Canada: Top 5 Civil Appeals from the Court of Appeal (July 2017)

Last Updated: July 26 2017
Article by Peter W. Kryworuk and Jacob R.W. Damstra

1. Ivic v. Lakovic, 2017 ONCA 446 (Hoy A.C.J.O., Blair and Hourigan JJ.A.), June 2, 2017

2. Hodge v. Neinstein, 2017 ONCA 494 (Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Brown JJ.A.), June 15, 2017

3. Bruff-Murphy v. Gunawardena, 2017 ONCA 502 (Lauwers, Hourigan and Benotto JJ.A.), June 16, 2017

4. Tracy v. Iran (Information and Security), 2017 ONCA 549 (Hoy A.C.J.O., Blair and Hourigan JJ.A.), June 30, 2017

5. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Society of Essex County v. Windsor (City), 2017 ONCA 555 (Hoy A.C.J.O., van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.), June 30, 2017*

1. Ivic v. Lakovic, 2017 ONCA 446 (Hoy A.C.J.O., Blair and Hourigan JJ.A.), June 2, 2017
Is a taxi company vicariously liable for an assault committed by one of its drivers? In this decision, the Court of Appeal considered this question. 
Tanja Ivic alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a cab driver who drove her home from a party. In addition to suing the driver personally, she brought a claim against the taxi company, pleading that it was vicariously liable for the acts of the driver, that it was negligent, and that it breached its fiduciary duty to her. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the motion judge dismissed Ivic's claim against the taxi company. 
Ivic did not challenge the motion judge's conclusion that her claim in negligence failed on the ground that she led no evidence with respect to the applicable standard of care in the circumstances nor regarding any breach on the part of the taxi company. She also did not challenge the motion judge's conclusion that she did not establish any basis for the existence of a fiduciary duty. Her appeal turned on whether the taxi company should be held liable for the assault, in the absence of any fault on its part.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the taxi company was not vicariously liable.
Hoy A.C.J.O. emphasized that in order for there to be a finding of vicarious liability, there must be a strong connection between what the employer was asking the employee to do and the wrongful act. She concluded that there was no such connection in this case. 
The Supreme Court of Canada outlined the test for assessing vicarious liability in Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534. When considering whether an employer is liable for unauthorized, intentional wrongdoing on the part of one of its employees, courts must consider: 
(i) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power;
(ii) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer's objectives;
(iii) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer's enterprise;
(iv) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; and 
(v) the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee's power.

While acknowledging that the opportunity for a taxi driver to assault a passenger was not negligible, Hoy A.C.J.O. found that the driver's opportunity for misconduct was not intimately connected to his functions. She distinguished the circumstances of this case from those in Bazley, where a non-profit organization that operated residential care facilities for the treatment of emotionally troubled children was held vicariously liable for an employee's sexual abuse. In Hoy A.C.J.O.'s view, the taxi driver's opportunity for misconduct did not rise to the level of what existed in Bazley.
Hoy A.C.J.O. disposed of the second, third and fourth factors noting that the alleged assault did not further the taxi company's aims in any respect and was not related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer's aims. Unlike the employee in Bazley, taxi drivers do not have physical contact with their customers in the course of carrying out their duties. In fact, the taxi company's Rules and Regulations sought to prevent such contact, explicitly providing: "Do not touch any customer if possible". Hoy A.C.J.O. noted that in dispatching the driver to pick up the appellant, the taxi company did not confer any power on him. "What power the driver had, he arrogated to himself through his own decisions", the court held.
Turning to the issue of the vulnerability of potential victims to the wrongful exercise of the employee's power, Hoy A.C.J.O. acknowledged that a lone, intoxicated woman out late at night is vulnerable. However, she is "prey" not only to taxi drivers. Any power wrongfully exercised by this driver was not predicated on his employment. Hoy A.C.J.O. agreed with the motion judge that the requisite strong connection between what the taxi company was asking the driver to do and the alleged sexual assault was not present. The company did not materially increase the risk of the appellant being sexually assaulted by permitting the driver to drive the taxi and dispatching him. The alleged assault was only "coincidentally linked" to its activities. 
Hoy A.C.J.O. also noted that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the imposition of vicarious liability in this case would further the broader policy rationales of fair compensation and deterrence. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
2. Hodge v. Neinstein, 2017 ONCA 494 (Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Brown JJ.A.), June 15, 2017
In this decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether solicitors who allegedly violated the Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 15 are immune from a class proceeding brought on behalf of their former and current clients.
The respondent Cassie Hodge was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2002. She retained the appellants, Gary Neinstein and Neinstein & Associates LLP, and signed a contingency fee arrangement with the firm. The agreement provided that the firm's legal fees would be equal to twenty-five per cent of the damages recovered on her behalf, plus partial indemnity costs and disbursements. 
Hodge entered into a settlement and the firm rendered a final account. 
It was undisputed that the contingency fee agreement and the amount the appellants charged were in violation of the Solicitors Act in two respects. First, contrary to s. 28.1(8), the firm did not obtain approval to include in its fee the costs obtained as part of Hodge's settlement. Second, in violation of s. 33(1), the firm charged interest from the date disbursements were incurred and not from a date one month after its bill was delivered. 
Hodge brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against the firm on behalf of all its contingency fee clients since October 2004. In her Amended Notice of Application, she sought a declaration that the firm was in violation of the Solicitors Act and breached its fiduciary duties to and contracts with the class members. She also sought an order that the firm repay any amounts taken for costs in addition to a percentage of damages. In all, 37 common issues were sought to be certified.
The certification judge found that Hodge failed to satisfy the five-part test for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. Specifically, the proposed class proceeding did not satisfy the "common issues" requirement in s. 5(1)(c) or the "preferable procedure" requirement in s. 5(1)(d).
The Divisional Court allowed Hodge's appeal and certified the matter as a class proceeding. It certified 19 common issues, including those based on the alleged breach of ss. 28.1(8) and 33(1) of the Solicitors Act. The court denied Hodge's motion to amend her Amended Notice of Application to plead the tort of conversion, however, concluding that it added nothing of substance to the proceeding as currently drafted. 
The appellants argued before the Court of Appeal that the matter should not have been certified as it failed to disclose a cause of action, fundamentally lacked in commonality and failed the preferable procedure requirement. They also submitted that ss. 23-25 of the Solicitors Act preclude the possibility of a class proceeding against the firm because those provisions form a "complete code" and require individual assessments of client accounts. The appellants asserted that in any event, solicitor-client privilege shielded them from the class proceeding. Hodge cross-appealed, arguing that the Divisional Court erred by denying her leave to amend her Amended Notice of Application to plead the tort of conversion and failing to certify further common issues.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Writing for the Court, Hoy A.C.J.O. held that it was not plain and obvious that a cause of action relying on s. 28.1 had no reasonable prospect of success. She also held that it was not plain and obvious that an application under ss. 23-25 was not available to review the impugned contingency fee agreements. Finally, she found that Hodge's pleadings disclosed a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.
Citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, Hoy A.C.J.O. noted that the underlying commonality question was whether allowing a proceeding to continue as a class proceeding would avoid duplication of fact-finding or legal analysis. She ultimately found no basis to interfere with 18 of the 19 common issues found by the lower court, taking issue only with the third common issue of whether the firm actually took amounts arising from costs in an award or settlement in contravention of the Solicitors Act. This, she held, should be characterized as an individual issue. 
Hoy A.C.J.O. held that the Divisional Court was correct in certifying the class proceeding on the basis that it was the preferable procedure for the resolution of these disputes, noting the three principal goals of judicial economy, behaviour modification and access to justice. She also agreed that the issue of solicitor-client privilege should not be a bar to certification because the court retains power under s. 10(1) of the Class Proceedings Act to decertify the class proceeding if it appears that the certification criteria are no longer satisfied.
Turning to the cross-appeal, Hoy A.C.J.O. rejected Hodge's submission that the Divisional Court erred by denying leave to amend her Amended Notice of Application to plead the tort of conversion. She agreed with Hodge, however, that the Divisional Court erred in failing to certify further common issues, holding that the court ought to have certified the issues of (i) whether the conduct of the firm – in allegedly failing to disclose information required by the Solicitors Act and the Regulation in its contingency fee agreements and taking as part of the fees amounts arising from awards or settlements for costs – breached fiduciary duties to class members, and (ii) whether there was entitlement to punitive damages.
3. Bruff-Murphy v. Gunawardena, 2017 ONCA 502 (Lauwers, Hourigan and Benotto JJ.A.), June 16, 2017
In this decision, the Court of Appeal revisited the role of the trial judge as "gatekeeper" to the admission of expert opinion evidence. 
The appellant, Liese Bruff-McArthur, was hit from behind by the respondent while stopped in her car. She alleged that she suffered multiple physical and mental injuries as a result of the accident, which left her unable to work and with a substantially diminished quality of life. Bruff-McArthur commenced an action against the respondent, who admitted liability. There was a 23 day jury trial on damages.
The appellant called a number of physicians who had either treated or examined her, two of whom were retained by the respondent's insurer to conduct assessments. These witnesses agreed that she suffered in the manner claimed and that the cause of her suffering was the motor vehicle accident. 
In support of its case, the defence called two medical expert witnesses which it had retained to conduct defence medical assessments. One of these witnesses, psychiatrist Dr. Monte Bail, raised a number of concerns. Counsel for the appellant objected to Dr. Bail's testimony, arguing that he was biased against her client and that his report was essentially an attack on Bruff-McArthur's credibility. 
The trial judge did not express any concerns with respect to Dr. Bail's testimony or his independence at the time, nor did he instruct the jury regarding the duty of expert witnesses. 
The jury returned with a verdict assessing general damages at $23,500 and rejecting all other heads of damages, including special damages, future care costs and past and future income loss.
Shortly thereafter, the trial judge released his decision on a threshold motion in which defence counsel had argued that Bruff-McArthur failed to meet the requirements in s. 267.4(12) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I. 8, i.e., of suffering a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function. In his reasons – in which he concluded that the appellant's claim for general damages did meet the threshold – the trial judge was highly critical of Dr. Bail's evidence, expressing concerns about the expert's methodology and independence. He found that Dr. Bail was not a credible witness and did not honour his obligation and written undertaking to be fair, objective and non-partisan pursuant to Rule 4.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Rather, he crossed the line from an objective witness to an advocate for the defence. 
The appellant took the position that trial fairness had been compromised, necessitating a new trial.
The Court of Appeal agreed.
Writing for the court, Hourigan J.A. noted the evolution of the role of expert witnesses from a "hired gun" or advocate for the party that retained him or her to an independent source of fair and objective opinion to assist the trier of fact. The role of the trial judge in relation to expert witnesses has evolved in tandem: as the "gatekeepers" to the admission of expert opinion evidence, trial judges are required to carefully scrutinize an expert witness's training and professional experience, and the necessity of his or her testimony, before the expert is qualified to give evidence in court. Hourigan J.A. emphasized that the gatekeeper function is especially important in jury cases as the jury may inappropriately defer to the expert's opinion rather than evaluate the expert evidence on their own.
Hourigan J.A. found that the trial judge failed to properly discharge the gatekeeper function at the qualification stage and held that had he done so, he would have concluded that the risks of permitting the expert to testify far outweighed any potential benefit from the proposed testimony. In Hourigan J.A.'s view, the concerns identified by the trial judge in his decision on the threshold motion were substantially correct: Dr. Bail "crossed the boundary of acceptable conduct and descended into the fray as a partisan advocate". In fulfilling his ongoing gatekeeper function, the trial judge ought to have excluded Dr. Bail's testimony, in whole or in part. He failed to do so, and trial fairness was "irreparably compromised".
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.
4. Tracy v. Iran (Information and Security), 2017 ONCA 549 (Hoy A.C.J.O., Blair and Hourigan JJ.A.), June 30, 2017
In 2012, Parliament enacted the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 (JVTA), which was designed to "deter terrorism by establishing a cause of action that allows victims of terrorism to sue perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters". The statute provides for a direct cause of action and an ability to sue on a foreign judgment obtained for loss or damage suffered as a result of terrorist activities. 
The respondents held judgments issued by courts in the United States for the sponsorship of terrorism by one or more of the appellants, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a military wing of that ministry. They sued in Ontario to enforce their judgments under the provisions of the JVTA
The appellants did not defend the respondents' enforcement actions, and ultimately a series of judgments and enforcement orders were granted. The appellants then moved unsuccessfully to set aside the judgments and orders in a series of motions before the motion judge.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeals, holding that if their submissions were accepted, they would have the effect of rendering enforcement actions under the JVTA "a cumbersome and largely unworkable process" that would provide limited recourse to victims of terrorism. 
Writing for the court, Hourigan J.A. held that the appellants' immunity from the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts was removed by the JVTA and s. 6.1 of the State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 (SIA) with respect to its sponsorship of terrorist acts that occurred on or after January 1, 1985, but not before. Hourigan J.A. rejected the appellants' submission that the JVTA could not apply retroactively, noting that Parliament has the power to make legislation retroactive as well as the authority to ignore international law through the use of clear statutory language. Hourigan J.A. also rejected the submission that the appellants were immune because the respondents failed to prove that the appellants were supporters of terrorism, explaining that the only proof necessary to maintain an enforcement action under s. 4(5) of the JVTA is the listing of the state sought to be sued under s. 6.1(1) of the SIA. In Hourigan J.A.'s view, the trial judge properly relied upon the facts found in the U.S. judgments and the respondents were not required to prove the commission of a specific offence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hourigan J.A. held that the motion judge applied the correct test for setting aside a default judgment and that the appellants did not meet their onus in establishing that even a single factor militated in favour of setting aside the judgments in question.
The Court of Appeal therefore dismissed the appeals, except for judgments based on acts of terrorism that occurred prior to January 1, 1985.
5. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Society of Essex County v. Windsor (City), 2017 ONCA 555 (Hoy A.C.J.O., van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.), June 30, 2017*
These appeals arose in the context of class actions commenced in 2008 and certified in 2012. The appellant charitable organizations sought remedies for what they characterized as unconstitutional or illegal taxation by the respondent municipalities, relating to bingo licence and administration fees charged by the municipalities. 
The appeals were from four orders of the case management judge, Patterson J., two in each proceeding. 
On January 13, 2017, Patterson J. made orders granting a motion to lift orders in the two proceedings dated June 9, 2016, protecting from disclosure the identities of persons who opted out of the class. The respondents moved to quash the appeals on the basis that the orders lifting the protective orders were interlocutory and that the route of appeal was to the Divisional Court with leave, pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. 
The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash the appeals from these orders. 
Writing for the court, van Rensburg J.A. agreed with the respondents that the protective orders were interlocutory. The orders were res judicata on the question of whether the identities and other information concerning opt-outs could be revealed; however, they did not determine on any final basis any substantive issue or right that could be determinative of the action. Justice van Rensburg rejected the appellants' submission that the orders were final because they may affect the rights of those who had opted out of the class, noting that as between the parties to the litigation, they were interlocutory orders that did not determine any rights or issues in the proceeding on a final basis. As the case management judge observed, the protective orders were designed to safeguard the integrity of the reconsideration period and should not outlast it. A decision to lift a protective order that was in place for a period that has expired is effectively a decision not to continue a protective order. Such an order is interlocutory. 
On November 1, 2016, Patterson J. refused leave to the appellants to amend their Amended Statements of Claim. The amendments, which the appellants proposed after the opting out period had expired, sought an accounting of licence and administration fees received by the municipalities found to be levied without authority or ultra vires, and disgorgement of such fees, with an alternative claim of restitution of fees charged to the plaintiffs and other class members in accordance with the accounting. The effect of the proposed amendments, if allowed, would have been to allow for the right to claim a recovery for the class of fees received by the respondents from persons no longer in the class.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals from Patterson J.'s orders. 
Justice van Rensburg held that the proposed amendments were not simply the clarification of a cause of action already pleaded, nor did they advance a different remedy for the same alleged cause of action. Rather, they sought to recast the claim from one for the return of fees paid by class members to a claim for disgorgement of all illegal licence and administration fees paid to the respondent municipalities within the class period, including those not paid by members of the class. In van Rensburg J.A.'s view, the acknowledgment that the claim, as originally pleaded, disclosed a cause of action did not assist the appellants in respect of amendments that sought to reconfigure the claims.
Justice van Rensburg rejected the appellants' reliance on Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, noting that while that case recognized that a claim can be made for repayment of illegal taxes as a public law remedy, it was not authority for a claim for the "disgorgement" of all allegedly illegal fees obtained by the respondents during the class period, including those paid by persons other than class members. Moreover, characterizing the remedy as a "disgorgement" did not assist the appellants. Disgorgement permits a plaintiff to claim not only its own loss but also the profit or gain of the defendant as a result of the wrong; it is not a vehicle for a plaintiff to pursue a claim for relief owed to someone who is a "stranger" to the action. Justice van Rensburg found that there was no reasonable prospect that the appellants' proposed claim for repayment of allegedly illegal taxes paid by persons other than class members would succeed. 
The Court of Appeal did not agree with the case management judge's suggestion that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, narrowed the Kingstreet constitutional/public law remedy to cases where the statute was subsequently declared unconstitutional.
Justice van Rensburg also held that there was no need for the proposed amendments to claim aggregate damages, noting that the appellants would be able to advance such a claim in the proceedings whether or not it was asserted in the pleadings. 
*Lerners LLP acted as counsel for the appellants on this appeal.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Peter W. Kryworuk
In association with
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Font Size:
Mondaq on Twitter
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
Email Address
Company Name
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Media & IT
 Real Estate
 Wealth Mgt
Asia Pacific
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Worldwide Updates
Check to state you have read and
agree to our Terms and Conditions

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.


Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.


Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.


A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.


This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.


If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.


This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.