Australia: "Nervous Shock - Employer´s Liability - Foreseeability Test" : New South Wales -v- Fahy - High Court Of Australia [2007] HCA20

Last Updated: 26 June 2007
Article by Andrew Adam

Publish Date: May 22, 2007

New South Wales -v- Fahy

High.Court.of.Australia
[2007] HCA 20

Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ

In Brief

  • The High Court has narrowly allowed an employer’s appeal from a unanimous NSW Court of Appeal decision on breach of duty giving rise to psychiatric injury.
  • The majority affirmed the need for preventative measures to be capable of clear description and not to conflict with overriding duties of defendants.
  • The Court declined to re-open the foreseeability test enunciated in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, although it may have left the door open for a challenge in the future.

Facts

  • The plaintiff was a constable in the Police Service of NSW. For the purposes of this litigation, the State was taken to be her employer and to have been vicariously liable for the actions of the plaintiff’s fellow officers.
  • In 1999 the plaintiff and her superior, Senior Constable Evans, attended the scene of a hold-up at a video store. On arriving, they learned that the video store attendant had been injured and was at a nearby medical centre.
  • On arriving at the medical centre, the officers were directed to the room where the victim was being attended to. The plaintiff went into the room but Evans did not. The victim had stab wounds to his chest and left side and was bleeding profusely. While the medical practitioner attended to the chest wound, the plaintiff attempted to stop the bleeding from the wound to the side. The victim feared for his life and gave the plaintiff messages to convey to his wife and children. While the plaintiff was attempting to stem the bleeding of the wound and comfort the victim, she called on her radio, following up the ambulance and relaying to her colleagues descriptions of the offenders.
  • Other officers arrived at the medical centre, but none joined the plaintiff. One senior officer, Inspector Whitten, took one look into the treatment room and turned and walked away. Once the victim was conveyed to the ambulance, Whitten told the plaintiff to put her hat back on as the media was there. On leaving the treatment room, the plaintiff saw a number of fellow officers, apparently doing nothing.
  • Following the incident, while the plaintiff was conveying the victim’s family to hospital, Whitten curtly told the plaintiff to stand down as he was unprepared to authorise any overtime for her simply to remain at the crime scene.
  • The Police Service had an informal practice of assigning officers duties in pairs (the "buddy system"). While the practice was informal, it was taught in police training and was generally followed. While there might be a division of labour between two attending officers during an emergency situation, typically each officer looked out for the other. The practice called on officers to be present in traumatic situations to provide support. Necessarily, the practice was not followed when officers attended to different aspects of a situation.
  • The NSW Ombudsman had, prior to this incident, identified the risk of psychiatric injury posed to police officers by traumatic situations.
  • Following the incident, the Police Service provided to the plaintiff (what was found to be) inadequate follow up to attempt to prevent her developing PTSD.
  • The plaintiff developed post traumatic stress disorder, which psychiatric evidence attributed to the plaintiff's feelings of abandonment.

Decision at Trial

  • The plaintiff sued the State in the District Court of NSW.
  • The trial judge found that there was no operational or other sufficient reason for Evans to have left the plaintiff alone in the treatment room with the victim and the medical practitioner.
  • The trial judge found that the plaintiff was left without support, both during and after a very traumatic incident. In the circumstances, the plaintiff's development of PTSD was clearly foreseeable.
  • The trial judge found that, since there was no reason why any of the other officers could not attend the treating room with the plaintiff, they were negligent in not being there to provide support.
  • Additionally, the trial judge found that the service, while it had a counselling service in place, failed to make this known to the plaintiff. Consequently, she did not access this service. This failure to provide post trauma counselling to the plaintiff was negligent.
  • The trial judge rejected the State’s submission that the plaintiff had not mitigated her loss by seeking appropriate treatment after her PTSD was diagnosed.

Intermediate Appeal

  • The State appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal, constituted by Spigelman CJ, Basten JA and Campbell AJA.
  • Spigelman CJ and Basten JA (Campbell AJA agreeing) found that, although operational reasons and other conflicting duties might prevent an officer's partner supporting her, Evans' failure to support the plaintiff constituted a breach of duty.
  • Spigelman CJ (Campbell AJA agreeing) found that the plaintiff's PTSD arose principally from her treatment of the victim. Once the plaintiff had established this, it was incumbent on the State to establish that she would have suffered PTSD notwithstanding Evans' failure.
  • Basten JA acknowledged that the plaintiff would likely have sustained PTSD notwithstanding Evans' failure. However, her condition would not have been as severe without that failure. It was then incumbent on the State to "unscramble the egg" and show that the plaintiff's condition arose not from Evans' failure but from the trauma of the incident itself. The State did not discharge this onus.
  • The Court of Appeal unanimously reversed the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff had not failed to mitigate her condition by treatment. The Court of Appeal would therefore have remitted the matter back to the District Court to determine the appropriate discount for the plaintiff's failure to mitigate.

Decision in High Court

  • The State appealed to the High Court, arguing that breach of duty of care had not been made out. Additionally, it sought to re-open Shirt insofar as it dealt with foreseeability of harm.
  • The Court found in favour of the State by a 4:3 majority. Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ found for the State. Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Crennan JJ would have dismissed the State's appeal.

The majority judgments

  • Gummow and Hayne JJ found for the State and joined in allowing the appeal. They considered that it would be unreasonable to impose on police officers a duty to provide support to their partners, for the reasons that:
  • The requirement, as expressed, would require officers working alone to have this support.
  • There will often be situations where, for operational reasons, the two officers need to separate. Indeed, the more traumatic the incident, the more likely that the officers will have different calls on their attention.
  • It was too difficult to give content to "providing psychological support". Some individuals are best supported by the presence of another. Others are better assisted by colleagues maintaining their distance and allowing them to recover their composure. Support may be better expressed by silence than intrusive enquiry as to one's wellbeing.
  • Additionally, Gummow and Hayne JJ found that a requirement that officers remain together would be trumped by the obligations of officers under the Police Service Act 1990. This fell into the class of "conflicting duties", identified in the Shirt calculus.
  • Callinan and Heydon JJ joined in allowing the appeal. They noted the plaintiff had dealt with other stressful incidents without requiring assistance. They questioned whether an accompanying officer would assist in all circumstances. What if the officers did not get on? Additionally, they recognised that police resources are limited and it may not be appropriate to insist on officers being partnered at all times.
  • Finally, Callinan and Heydon JJ held that, given that the police service provided training to reduce and relieve stress and the inevitability of traumatic situations in police work, this negated the requirement for the plaintiff to be buddied.

The minority judgments

  • Gleeson CJ accepted that it would be inappropriate for the courts to require police officers always to have a second officer supporting them when exposed to trauma as there would no doubt be other calls on the second officer's attention. However, there was no such other call on Evans' attention in this matter. His failure to support the plaintiff clearly entailed the foreseeable consequence of psychiatric injury. Evans, and the State vicariously, were negligent in the causation of the plaintiff's condition. He would have dismissed the appeal.
  • Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal. He noted the Ombudsman's report on Officers Under Stress and the identified need for managers within the service to identify and respond to the needs of officers suffering psychological stress. Additionally, he noted the expert evidence at trial that at the time of the incident it was well known within police services that inappropriate police management had negative outcomes on officers' PTSD. He noted the then existing assistance for managing PTSD had not been implemented in the plaintiff's case.
  • He disagreed with Gummow and Hayne JJ that the buddy system was inconsistent with the execution of officers' duties. He noted that the buddy system was not absolute or inflexible. Therefore, it could easily give way to operational requirements that necessitated officers working alone. However, that did not detract from its applicability when there was no competing call on an officer's buddy's attention.
  • He would have found the State negligent, both vicariously for Evans's desertion of the plaintiff and also its direct liability for failing to bring into action its existing counselling programme.
  • Crennan J would have dismissed the appeal. The service had set up the buddy system as a reasonable, obvious and practical measure by which the known risks of traumatic situations could be minimised. She disagreed that the buddy system imposed any unduly onerous burden on the police service or that it would be inconsistent with the effective discharge of officers' statutory duties.

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt

  • The State sought to reopen Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, in as far as it identified the threshold foreseeability of a risk to which a defendant must have regard. Shirt required a defendant to have regard to risks that were not far fetched or fanciful. This part of the decision in Shirt has been subject to a significant criticism outside courts, and some criticism by judges.
  • Gleeson CJ and Crennan J did not directly address this issue.
  • Kirby, Gummow and Hayne JJ would not have re-opened Shirt on the bases that:
  • The decision in Shirt has been a settled part of Australian law for over 25 years.
  • Most of the criticism of the decision was really criticism of misapplication of the decision by trial judges.
  • The Civil Liability Acts of the various States and Territories had generally codified in a modified form, the Shirt test: for example subs 5B(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). (But see Drinkwater v Howarth [2006] NSWCA 222, in which the Court of Appeal stated that subs 5B(1) might be equivalent to the Shirt test.)
  • As it was unnecessary to their decision, Callinan and Heydon JJ did not re-open Shirt. If they were to consider the issue, they would have replaced it with the test in Caterson v Commissioner for Railways (1973) 128 CLR 99, that the materialisation of a risk is foreseeable only if it is "not unlikely to occur".

Implications

  • The High Court has reiterated that steps a defendant ought to have taken to reduce a risk must be capable of clear expression and not inconsistent with the defendant’s other duties.
  • The Court has declined an invitation to refashion the test of foreseeability in Shirt, although two of the five judges who directly addressed this issue would have. There may be some prospect in the future of the High Court reconsidering this issue. However, given the statutory codifications of a test of foreseeability in the Civil Liability Acts, the general importance of such a question (relevant to the High Court’s grant of special leave to appeal) will fall away over time.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Authors
Andrew Adam
 
Some comments from our readers…
“The articles are extremely timely and highly applicable”
“I often find critical information not available elsewhere”
“As in-house counsel, Mondaq’s service is of great value”

Tools
Print
Font Size:
Translation
Channels
Mondaq on Twitter
 
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert
Email Address
Company Name
Password
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
Accounting and Audit
Anti-trust/Competition Law
Consumer Protection
Corporate/Commercial Law
Criminal Law
Employment and HR
Energy and Natural Resources
Environment
Family and Matrimonial
Finance and Banking
Food, Drugs, Healthcare, Life Sciences
Government, Public Sector
Immigration
Insolvency/Bankruptcy, Re-structuring
Insurance
Intellectual Property
International Law
Law Practice Management
Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration
Media, Telecoms, IT, Entertainment
Privacy
Real Estate and Construction
Strategy
Tax
Transport
Wealth Management
Regions
Africa
Asia
Asia Pacific
Australasia
Canada
Caribbean
Europe
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
U.K.
United States
Worldwide Updates

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of www.mondaq.com

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.

Disclaimer

Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.

Registration

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.

Cookies

A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.

Links

This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.

Mail-A-Friend

If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.

Security

This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.