Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil
Procedure, enacted last year, permits a Court to dismiss a
proceeding, on its own initiative after a summary procedure, if it
"appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise
an abuse of the process of the court." In its April 9, 2015
decision in Brown v. Lloyd’s of London Insurance
Market, the Ontario Court of Appeal employed Rule 2.1 for
the first time to dismiss an appeal that was frivolous and abusive.
The Registrar advised the appellant that his appeal may be
dismissed for this reason, and permitted him to make written
submissions. He did so, as did one of ten respondents. The Court
 Under Rule 2.1,
this court may stay or dismiss a proceeding that appears on its
face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the
process of the court. Having reviewed the appellant's
submissions and those of the respondent, the Toronto-Dominion Bank,
as well as the appellant's pleading and the motion judge's
reasons, we are satisfied that the appellant's appeal is
frivolous and vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the court's
process and, therefore, that it should be dismissed on the
authority of Rule 2.1.
 The motion
judge held that: i) the appellant's statement of claim contains
"no intelligible claims" against any of the defendants
"except possibly his former landlord [the defendant, A.
Esden-Tempski]"; and ii) apart from the claims concerning Mr.
Esden-Tempski, the incidents pleaded and the relief sought in
relation to them concern the "redesign [of] the social welfare
and legal services systems of Ontario". The motion judge
therefore held that "it is self-evident on the face of the
claim that it is frivolous and vexatious and cannot possibly
succeed as against all of the defendants except, possibly, Mr.
 We agree with
the motion judge's characterization of the appellant's
action and with his assessment of the appellant's pleading.
With the possible exception of the claims sought to be advanced
against Mr. Esden-Tempski, the allegations in the appellant's
pleading, to the extent that they are discernable, and the
associated relief claimed are either non-justiciable or fail to
disclose a reasonable cause of action within the meaning of the
 None of the
matters raised by the appellant in his Notice of Appeal and
responding submissions, described above, constitutes a ground of
appeal tenable at law from the motion judge's ruling. The
appellant's complaints either misconstrue the requirements of
the Rules, mischaracterize the motion judge's reasons, or raise
speculative and/or bald assertions of past or future alleged injury
to himself or others.
Like the motion judge, we conclude that while one might empathize
with some of the appellant's concerns and suggested
experiences, they do not disclose actionable complaints, as
pleaded. Nor do they afford a viable ground of appeal from the
motion judge's order.
these circumstances, the appellant's appeal must be dismissed
under Rule 2.1. Both the appellant's underlying action and his
proposed appeal are so devoid of potential merit as to be frivolous
and vexatious and an abuse of the court's process on their
face, save only with respect to the appellant's proposed claims
against Mr. Esden-Tempski. There can be no reasonable expectation
that, should the appeal proceed, the appellant could obtain the
relief he seeks.
For these reasons, this is an appropriate case for invocation of
Rule 2.1 in relation to the appellant's proposed proceeding in
this court. The appellant's appeal is therefore dismissed.
This is not an appropriate case for any award of costs in relation
to this Rule 2.1 motion. The court dispenses with the need for the
respondents to seek the appellant's approval as to the form and
content of this court's order.
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In Irwin v. Alberta Veterinary Medical Association, 2015 ABCA 396, the Alberta Court of Appeal found that the "ABVMA" failed to afford procedural fairness to a veterinarian undergoing an incapacity assessment.
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