement and the fact that all the parties to the arbitration were Indian parties; and (c) the necessity for an application under Section 45 of the Act to have arbitration proceedings initiated (this was deemed unnecessary by the Court since an arbitration proceeding was already initiated). Most importantly, with regard to (b), the court opined that Singapore was not a mere 'venue', but the seat of arbitration, placing heavy reliance on Yograj Infra11 Thereafter, it also held that two Indian parties may elect to have an arbitration seated abroad, and Part I would not be applicable thereto, as per the terms of the SC in Sasan Power,12 read with the entire catena of judgments such as BALCO, Eitzen, Reliance Industries,13 Imax v E-City,14 Indus Mobile,15 etc. It is pertinent to note that the SC in Sasan Power did not in fact address the issue of Indian parties submitting to a foreign-seated arbitration because a foreign entity was a party to the arbitration agreement. However, GMR v. Doosan's view is in consonance with the Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision in Sasan Power,16 where the it was held that two domestic parties, may submit themselves to a foreign-seated arbitration. |
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Focus Energy v Reebok17 Delhi High Court Bench: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Pratibha M. Singh 1 November 2018 |
The arbitration agreement was pre-BALCO, and hence governed by the rule in Bhatia International. The governing law of the contract was Indian law. The arbitration proceedings were to be governed by English law, and arbitration was to be conducted by the London Centre of International Arbitration ("LCIA"). The dispute was with respect to the maintainability of proceedings under Section 34 of the Act before the Delhi High Court. In this respect, the party filing the petition contended that since the opposing party had not denied the averments regarding the jurisdiction of the court in its pleadings, it had acceded to Delhi's jurisdiction, and in any event, Part I was applicable because there was no exclusion thereof in the agreement, as required by Bhatia. The court first stated that the lack of an averment in the reply was not tantamount to acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The court went on to hold that the designation of London (English law) as the seat and the curial law as that of the LCIA was an implied exclusion of the applicability of Part I by the parties. In this regard, the court went on to analyse the complete conspectus of all previous judgments in this area of law, from Bhatia International to Hardy Exploration,18 (discussed hereinbelow) and came to the conclusion that: "The above discussion clearly shows that even in those cases, which are governed by the Bhatia International (supra) principle, it is only when the seat of the arbitration is in India or the arbitration agreement is governed by the Indian law, or where a judgment cannot be reached as to the seat of arbitration that Bhatia International (supra) would continue to govern. In the present case, neither situation exists." (emphasis supplied) |
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Delhi Airport Metro Express v CAF19 Delhi High Court Bench: Hon'ble Justice Mr. Jayant Nath 25 October 2018 |
The arbitration agreement was pre-BALCO. The governing law of the contract was Indian law. The arbitration was to be seated in London, and conducted by the ICC. The petitioner, in a Section 34 application, made the contention that while the seat of the arbitration was indeed London, the law of the seat would cease to have any effect after the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, and Part I would regain applicability for any post-award proceedings, such as a petition for setting aside an award. However, the court, relying on BALCO and Roger Shashoua20 (discussed hereinbelow), held that the court of the seat would govern all arbitration proceedings and Part I would not be applicable to any stage of a foreign seated arbitration. |
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Heligo Charters v Aircon Feibars21 Bombay High Court Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Naresh H. Patil and Hon'ble Mr Justice Nitin W. Sambre 29 June 2018 |
In this case, the governing law of contract and the law of the seat was Singaporean law, and the arbitration was to be administered by SIAC. The timelines herein are as follows: (a) execution of arbitration agreement - 9 September 2014 (post - BALCO); (b) reference of the dispute to arbitration - 8 April 2015; (c) notification of the 2015 Amendment - 23 October 2015; (d) passing of foreign award - 25 January 2017; and (e) filing of a Section 9 application for protection of a security - April 2017. The court decided that: (a) the 2015 Amendment would be applicable to the present court proceedings because they were initiated after the 2015 Amendment, despite the underlying arbitration agreement being executed prior to the same; and (b) despite this being a foreign seated arbitration whereby the applicability of Part I was excluded, it is still subject to Section 9 of the Act because of the proviso to Section 2(2) of Act owing to the absence of an express exclusion of the operation of the same by the parties. "In view of the amended provisions and facts, we are of the view that operation of provisions of Section 9 cannot be excluded in absence of a specific agreement to the contrary." |
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Norscot Rig Management v Essar Oilfield Services22 Bombay High Court Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Kulkarni 3 October 2019 |
This case, which pertained to a foreign-seated arbitration, involved a petition filed under Section 9 of the Act for the protection of certain assets. The court proceedings were initiated after the 2015 Amendment, but they stemmed from an arbitration which had been initiated before the 2015 Amendment. The court held that while the same would be allowed ordinarily because Part I would be applicable in light of the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act introduced in the 2015 Amendment, the situation had changed after the 2019 Amendment, and hence the Section 9 petition would not be maintainable. The 2019 Amendment inserted Section 87, which as discussed hereinabove, stated that the 2015 Amendment would not be applicable to court proceedings arising out of arbitrations which had been initiated prior to the 2015 Amendment, even if the said court proceedings were initiated after the 2015 Amendment. |
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Actis v Tigaksha Metallics23 Himachal Pradesh High Court Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur 10 January 2020 |
This case arose out of an application made before the court for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act. The governing law of the contract in this case was English law. The arbitration was to be conducted as per the LCIA Rules and the arbitration was to be seated in Geneva. Therefore, the court came to the conclusion that Part I in general was not applicable hereto because it was a foreign-seated arbitration. However, the court held that since Section 9 of the Act forms a part of the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act, the same is exempted from the exclusion of the applicability of Part I, and hence, the present application was held to be maintainable. The court did not examine the question of whether the parties had expressly excluded the application of Section 9 of the Act in the arbitration agreement. |
Therefore, as is evident from the conspectus of decisions of various High Courts, there no longer seems to be any controversy with respect to the applicability of Part I to foreign-seated arbitrations. With respect to pre-BALCO ICAs, the contours of whether Part I was explicitly / implicitly excluded have largely been clarified by judgments such as Harmony Shipping and Eitzen. This was very succinctly captured the Delhi High Court in Focus Energy v Reebok, as also set out hereinbefore:
"The above discussion clearly shows that even in those cases, which are governed by the Bhatia International (supra) principle, it is only when the seat of the arbitration is in India or the arbitration agreement is governed by the Indian law, or where a judgment cannot be reached as to the seat of arbitration that Bhatia International (supra) would continue to govern. In the present case, neither situation exists." (emphasis supplied)
The Applicability of Section 9 / 27 /37 of the Act to Foreign Seated Arbitrations
A new controversy seems to be in the works - the fact that there is no determinative test to ascertain whether or not the parties to a foreign-seated arbitration agreement have explicitly / implicitly excluded the applicability of Sections 9 / Section 27 / Section 37(1) and (3) (as required by the 2015 Amendment) of the Act to the said arbitration agreement. As seen above, the Madras High Court in Archer Power Systems v Kohli Ventures has decided that an arbitration agreement with a foreign juridical seat and curial law is tantamount to an implicit exclusion of not only Part I, but also the operation of Section 9 of the Act. However, a contributory factor to this conclusion was that the arbitration agreement expressly excluded the applicability of the Act to the proceedings (but the arbitration agreement did not specifically address the proviso in Section 2(2) of the Act). On the other hand, the Bombay High Court in Heligo Charters v Aircon Feibars and the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Actis v Tigaksha Metallics have held the inverse, in situations with very similar arbitration agreements for foreign-seated arbitrations. These two decisions are in line with the Delhi High Court's 2016 decision in Raffles Design24, which held that that a designation of a foreign seat or choice of foreign curial law is not an implied exclusion of Section 9 of the Act, in the context of the proviso introduced in the 2015 Amendment. A tabular comparison of these four judgements (including Raffles Design) will put this in perspective:
|
Judgment |
Court and Bench Strength |
Proper law of the Contract |
Seat / Venue |
Curial Law |
Applicability of Part I |
Applicability of Section 9 |
|
Raffles Design v Educomp |
Delhi High Court; Single Bench |
Singaporean law |
Singapore (seat) |
SIAC Arbitration Rules |
Not Applicable |
Applicable |
|
Archer Power Systems v Kohli Ventures |
Madras High Court; Division Bench |
Indian law |
London (seat), along with a specific exclusion of the (Indian) Act for arbitration proceedings |
ICC Arbitration Rules |
Not Applicable |
Not applicable |
|
Heligo Charters v Aircon Feibars |
Bombay High Court; Single Judge Bench |
Singaporean law |
Singapore (seat) |
SIAC Arbitration Rules |
Not Applicable |
Applicable |
|
Actis v Tigaksha Metallics |
Himachal Pradesh High Court; Single Judge Bench |
English law |
Geneva (seat) |
LCIA Arbitration Rules |
Not Applicable |
Applicable |
The SC is yet to address this issue directly, or formulate any litmus test to determine whether parties have explicitly / implicitly excluded the applicability of Section 9 of the Act to a foreign-seated arbitration. Therefore, at present, we only have these 4 judgments - all delivered by single-judge benches of different High Courts. The more prevalent opinion is clearly the one espoused in Raffles Design, Heligo Charters v Aircon Feibars and Actis v Tigaksha Metallics, but the Madras High Court's opinion in Archer Power Systems v Kohli Ventures, that an exclusion of the Act as a whole amounts to an exclusion of Section 9 of the Act (in the context of a foreign seated arbitration) definitely bears further examination and consideration.
Conclusion
On a conspectus of all the issues and precedents discussed and analysed above, over 2017 - April 2020, the following may be concluded at this stage:
- The BALCO - Bhatia International dissonance has largely been settled, and there are now cohesive factors to determine whether or not parties implicitly / explicitly intended to exclude the application of Part I of the Act to their ICAs, in the event they pre-dated BALCO; and
- Section 87 of the Act (introduced by the 2019 Amendment) has been struck down, and accordingly, the 2015 Amendment will be applicable to: (a) arbitration proceedings arising out of agreements signed following the 2015 Amendment; (b) court proceedings arising out of arbitrations that arise post the 2015 Amendment; and (c) court proceedings arising out of pre-2015 Amendment arbitrations, which have been filed post the 2015 Amendment. Accordingly, proceedings for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act in foreign-seated arbitrations, which had been initiated following the 2015 Amendment would not be cut off at the knees. Further, there would be no automatic stay on the operation of awards passed in pre - 2015 arbitration proceedings when a Section 34 application was filed in relation thereto following the 2015 Amendment.
Additionally, outside of the issues flagged in this article, the SC has delivered another important clarificatory judgment in relation to ICAs, in L&T Scomi,25 where the SC declared that the when a consortium or an un-incorporated joint venture was a party to an arbitration agreement, the nationality of the partner / entity with effective management and control of the consortium / JV would determine whether the arbitration was an ICA or not.
From the above analysis, it is clear that confusion arises when the parliament and courts are not on the same page with respect to the intended direction of the Act. It is a known fact that the Government itself is defending a vast number of awards and therefore an automatic stay suits the Government, which not only gives the Government some breathing space but also saves it from depositing huge sums as pre-deposits. This was probably the rationale behind diluting the 2015 Amendment. However, the SC was quick to remedy this and held that Section 87 of the Act (introduced by the 2019 Amendment) was arbitrary and hence, unconstitutional.
While the intent of every agency of the country remains to make India an arbitration friendly jurisdiction, sometimes, these self-serving measures set the clock back in time. If India has to emerge as a truly arbitration friendly jurisdiction, the stakeholders will be required to rise above their own interests, collaborate and formulate some non-negotiable principles, especially with respect to ICAs, and ensure that those principles are followed in letter and spirit.
Indian jurisprudence on ICA has been making consistent progress, however, the road till here has not been completely smooth. With the progress, some new grey areas have emerged in the quagmire surrounding ICAs. For instance, as discussed in detail hereinbefore, the insertion of the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act, which makes Sections 9, 27 and 37(1) and (3) of the Act the exceptions to rule that Part I shall only apply to India-seated arbitrations and is subject to an agreement between the parties to the contrary, has caused a divergence of opinion. The courts have managed to lay down grounds for determining parties' implicit / explicit intention to exclude the applicability of Part I in general. However, contrary rulings of high courts evidence that no such test exists to determine whether parties intended to exclude the application of the exempted sections as well, and it seems likely that the question will be referred to the SC in the coming years.
In Part 2 of this three-part series, we will cover one of the most controversial grey areas created in ICAs the recent past: the seat / venue dichotomy.
Footnotes
1. Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services, Inc, (2012) 9 SCC 552 (SC, 2012) promulgated the rule that Part I would not be applicable to foreign-seated arbitrations. The rule in BALCO was only prospectively applicable to arbitration proceedings which arose out of arbitration agreements which had been concluded following the judgment.
2. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (SC, 2019).
3. Board of Cricket Control in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 287 (SC, 2018).
4. Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA, (2002) 4 SCC 105 (SC, 2002), whch promulgated the position of law prior to BALCO, i.e., that Part I would be applicable to foreign seated arbitrations, unless the same was explicitly / implicitly excluded by the parties. An analysis of how courts have interpreted arbitration agreements in light thereof and in light of BALCO up till June 2017 may be accessed here.
5. Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. v. Gupta Coal India Ltd. & Anr., (2015) 9 SCC 172 (SC, 2015).
6. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura Minechem Ltd., (2016) 11 SCC 508 (SC, 2016).
7. Section 2: Scope -
"(2) This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.
Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and recognised under the provisions of Part II of this Act."
8. International Nut Alliance LLC v. Binu John, 2018 (1) KHC 82 (Kerala High Court, 2017).
9. Archer Power Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Kohli Ventures Ltd. & Ors., 2017 (4) CTC 449 (Madras High Court, 2017).
10. GMR Energy Ltd. v. Doosan Power Systems India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2017 (6) ArbLR 447 (Delhi) (Delhi High Court, 2017).
11. Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., (2011) 9 SCC 735 (SC, 2011).
12. Sasan Power Ltd. v. North American Coal Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2014 (7) SCC 603 (SC, 2014).
13. Reliance Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603 (SC, 2014).
14. Imax Corporation vs. E-City Entertainment (I) Pvt. Ltd., (2017) 5 SCC 331 (SC, 2017).
15. Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. vs. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2017) 7 SCC 678 (SC, 2017).
16. Sasan Power Ltd v. North American Coal Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC Online MP 7417 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2015).
17. Focus Energy Ltd. v Reebok International Ltd., 2018 (6) ArbLR 234 (Delhi) (Delhi High Court, 2018).
18. Union of India v. Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc., AIR 2018 SC 4871 (SC, 2018).
19. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. (India) v. Construcciones Y Auxiliar De Ferrocarriles, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12173 (Delhi High Court, 2018).
20. Roger Shashoua & Ors. v. Mukesh Sharma & Ors., (2017) 14 SCC 722 (SC, 2017).
21. Heligo Charters Private Limited vs. Aircon Feibars FZE, 2018 (5) ArbLR 317 (Bombay High Court, 2018).
22. Norscot Rig Management Pvt. Ltd. v. Essar Oil field Services Ltd. & Ors., Comm. Arb. Petn. No. 1065 of 2018 (Bombay High Court, 2019).
23. Actis Consumer Grooming Products Ltd. v. Tigaksha Metallics Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Arb. Case No. 8 of 2018 (Himachal Pradesh High Court, 2020).
24. Raffles Design International India Pvt. Ltd. v. Educomp Professional Education Ltd., 2016 (6) ArbLR 426 (Del) (Delhi High Court, 2016).
25. M/s Larsen and Toubro Limited Scomi Engineering Bhd v. Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, (2019) 2 SCC 271 (SC, 2018).
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