On March 21, 2013, the Minister of Finance tabled in the House of Commons Canada's Economic Action Plan 2013 entitled "Jobs, Growth and Long Term Prosperity," complete with a Notice of Ways and Means Motion outlining the proposed tax measures and a Supplementary Information document providing particulars on each such measure (collectively, "Budget 2013").
There are 52 specific proposed tax measures outlined in the Notice of Ways and Means Case Moldowan 3 Motion to amend the Income Tax Act (the "Act"), and resolution 43 reads as follows:
43. (1) The portion of subsection 31(1) of the Act before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:
31. (1) If a taxpayer's chief source of income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and some other source of income that is a subordinate source of income for the taxpayer, then [. . .] the taxpayer's loss, if any, for the year from all farming businesses carried on by the taxpayer shall be deemed to be [. . .] [the lesser of the actual farming loss and $17,500.] [emphasis added]
The tax measure referred to above proposes to amend section 31 of the Act,1 which is the infamous restricted farm loss rule that, in its current form, has been terrorizing part-time farmers since 1952.2 The rule has been part of Canada's fiscal landscape for over 60 years and, as will be discussed below, has not only survived with baffling resiliency but, thanks to Budget 2013, is slated to miraculously gain strength in spite of a mountain of criticism and a legion of authoritative commentary and evidence (or lack thereof) that it has existed with no tax policy foundation and serves no purpose.
What's the Issue?
As a tax practitioner with intimate knowledge of the restricted farm loss rule and its historical development, application, and effect on taxpayers, the 10 words contained in Budget 2013 resolution 43 underlined above ("that is a subordinate source of income for the taxpayer", referred to in this article as the "Subordinate Clause") represent what I describe as the last brick laid near the apex of an Egyptian pyramid, being the most recent addition to a vast broad-based structure with a mysterious origin, having been built over a prolonged period of time through some windows of history we would rather forget, and containing the tombs of those part-time farmers who were sacrificed along the way.
In a nutshell, if the proposed amendment to the Act containing the Subordinate Clause becomes a rule of law,3 it will represent a codification of the judge-made rule outlined in the 1977 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moldowan v. R.4 ("Moldowan") which was, prior to August 2012, the definitive authority that dictated the interpretation of section 31.5 In August 2012, Moldowan (and everything it stood for) was emphatically overruled by a modern panel of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Craig6 ("Craig"), which was a major taxpayer victory and provided a new analysis to be undertaken when interpreting section 31. In response, resolution 43 in Budget 2013 signifies Parliament preemptively swinging its sovereign hammer (held by the Department of Finance) to not only overrule Craig, but going one drastic step further and proposing to reinstate the key Moldowan principle (which is embodied in the Subordinate Clause) that had become the Canada Revenue Agency's favourite weapon when battling a part-time farmer over farm loss deduction claims.7 However, in doing so, the Department of Finance has: (1) chosen to codify a highly controversial "test" (the Subordinate Clause); (2) with the words created in a highly controversial case (Moldowan); and (3) has gone so far as to justify the proposed amendment under the auspices of confirming the original "intended" tax policy associated with section 31. Each of these concerns will be dealt with in more detail below.
The Controversial Test The Subordinate Clause
As indicated above, section 31 has a long and controversial history, not only in relation to its technical wording, but also in relation to the interpretation of those words in Moldowan (this aspect will be discussed in the next section below).
Section 31 can be summarized as a restrictive provision aimed at part-time farmers8 which, unless you can escape the provision, will result in a limit (or cap) on the amount of your farming loss (up to a maximum farming loss of $8,750)9 that you are permitted to deduct from your other (non-farming) income for tax purposes in any given taxation year. Paraphrased for simplicity, the current operative words of section 31 state that you will not be restricted by the provision (i.e., you can deduct your farming losses against other income without restriction) if your chief source of income for a taxation year is farming or a combination of farming and some other source of income. Therefore, even as a part-time farmer, if your facts dictate that farming is your chief source of income or alternatively, if your facts dictate that your chief source of income is a combination of farming and some other source of income, then you are free from the section 31 restriction and your farming losses are fully deductible against your non-farming income, without limitation.10 The words appear straightforward enough insofar as they are English words each with their own regular meaning, but when strung together to formulate a statutory test, they have caused nothing but apprehension for both taxpayers and the judiciary.
In Moldowan, Dickson J had the unenviable task of construing the language of the predecessor of section 31, which he described as "an awkwardly worded and intractable section and the source of much debate"11 and which Bowman TCCJ noted in a later case "has been criticized as being unfair, draconian, [and] inappropriate to the fiscal objectives which it seeks to achieve and incomprehensible".12 The result of Dickson J's analysis was the creation of a judge-made rule (or test) that had the result of literally adding words to the statutory language, and the new words had far-reaching restrictive meaning that would be followed in their application for years to come. While Dickson J might not have intended to effectively create legislation13 in 1977 (notwithstanding that even a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada does not have the constitutional authority to create legislation; he or she can only interpret and apply it), he has managed to do so in 2013 by having his words added as a proposed amendment to section 31. It is his words that comprise the Subordinate Clause.
Prior to the Subordinate Clause making its way into the proposed legislation in Budget 2013, various judges of lower courts who were faced with fact situations that required the application of section 31 in the context of a restricted farm loss case and were bound to follow Moldowan managed to manufacture flexibility into the analysis by adopting the following approach articulated by Bowman TCCJ in Hover:14
Although the Moldowan case has been quoted to a greater or lesser extent in virtually every farming loss case since 1977 it assists in focusing on the criteria to be considered to set out the relevant passages from the reasons for judgment of the Court, bearing in mind the admonition that the words of the court are not to be parsed and analyzed with the same degree of particularity as one would employ in the interpretation of a statute. [emphasis added]
Obviously, if the Subordinate Clause is enacted as new tax legislation and becomes the words of a statute, this judicial flexibility to achieve fair results will be lost. It is for this reason that the proposed amendment to section 31 outlined in Budget 2013 could permanently change the fiscal landscape as it pertains to section 31, possibly resulting in a drastic shift in the practical application of section 31 such that it may prove to be impossible for any part-time farmer with a full-time occupation to ever be permitted a farm loss deduction in excess of $17,500, which would be much more onerous on taxpayers than the original Moldowan principles.
Continuing with the above noted concept of the highest analytical standard required for the interpretation of a statute, a technical analysis of the proposed words of section 31 (incorporating the Subordinate Clause) exposes the most compelling reason for its weaknessto state it frankly: the test is circular and illogical, and in fact, is not a test at all.
Repeated, the Budget 2013 proposed operative words of section 31 are:
31. (1) If a taxpayer's chief source of income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and some other source of income that is a subordinate source of income for the taxpayer, then [the taxpayer's loss is restricted to $17,500.] [emphasis added, underlining the Subordinate Clause]
The provision purports to contain two tests, each of which should be independently available to a taxpayer, thus affording the taxpayer two separate opportunities to apply the taxpayer's facts within the stated parameters to argue for full deduction of farming losses. However, the words contemplate only two scenarios that will permit full deduction of your farming losses when you are comparing two sources of income (for illustration, assume your two sources of income are professional income and farming income):
(1) Farming is your chief source of incomestop thereyou are entitled to full deduction of your farming losses (the required implication is that your professional income is your subordinate source of income); or
(2) Your professional income is your subordinate source of incomeyou are entitled to full deduction of your farming losses (the required implication is that your farming income is your chief source of incomesame as above).
The two scenarios must satisfy only one test and there is nothing to compare that would change the result for the taxpayer. The only way the taxpayer can deduct his or her full farming losses is if farming is his or her chief source of income. To say the same thing another way, the only way the taxpayer can deduct his or her full farming losses is if his or her professional income is his or her subordinate source of income (because it means that farming is his or her chief source of income). There is no either/or analysisthe "two" tests say the same thing. If that's the case, the Subordinate Clause serves no purpose.
This is not a new revelationSharlow JA expressed her concern about this logical inconsistency in Gunn15 and Rothstein J echoed his same concern in Craig.16
The Controversial Case Moldowan
In addition to the technical drafting problem with the Subordinate Clause noted above, the practical reality is that if the Subordinate Clause becomes a provision of the Act as it is proposed in Budget 2013, then for all intents and purposes, the Moldowan principles will be resurrected as the method of analysis for section 31 cases. As discussed above, the fact that the analysis will now be based on unassailable statutory language (by virtue of the codification of the Subordinate Clause) will not temper the judicial frustration with its application, but rather, will aggravate it. The Moldowan principles were overruled because they represented outdated and obsolete judge-made rules that have been supplanted by more contemporary Supreme Court of Canada authority17 and because the underlying statutory provision (section 31) does not have a basis in tax policy that is intuitive, discernible, or defensible to a trier of fact.
For these reasons, section 31 always has been and always will be shrouded in controversy. The Moldowan decision was supposed to create certainty for taxpayers to enable them to understand the tax rule in order to self-assess their tax liability and plan their tax affairs intelligently and for judges who must be able to interpret and apply the tax rule in a court of law.18 However, Moldowan had the opposite effect and just added fuel to the fire. After the decision, section 31 was the subject of challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that it was unconstitutionally vague and violated a taxpayer's rights to liberty and security19 and a taxpayer's right of equality.20 These Charter challenges were unsuccessful but paint a picture.
The problem is that section 31 is fundamentally flawed and beyond repair, and the addition of the Subordinate Clause to the provision will not cure these fundamental problems; it will likely exacerbate them.
The turning point in the judicial assault on Moldowan was the Federal Court of Appeal's 2006 decision in Gunn.21 By that time, Moldowan had already suffered a life-altering blow in 2002 when the Supreme Court of Canada rejected Moldowan's "reasonable expectation of profit test" ("REOP test") as the test to use in order to determine if a taxpayer has a source of income from which losses may be deducted.22 From that date forward, Stewart's "commercial manner test" was the new authority and provides significant assistance for future cases to determine if a taxpayer's farming activities constitute a business, thus satisfying the tax policy objective of ensuring that part-time farmers whose farming activity is a true hobby do not have the ability to deduct any farming losses from their non-farming income.23
In Gunn, Sharlow JA looks beyond the muddled wording of section 31 and ascribes to the modern juridical approach to the interpretation of taxing statutes by engaging in a thorough analysis of the legislative history of section 31 with a view to determining its purpose and how that purpose aligns with the object and spirit of the Act. After going to great lengths to gain satisfaction on this issue,24 she makes note that her research uncovered the fact that the first "statutory predecessor" to the current section 31 was enacted in 1949, and when that provision was read in the context of the 1948 Income Tax Act in force at that time, the "original version of the farm loss restriction was a relieving provision"25 [emphasis added].
She went on to explain that, starting in 1949, what would otherwise be a non-deductible farming loss when read in the context of the other provisions of the 1948 Income Tax Act, the predecessor to section 31 permitted a farmer to deduct up to $5,000 of such a farming loss against other income (note, the "farm loss restriction" limit at that time was $5,000, later to be increased to the current $8,750). Sharlow JA then expresses her next remarkable revelation that when two unrelated provisions of the 1948 Income Tax Act were repealed three years later in 1952, by virtue of the fact that the predecessor to section 31 was not repealed or changed simultaneously (it might have simply slipped through the cracks and went unnoticed during the reformulation of the tax laws), when left on its own, the predecessor to section 31 was instantaneously converted from a relieving provision into a penalizing provision for farmers. This analysis provides a logical explanation of the true policy justification for section 31 when it was first enacted (which again, was to provide a tax advantage to farmers, not a disadvantage).26
Sharlow JA completes her analysis of this concept by stating:
In my view, it remains unclear why the farmers who had been singled out for special relief in 1949 were subjected, in 1952, to a more onerous tax burden than the operators of other kinds of business.27
After completing her comprehensive analysis of the history of section 31, Sharlow JA then comes to the following conclusion:
After reviewing the authorities available to me, I have been able to find nothing that provides a satisfactory explanation for the existence of section 31 of the Income Tax Act. It would appear that in the past, some tax policy makers and tax policy advisors believed, incorrectly, that the statutory predecessors to section 31 were needed to control a particular form of tax abuse treating the cost of a hobby farm (that is, a non-commercial farming activity undertaken solely for personal or social purposes) as a business loss. If the same flawed justification for section 31 survives to this day, there would be a cogent argument for a Parliamentary review of section 31.28
What Sharlow JA could not have predicted was that after all of her efforts to research, dissect, and spell out the history and lack of purpose of section 31, Parliament would in fact review section 3129 and address the problems she raised by simply codifying a judge-made rule that had no statutory foundation.
More surprisingly, the warnings that she provided in her judgment that "finding unexpressed legislative intentions under the guise of purposive interpretation runs the risk of upsetting the balance Parliament has attempted to strike in the Act"30 and that "[i]t would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income Tax Act if clear language in a detailed provision of the Act were to be qualified by unexpressed exceptions derived from a court's view of the object and purpose of the provision"31 appear to have fallen on deaf ears at the Department of Finance. The statement by the Department of Finance that the Budget 2013 tax measure to install Dickson J's judge-made rule comprising the Subordinate Clause restores the "intended policy"32 of the restricted farm loss rule, after more than 60 years of enforcing that rule in a tax policy vacuum, is ex post facto and clearly constitutes assistance from a court in determining unexpressed legislative intentions.
The final33 kill blow to Moldowan of course was the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Craig reversing Moldowan (what was left of it after Stewart) and unequivocally stating that Moldowan cannot stand.34 With respect, the top juridical minds in this country have concluded that Moldowan and everything it stood for has no place in today's contemporary fiscal landscape. Without the proposed addition of the Subordinate Clause to section 31 contained in Budget 2013, the REOP test aspect of the Moldowan decision has been replaced by the Stewart analysis,35 and the section 31 analysis aspect of the Moldowan decision has been replaced by the Craig analysis. Therefore, without any intervention from Parliament, section 31, if it remained unamended, could finally enter an era during its storied history where it could offer taxpayers confidence in its scope and give the judiciary the tools to facilitate fair, consistent, and equitable treatment of taxpayers in its application.
Farming Case Study Horse Racing
A detailed analysis of tax policy considerations is beyond the scope of this article; however, my review of the jurisprudence associated with restricted farm loss cases uncovered a relevant observation with respect to an often unexpressed (but often implied) judicial attitude toward a specific type of farming activity horse racing.
The concern is best illustrated by the following comment made by Margeson TCJ in 2001:
This is not the usual "horse case" or "horse racing case" where the Appellant is typically a professional or a businessman with a substantial amount of income earned outside of any farm operation and who has taken up the farm operation for the purpose of satisfying his own ego, personal interests or fantasy and at the same time seeks to claim horrendous losses incurred which substantially reduce taxes that he has to pay on his other than farming income.36
A related candid judicial moment came from Bowman ACJTC in a 2004 decision:
I doubt as a matter of law there is a legal distinction between racehorses and cows or pigs for the purposes of section 31 but there is certainly a practical one. A rather cursory computer search indicates that of the multitude of farming loss cases under section 31 involving the raising of horses, only two or three appeals have been allowed. In other words, if you are hoping to get into the Moldowan category 1 you would be well advised to stay away from racehorses. Pigs, cows and chickens are probably a better bet [. . .].37
Although Sharlow JA bit her tongue while reversing Margeson TCJ's judgment in Taylor,38 she did make the following statement in Gunn:
If these comments are meant to suggest that section 31 ought to be applied more assiduously to a horse breeder than a hog farmer, or to an individual with a relatively high professional income earned in a city, than an individual with more modest employment income earned in a small rural town, then I do not subscribe to them.39
Aside from the arguments contained elsewhere in this article that section 31 has no apparent policy foundation and appears to serve no discernible purpose, the comments above put into question whether section 31 has any redeeming qualities whatsoever from a tax policy perspective and whether ill-conceived notions about horse racing shed light on the mystery behind why farming (horse racing related or otherwise) has been singled out as the only type of business that if not done exclusively will be subject to loss deduction restrictions. Fundamental tenets of good fiscal policy require that a tax law is fair (those in similar circumstances have similar tax obligations), neutral (does not encourage or discourage behavior that conflicts with policy objectives), and comprehensible (certainty in its application to taxpayers and the taxing authorities).40
From a broader economic perspective, the horse racing industry is misunderstood by tax policymakers. Although colloquially referred to as the Sport of Kings, horse racing is not reserved for the wealthy who engage in wasteful exorbitance seeking to be rewarded with ribbons and trophies. To the contrary, horse racing is a major economic force in Canada, contributing $5.7 billion annually to the Canadian economy, providing more than 47,000 full-time equivalent jobs, and supporting 45,000 horses whose owners have more than $4.8 billion invested in related assets.41 Furthermore, involvement by part-time farmers in this industry is critical to its continued existence.
Provincial governments have acknowledged the importance of horse racing to the provincial economy through their fiscal policies, evidenced by the revenue sharing models in place in certain provinces which allocate horse racing-sourced gaming revenue (both pari-mutuel revenue with respect to betting activity on the horse races themselves and also slot machine revenue that is directly generated by the respective horse racing facility) between the provincial government and the provincial horse racing industry.42
The supportive provincial fiscal policy with respect to horse racing is incompatible with the federal government's tax policy reflected by section 31, which discourages investment in horse racing businesses. This is a puzzling dichotomy that should be reconciled, assuming the respective levels of government have the same overall economic objectives of jobs, growth, and prosperity.
Budget 2013 Proposed Increase in the Section 31 Deduction Limit
In addition to the proposal to add the Subordinate Clause to section 31, the Department of Finance has also proposed in Budget 2013 that the deduction limit of $8,750 in section 31 be doubled to a deduction limit of $17,500. It is estimated that this measure will have a "fiscal cost" equivalent to the sum of $5 million per year,43 which represents the tax revenue that will be forgone by permitting an additional $8,750 of deduction room for those who will become entitled to it.
This "fiscal cost" of $5 million does not take into account the potential increase in tax revenue that would result from widespread denial of deduction of farming losses if taxpayers are shut down by the addition of the Subordinate Clause to section 31, and should be viewed in the context of budgeted tax revenue to be collected in the current year by the federal government of approximately $270 billion and the invisible and potentially huge unquantifiable cost on our economy caused by section 31 discouraging entrepreneurship and investments in farming businesses by Canadians who have other occupational income.
Further, and at the risk of sounding ungrateful on behalf of part-time farmers, the increase of the deduction limit from $8,750 to $17,500 is akin to raising minimum wage to 69 cents per hour in a world where a loaf of bread costs $120.
After Budget 2013 was released on March 21, 2013, I waited with bated breath for the public outcry. The purpose of this article is to compile and outline the major issues of concern with respect to section 31, in its current form and particularly in relation to the proposed amendment of the provision to add the Subordinate Clause as outlined in Budget 2013. Further, an articulation of the specific problems pertaining to the technical drafting of the proposed provision and the deleterious consequences that would result from the resurrection of the Moldowan principles into the interpretive sphere of the restricted farm loss rule can only aid in the necessary discussions and consultations that should occur prior to the passing of this measure into law.44
Perhaps the final brick to be placed at the apex of the Egyptian pyramid metaphor previously mentioned will be the repeal of section 31, thus completing the pyramid, sealing in its demons and permitting the monument to be observed in Canadian fiscal history as an era that is over but not forgotten.
1 For a detailed review of section 31, see the prior article I wrote on this subject: John Stavropoulos, "Restricted Farm Losses (Section 31 of the Income Tax Act) A Judicial Revolution is Upon Us" CCH Tax Topics No. 2041, April 21, 2011, pp. 1-5.
2 As will be described below, the provision was enacted in 1949, but it became troublesome for part-time farmers in 1952 after other provisions of the Act were repealed.
3 It is acknowledged that a budget proposal is the first step in the procedure for enacting new tax legislation, followed by draft legislation, the movement of a bill through the House of Commons, passing of the bill by the Senate, and the bill receiving Royal Assent.
4 Moldowan v. R., 1977 DTC 5213 (SCC).
5 It is arguable that, notwithstanding the principle of stare decisis, the Gunn case in 2006 (see infra note 15) supplanted Moldowan as the leading authority on certain section 31 matters (as they pertain to what is known as the "combination question").
6 The Queen v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43.
7 It is acknowledged that the "sovereign hammer" utilized by Parliament is legal and completely acceptable as a mechanism to reverse a court decision by changing the law; however, the remainder of this article will explain why the hammer is being misused in this instance.
8 The reference to a part-time farmer in this article refers to a person who is involved in a farming activity (such as raising crops, livestock, or racing horses) and who also has another occupation that earns income, thus having at least two sources of income.
9 Budget 2013 also proposes to increase this cap or limit to $17,500.
10 This determination of the applicability of the rule to your own facts obviously needs to be done with caution given the uncertainty associated with the application of this provision, as discussed in this article.
11 Supra note 4 at paragraph 2.
12 Hover v. Minister of National Revenue, 93 DTC 98 (TCC) ("Hover").
13 Hadley v. R., 85 DTC 5058 (FCTD). At paragraph 52, Joyal J comments that "[Dickson J] was not attempting to draft legislation".
14 Supra note 12 at paragraph 51.
15 Gunn v. R., 2006 DTC 6544 (FCA) at paragraphs 71 and 72.
16 Supra note 6 at paragraphs 12, 28, and 30.
17 Stewart v. Canada, 2002 SCC 46 ("Stewart") as it pertains to the hobby element (by application of the "commercial manner test") and Craig, Ibid., as it pertains to the chief source of income and combination question in section 31.
18 Supra note 15 at paragraph 78, citing Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R.,  2 S.C.R. 601.
19 Fleming v. Minister of National Revenue, 1986 DTC 1628 (TCC).
20 Supra note 12.
21 Supra note 15.
22 It is interesting to note that after the rejection of the REOP test in Stewart, the Department of Finance attempted to amend the Act to legislate the REOP test (announced in 2003); however, after a major backlash from interest groups in the financial sector, the proposed amendments have been put on hold indefinitely.
23 On the basis that the expenditures constitute "personal or living expenses," which are not deductible by virtue of their definition in subsection 248(1) of the Act. Note that this policy result is achieved without the need for section 31.
24 Supra note 15 at paragraphs 27-53.
25 Ibid. at paragraph 35.
26 Summarized: (1) Prior to 1949, a taxpayer's chief source of income could not be reduced by unrelated business losses of any kind, including farming losses; (2) In 1949, 1950, and 1951, a taxpayer's chief source of income could not be reduced by unrelated business losses of any kind, other than farming losses to a maximum of $5,000; (3) After 1951, a taxpayer's chief source of income can be reduced in unlimited amounts by unrelated business losses, other than farming losses, which are limited to $5,000 (later increased to $8,750)Morrissey v. R., 1989 DTC 5080 (FCA) at paragraph 8.
27 Supra note 15 at paragraph 38.
28 Ibid. at paragraph 54.
29 Only after Moldowan was reversed by Craig six years later in 2012.
30 Supra note 15 at paragraph 75, citing Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada,  3 S.C.R. 622 and various other Supreme Court of Canada authorities.
31 Ibid. at paragraph 76 citing P.W. Hogg and J.E. Magee, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law (2nd ed. 1997), at pp. 475-476.
32 2013 Budget in Tax Measures: Supplementary Information contained in CCH Special Report, The Federal Budget, March 21, 2013, at p. 363.
33 Prior to its reincarnation in Budget 2013.
34 Supra note 6 at paragraph 32.
35 Again, the hobby farmer would have no ability to gain a tax advantage under this test in any event.
36 Taylor v. R.,  3 CTC 2126 (TCC) at paragraph 24; reversed 2002 DTC 7596 (FCA).
37 McRae v. R.,  4 CTC 2136 (TCC) at paragraph 11.
38 Supra note 36.
39 Supra note 15 at paragraph 67, referring to similar comments made in Canada v. Donnelly (C.A.),  1 F.C. 513.
40 H. Kerr, K. McKenzie, and J. Mintz, Tax Policy in Canada (Canada: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012), Chapter 2, generally.
41 Vel Evans, The Economics of Horse Racing in Canada in 2010 (Newmarket: Strategic Equine Inc., 2012), research study containing statistical information for the year 2010, published March 2012.
42 Ibid. at page 4.
43 Budget 2013Table A2.1, Cost of Proposed Tax and Tariff Measures, Fiscal Costs (millions of dollars).
44 As of the publication date of this article, Bill C-60 (Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1), which implements certain income tax measures contained in Budget 2013, has manoeuvred through the legislative process and received Royal Assent on June 26, 2013. The section 31 measures contained in Budget 2013 were not included in the Bill.
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