The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman radically altered the manner in which general personal jurisdiction is analyzed in the United States, holding that except where extraordinary circumstances are present, a corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction only in the state in which it is incorporated, and the state in which it has its principal place of business. In the wake of that decision, plaintiffs have scrambled to find alternative bases for personal jurisdiction, especially where specific personal jurisdiction is not present.

The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, addressed one such issue—whether the registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service in Delaware constituted consent to general personal jurisdiction. The action arose out of claims for wrongful exposure to asbestos. The plaintiffs, Ralph and Sandra Cepec, commenced the action against seven companies associated with the manufacture, distribution or installation of products containing asbestos. Genuine Parts Co., one of the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the claims asserted had nothing to do with its activities in Delaware, and there was no basis for a finding of general personal jurisdiction. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Genuine Parts consented to general personal jurisdiction before the Delaware courts "merely by registering to do business in Delaware."

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, holding that in light of Daimler, Delaware's registration statutes "must be read as a requirement that a foreign corporation must appoint a registered agent to accept service of process, but not as a broad consent to personal jurisdiction in any cause of action, however unrelated to that foreign corporation's activities in Delaware." In reaching its decision, the court reversed twenty-five years of Delaware precedent, noting that a narrower reading of its registration statute (1) avoided subjecting corporations that register to general personal jurisdiction where it would not exist for foreign corporations that fail to properly register, and (2) "has the intuitively sensible effect of not subjecting properly registered foreign corporations to an 'unacceptably grasping' and 'exorbitant' exercise of jurisdiction, consistent with Daimler's teachings." Id. at 31-32.

As the Delaware Supreme Court noted in its decision, United States courts are split on this issue; the court specifically referenced the conflicting decisions of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587, 591 (D. Del. 2015) (finding that registration did not equal consent to jurisdiction), and Astrazeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 555 (D. Del. 2015) (finding that registration does constitute consent). Accordingly, we likely will continue to see this issue raised in cases until the US Supreme Court decides this issue. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 2016 Del. LEXIS 247 (Del. Apr. 18, 2016).

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