European Union: EU Council Adopts REMIT: New Rules On Energy Market Abuse In Force By December

Last Updated: 8 December 2011
Article by Peter Willis

On 10 October, the EU Council of Ministers adopted the Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT).1 REMIT will prohibit market abuse (insider trading and market manipulation) in physical and over-the-counter financial transactions in wholesale energy markets. It will effectively extend to these transactions the market abuse regime currently applicable to transactions in securities. Extending the European Commission's original proposal, it will now also apply to transactions entered into by end users of gas and electricity with an annual consumption of 600 GWh or more. The key prohibitions are expected to enter into force by December this year. However, a number of elements of the new regime, including data collection and trader registration requirements, and specific enforcement powers for national energy regulators, will come into force at a later date.


REMIT will:

  • prohibit insider trading in wholesale energy products;
  • require the publication of inside information in relation to wholesale energy products;
  • prohibit market manipulation in relation to wholesale energy products;
  • require the European energy regulatory authority, ACER, to monitor EU wholesale energy markets;
  • require energy market participants (primarily through brokers and exchanges) to submit detailed information on energy transactions to ACER;
  • require ACER to work closely with national energy regulators and to exchange information with them, subject to safeguards as to the confidentiality of information;
  • require energy market participants to register with national regulators; and
  • give national energy regulators powers of investigation and enforcement, including powers to impose "dissuasive" penalties.


The interaction between the sector-specific rules in REMIT and the general rules on insider trading and market manipulation is complex. Essentially REMIT applies a range of obligations, including disclosure and registration requirements, to wholesale energy products,2 namely:

  1. contracts for the supply of electricity or natural gas where delivery is in the EU;
  2. derivatives relating to electricity or natural gas produced, traded or delivered in the EU;
  3. contracts relating to the transportation of electricity or natural gas in the EU;
  4. derivatives relating to the transportation of electricity or natural gas in the EU.

However, the two key REMIT prohibitions on insider trading and market manipulation do not apply3 to energy derivatives traded on exchanges such as NASDAQ OMX and APX-ENDEX (which according to the Commission in the case of electricity represent only about 16% of total volumes). They remain covered by the market manipulation and insider trading prohibitions in the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)4.

It is also important to note that the wording of the REMIT definitions and prohibitions follows very closely the terms used in MAD and its implementing measures. The intention is that the two regimes should be consistent, and the guidance already produced by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), now the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) will therefore provide a useful aid to interpreting REMIT. However, the position has been further complicated by the the Commission's proposal for a new Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)5 to replace MAD. The definitions proposed for MAR are very similar, but not identical, to those used in REMIT6. At the same time, the Commission is proposing7 a revision of the Directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID)8

REMIT does not apply to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, but ACER's monitoring of wholesale energy markets (see below) must take into account the interactions between the EU ETS and wholesale energy markets. Looking ahead, emission allowances will be classified as financial instruments as part of the review of MiFID, and so will fall within the scope of MAR.

Application to end customers

REMIT applies mainly to transactions in relation to wholesale energy products. However, recognising the impact of energy-intensive end users on wholesale markets, the European Parliament adopted an amendment to the Commission's original proposal, extending REMIT to contracts for the supply and distribution of electricity or natural gas to final customers with a consumption capacity greater than 600 GWh per year.9 In this case, consumption capacity means the capacity of all plants owned by the same economic entity (i.e. at a group level) on markets with interrelated wholesale prices. To illustrate the scale of the requirement, 600 GWh per year corresponds to the consumption of a large cement manufacturer with 6 plants or so.

Insider trading

The first of the REMIT prohibitions is the prohibition of insider trading.10 REMIT prohibits those who possess inside information in relation to a wholesale energy product from 3 types of activity:

  • use – using that information by acquiring or disposing of wholesale energy products to which that information relates;
  • disclosure – disclosing that information to any other person, unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of their employment, profession or duties;
  • inducement – recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of the inside information, to acquire or dispose of wholesale energy products to which that information relates.

FSA guidance

The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), in its Code of Market Conduct, 11 at 1.3.3, provides useful guidance for the purposes of MAD - which should be equally valid for REMIT - on factors that will tend to suggest that a person possessing inside information has not used it as the basis for entering into a transaction.

"(1) if the decision to deal or attempt to deal was made before the person possessed the relevant inside information; or

(2) if the person concerned is dealing to satisfy a legal or regulatory obligation which came into being before he possessed the relevant inside information12; or

(3) if a person is an organisation, if none of the individuals in possession of the inside information:

  1. had any involvement in the decision to deal; or
  2. behaved in such a way as to influence, directly or indirectly, the decision to engage in the dealing; or
  3. had any contact with those who were involved in the decision to engage in the dealing whereby the information could have been transmitted.

In the opinion of the FSA, if the inside information is held behind an effective Chinese wall, or similarly effective arrangements, from the individuals who are involved in or who influence the decision to deal, that indicates that the decision to deal by an organisation is not "on the basis of" inside information." This concept is echoed expressly in the proposal for MAR, which provides that a transaction does not amount to insider dealing where a legal person has "effective arrangements" in place to prevent those with inside information from being involved in or influencing any decision.13 This emphasises the importance of an appropriate compliance programme, including arrangements for ensuring that inside information is not passed to those responsible for trading.

The prohibition on insider trading applies to managers, board members, shareholders and those who obtain the information through the exercise of their business activities, as well as those who acquire it through criminal activity or who know or ought to know that it is inside information.14 Where the person possessing the inside information is a legal person such as a company, the prohibition also applies to any individual who takes part in the decision to carry out the transaction on behalf of the legal person.15


In its judgment in Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group NV v. CBFA, the European Court of Justice held that:

"the fact that a person... in possession of inside information, acquires or disposes of, or tries to acquire or dispose of, for his own account or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, the financial instruments to which that information relates implies that that person has 'used that information' within the meaning of that provision, but without prejudice to the rights of the defence and, in particular, to the right to be able to rebut that presumption."

Spector has given rise to a degree of uncertainty which the MAR proposal has unfortunately not remedied. In any event, however, it should be noted that the scope for revising certain REMIT definitions outlined below extends only to the definition of "inside information" and not to the definition of "insider trading."

There are a number of exceptions to the prohibition.

There is a specific exception to the prohibitions on use and inducement where transmission system operators purchase electricity or natural gas in order to ensure the safe and secure operation of the system in accordance with their obligations under Directives 2009/72 and 2009/73 (the third package Directives).16 So, for example, where a TSO possesses inside information in relation to a constraint on its transmission system, it is not prohibited from using that information in order to acquire the electricity required to resolve that constraint. However, the prohibition on disclosure does apply in these circumstances.

More generally, the prohibition on insider trading does not apply17 to:

  1. transactions resulting from an agreement concluded, or an order to trade placed, before the person concerned came into possession of inside information;
  2. transactions entered into by producers or operators of gas storage or LNG import facilities, the sole purpose of which is to cover the immediate physical loss resulting from unplanned outages, where the market participant would otherwise not be able to meet existing contractual obligations or where such action is undertaken in agreement with the transmission system operator(s) concerned in order to ensure safe and secure operation of the system. In such a situation, the relevant information relating to the transactions must be reported to ACER and the national regulatory authority. This reporting obligation is in addition to the general requirement to disclose insider information, outlined below;
  3. market participants acting under national emergency rules. In this case, the authority competent for emergency planning is required to publish the inside information.

What is "inside information"?

Inside information for the purposes of REMIT means18 information which:

  • is of a precise nature (i.e. indicating an actual or reasonably anticipated event or set of circumstances, and which is sufficiently specific to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or event on the prices of wholesale energy products)19;
  • has not been made public;
  • relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more wholesale energy products; and
  • if it were made public, would be likely to affect significantly the prices of those wholesale energy products.

For these purposes, "information" means20 information which:

  1. must be made public under Regulations 714/2009 and 715/2009, including guidelines and network codes adopted under those Regulations (so the content of EU network codes is capable of constituting inside information, and acting on the knowledge that a network code will in future prohibit a particular technology or standard could amount to insider trading);
  2. relates to the capacity and use of facilities for production, storage, consumption or transmission of electricity or natural gas or related to the capacity and use of LNG facilities, including planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities;
  3. must be disclosed in accordance with legal or regulatory provisions at EU or national level, market rules, and contracts or customs on the relevant wholesale energy market, insofar as this information is likely to have a significant effect on the prices of wholesale energy products; or
  4. a reasonable market participant would be likely to use as part of the basis of its decision to enter into a transaction relating to, or to issue an order to trade in, a wholesale energy product.

This definition of "information" therefore differs from MAD which, in the case of commodity derivatives, states that inside information is information that market users would expect to receive in accordance with accepted market practices. Commission Directive 2004/72, implementing MAD, provides that this is information which is routinely made available to market users or which must be disclosed in accordance with legal or regulatory obligations, market rules, contracts or market customs. Following criticism, particularly by CESR and the European energy regulators' group ERGEG, that the commodity derivatives-specific definition in MAD was difficult to apply, a single definition of inside information is adopted in the proposal for MAR. It specifies, however, that for derivatives which are wholesale energy products, firstly information required to be disclosed under REMIT should be considered inside information, and secondly competent authorities should take into account the specific characteristics of the definitions in REMIT when they apply the Articles in MAR relating to inside information, insider dealing and market manipulation.

The dissemination of information for the purposes of journalism or artistic expression is to be assessed taking into account the rules governing the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media, unless the persons concerned derive an advantage or profit from the dissemination, or it is done with the intention of misleading the market as to the supply of, or demand for, or price of wholesale energy products.21

Obligation to publish inside information

Market participants are required to publish "in an effective and timely manner" inside information which they possess in respect of businesses or facilities which they or their group companies own or control or for which they are responsible, either in whole or in part. Disclosure must include information relevant to the capacity and use of facilities for production, storage, consumption or transmission of electricity or natural gas or related to the capacity and use of LNG facilities, including planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities.22

A market participant may delay the publication of inside information so as not to prejudice its legitimate interests, provided that the omission is not likely to mislead the public and provided that the market participant keeps the information confidential and does not use it in its own trading. It must without delay provide that information, together with a justification for the delay of the public disclosure, to ACER and the national regulatory authority.23 In other words, it must make the disclosure to the authorities while it is still keeping the information confidential from the market. It should be noted that this mandatory notification requirement is more onerous than the corresponding provisions in both MAD, which merely permits Member States to require disclosure to the competent authority and the proposal for MAR, which requires the issuer/market participant to inform the competent authority immediately after the information is disclosed to the public.

Commission guidance under MAD

The Commission's "Level 2" implementing Directive 2003/124,24 in Article 3(1), elaborates on the corresponding provision of MAD, indicating that the "legitimate interests" of the market participant, justifying delayed disclosure, relate to exceptional circumstances such as the following:

  1. "negotiations in course, or related elements, where the outcome or normal pattern of those negotiations would be likely to be affected by public disclosure. In particular, in the event that the financial viability of the issuer is in grave and imminent danger, although not within the scope of the applicable insolvency law, public disclosure of information may be delayed for a limited period where such a public disclosure would seriously jeopardise the interest of existing and potential shareholders by undermining the conclusion of specific negotiations designed to ensure the long term financial recovery of the issuer;
  2. decisions taken or contracts made by the management body of an issuer which need the approval of another body of the issuer in order to become effective, where the organisation of such an issuer requires the separation between these bodies, provided that a public disclosure of the information before such approval together with the simultaneous announcement that this approval is still pending would jeopardise the correct assessment of the information by the public."

Although these MAD examples are clearly directed at insider trading in the context of the issue of securities, they provide a useful illustration of the type of circumstance to which this provision will apply in REMIT.

Where a market participant or its employee or agent discloses inside information, it must ensure simultaneous complete and effective public disclosure of the information. In the event of unintentional disclosure, it must ensure complete and effective public disclosure as soon as possible. These requirements do not apply if the person receiving the information has a duty of confidentiality.25

The publication of inside information, including in aggregated form, in accordance with Regulations 714/2009 or 715/2009, or guidelines or network codes adopted pursuant to those Regulations, will satisfy the disclosure requirements.

Where a transmission system operator has been granted an exemption from publishing certain data under Regulations 714/2009 or 715/2009, the TSO is also exempted from the publication requirement in REMIT. The disclosure requirement is also without prejudice to the right of market participants to delay the disclosure of sensitive information relating to the protection of critical infrastructure pursuant to Directive 2008/114.

Market manipulation

REMIT also prohibits any engagement in market manipulation in relation to wholesale energy products.26

Market manipulation means27 entering into any transaction or issuing any order to trade in wholesale products which:

  1. gives or is likely to give false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for or price of wholesale energy products;

CESR guidance on false/misleading transactions

CESR's first set of "Level 3" guidance,28 at 4.11, provides the following illustrations of false/misleading transactions in the context of MAD, which can usefully be carried across to REMIT with limited modification:

  1. "Wash trades. This is the practice of entering into arrangements for the sale or purchase of a financial instrument where there is no change in beneficial interests or market risk or where the transfer of beneficial interest or market risk is only between parties who are acting in concert or collusion...
  2. Painting the tape. This practice involves engaging in a transaction or series of transactions which are shown on a public display facility to give the impression of activity or price movement in a financial instrument.
  3. Improper matched orders. These are transactions where both buy and sell orders are entered at or nearly at the same time, with the same price and quantity by different but colluding parties, unless the transactions are legitimate trades carried out in conformity with the rules of the relevant trading platform (e.g. crossing trades).
  4. Placing orders with no intention of executing them. This involves the entering of orders, especially into electronic trading systems, which are higher/lower than the previous bid/offer. The intention is not to execute the order but to give a misleading impression that there is demand for or supply of the financial instrument at that price. The orders are then withdrawn from the market before they are executed. (A variant on this type of market manipulation is to place a small order to move the bid/offer price of the financial instrument and being prepared for that order to be executed if it cannot be withdrawn in time.)"29
  1. secures or attempts to secure, by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or several wholesale energy products at an artificial level, unless the person who entered into the transaction or issued the order to trade establishes that his reasons for doing so are legitimate and that that transaction or order to trade conforms to accepted market practices on the wholesale energy market concerned;

Commission guidance on accepted market practices

Recital 14 of REMIT refers to the definition of AMPs in Article 1(5) of MAD. This is in turn expanded upon in the Commission's "Level 2" guidance in Directive 2004/72,30 which provides at Article 2(1) (a) that competent authorities must take the following factors into account when considering whether a particular action constitutes an AMP:

  1. The level of transparency of the relevant market practice to the whole market;
  2. The need to safeguard the operation of market forces and the proper interplay of the forces of supply and demand;
  3. The degree to which the relevant market practice has an impact on market liquidity and efficiency;
  4. The degree to which the relevant practice takes into account the trading mechanism of the relevant market and enables market participants to react properly and in a timely manner to the new market situation created by that practice;
  5. The risk inherent in the relevant practice for the integrity of, directly or indirectly, related markets, whether regulated or not, in the relevant financial instrument within the whole Community;
  6. The outcome of any investigation of the relevant market practice by any competent authority or other authority mentioned in Article 12(1) of Directive 2003/6/EC, in particular whether the relevant market practice breached rules or regulations designed to prevent market abuse, or codes of conduct, be it on the market in question or on directly or indirectly related markets within the Community;
  7. The structural characteristics of the relevant market including whether it is regulated or not, the types of financial instruments traded and the type of market participants, including the extent of retail investors' participation in the relevant market."

It will be seen that this falls far short of creating any safe harbours, and provides very little certainty. Recognising this uncertainty, and with a desire to harmonise the regime across Europe, no equivalent provision has been included in the proposal for MAR.

CESR guidance on price positioning

CESR's first set of "Level 3" guidance,31 at 4.12, provides a rather more useful list of examples of practices that do not constitute "accepted market practices" (AMPs):

  1. "a) Marking the close. This practice involves deliberately buying or selling securities or derivatives contracts at the close of the market in an effort to alter the closing price of the security or derivatives contract. This practice may take place on any individual trading day but is particularly associated with dates such as future/option expiry dates or quarterly/annual portfolio or index reference/valuation points.
  2. ...
  3. Abusive squeeze. This involves a party or parties with a significant influence over the supply of, or demand for, or delivery mechanisms for a financial instrument and/or the underlying product of a derivative contract exploiting a dominant position in order materially to distort the price at which others have to deliver, take delivery or defer delivery of the instrument/product in order to satisfy their obligations. (It should be noted that the proper interaction of supply and demand can and often does lead to market tightness but that this is not of itself market manipulation. Nor does having a significant influence over the supply of, demand for, or delivery mechanisms for an investment/product by itself constitute market manipulation.)
  4. Creation of a floor in the price pattern. This practice is usually carried out by issuers or other entities which control them, and involves transactions or orders to trade employed in such a way that obstacles are created to the share prices falling below a certain level, mainly in order to avoid negative consequences for their share or credit ratings. This needs to be distinguished from legitimate trading in shares as part of "buy-back" programmes or the stabilisation of financial instruments.
  5. Excessive bid-ask spreads. This conduct is carried out by intermediaries which have market power - such as specialists or market makers acting in cooperation - in such a way intentionally to move the bid-ask spread to and/or to maintain it at artificial levels and far from fair values, by abusing of their market power, i.e. the absence of other competitors.
  6. Trading on one market to improperly position the price of a financial instrument on a related market. This practice involves undertaking trading in one market with a view to improperly influencing the price of the same or a related financial instrument in another market. Examples might be conducting trades in an equity to position the price of its derivative traded on another market at a distorted level or trading in the underlying product of a commodity derivative to distort the price of the derivative contract. (Transactions to take legitimate advantage of differences in the prices of financial instruments or underlying products as traded in different locations would not constitute manipulation.)"
  1. employs or attempts to employ a fictitious device or any other form of deception or contrivance which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals regarding the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products;

CESR guidance on transactions involving fictitious devices/deception

CESR's first set of "Level 3" guidance,32 at 4.13, provides the following examples:

  1. "a) Concealing ownership. This is a transaction or series of transactions which is designed to conceal the ownership of a financial instrument via the breach of disclosure requirements through the holding of the instrument in the name of a colluding party (or parties). The disclosures are misleading in respect of the true underlying holding of the instrument. (This practice does not cover cases where there are legitimate reasons for financial instruments to be held in the name of a party other than the beneficial owner - e.g. nominee holdings. Nor do all failures to make a required disclosure necessarily constitute market manipulation.)
  2. Dissemination of false or misleading market information through media, including the internet, or by any other means (in some jurisdictions this is known as 'scalping'). This is done with the intention of moving the price of a security, a derivative contract or the underlying asset in a direction that is favourable to the position held or a transaction planned by the person disseminating the information.
  3. Pump and dump. This practice involves taking a long position in a security and then undertaking further buying activity and/or disseminating misleading positive information about the security with a view to increasing the price of the security. Other market participants are misled by the resulting effect on price and are attracted into purchasing the security. The manipulator then sells out at the inflated price.
  4. 'Trash and cash'. This is the opposite of pump and dump. A party will take a short position in a security; undertake further selling activity and/or spread misleading negative information about the security with the purpose of driving down its price. The manipulator then closes their position after the price has fallen.
  5. Opening a position and closing it immediately after its public disclosure. This practice is typically carried out by portfolio managers and other large investors whose investment decisions are usually valued by market participants as relevant signals of future price dynamics. The canonical unfair conduct consists in closing the position previously acquired immediately after having publicly disclosed it putting emphasis on the long holding period of the investment. However, making a report or disclosure will not, in itself, give rise to a false or misleading impression if it was made in the way specified by any applicable legal or regulatory requirement and was expressly required or permitted by such a requirement."

Attempting to manipulate the market is also prohibited.33 This essentially involves entering into any transaction, issuing an order to trade or taking any other action with the intention of manipulating the market in any of the ways outlined above.34

It is also market manipulation to disseminate information through the media, including the internet, or by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products, including the dissemination of rumours and false or misleading news, where the disseminating person knew, or ought to have EU & Competition Update 11 known, that the information was false or misleading.35 Disseminating information with the intention of giving false or misleading signals will constitute an attempt to manipulate the market, and is also prohibited.36

The dissemination of information for the purposes of journalism or artistic expression is to be assessed taking into account the rules governing the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media, unless the persons concerned derive an advantage or profit from the dissemination, or it is done with the intention of misleading the market as to the supply of, or demand for, or price of wholesale energy products.37

CESR guidance on dissemination of false and misleading information

CESR's first set of "Level 3" guidance,38 at 4.14, provides the following examples:

"This type of market manipulation involves dissemination of false and misleading information without necessarily undertaking any accompanying transaction. This could include creating a misleading impression by failure properly to disclose a price sensitive piece of information which should be disclosed. For example, an issuer with information which would meet the Directive definition of 'inside information' fails properly to disclose that information and the result that the public is likely to be misled.

  1. Spreading false/misleading information through the media. This involves behaviour such as posting information on an internet bulletin board or issuing a press release which contains false or misleading statements about a company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market. The person spreading the information knows that it is false or misleading and is disseminating the information in order to create a false or misleading impression. Spreading false/misleading information through an officially recognised channel for disseminating information to users of a regulated market is particularly serious as it is important that market participants are able to rely on information dissemination via such official channels.
  2. Other behaviour designed to spread false/misleading information. This type of market manipulation would cover a course of conduct designed to give false and misleading impression through means other than the media. An example might be the movement of physical commodity stocks to create a misleading impression as to the supply or demand for a commodity or the deliverable into a commodity futures contract."

"Abusive squeeze", capacity withholding and pricing in constrained markets

One of the categories of market manipulation mentioned in the CESR guidance above is "abusive squeeze". This involves "a party or parties with a significant influence over the supply of, or demand for, or delivery mechanisms for [in this case, a wholesale energy product] exploiting a dominant position in order materially to distort the price at which others have to deliver, take delivery or defer delivery of the instrument/product in order to satisfy their obligations." Recital 14 of REMIT similarly gives as an example of market manipulation "conduct... to secure a decisive position over the supply of, or demand for, a wholesale energy product which has, or could have, the effect of fixing, directly or indirectly, prices or creating other unfair trading conditions". There are clearly some similarities between practices that constitute this type of market manipulation and practices that constitute an abuse of a dominant position for the purposes of competition law. A key question for the purposes of REMIT will be to what extent the enforcement authorities are required to establish some degree of market power in order to find market manipulation of this type. They are likely to argue that the reference to a "dominant position" in the CESR guidance, which reflects wording in MAD not found in REMIT, is not to be interpreted as requiring dominance in the competition law sense of the term. Both the European Commission and a number of national competition authorities have investigated suspected abuses of dominance consisting of withholding generation capacity in order to increase prices, either directly, or by forcing the transmission system operator or market operator to purchase electricity on a higher-priced market for balancing or other similar ancillary services.

They have not always succeeded, mainly because of the difficulties involved in establishing that the required elements of an abuse of dominance are present. The Commission, in the press release that it issued upon publication of its initial proposal in December 2010,39 commented that

"Tailor made rules are also needed to take into account energy specific market abuses, such as withholding of energy production from the market to increase prices. Electricity cannot be stored on an industrial scale. It must be produced in the moment it is consumed. This means that market prices are highly sensitive to the availability of generation capacities."

REMIT is therefore likely to offer the Commission and national authorities some advantages over the use of competition law to tackle such practices:

  • it may not be necessary to establish dominance to competition law standards – possibly only some degree of "significant influence" over the capacity concerned; and
  • crucially, it will be for the market participant to establish that its reasons for securing an "artificial price" are legitimate and that the transaction conforms to accepted market practices on the wholesale energy market concerned.

This is an area where there is an urgent need for guidance, specific to REMIT, as to the interpretation of the various concepts. In particular, greater clarity as to what is meant by AMPs, as outlined above, is vital, and is made even more so by the omission from the proposal for MAR of any provision for AMPs.

Commission's power to update definitions

REMIT gives the Commission the power to adopt delegated acts (i.e. to take implementing measures which are subject to a right of veto in favour of each of the Parliament and the Council), in order to update the definitions of insider trading and market manipulation.40 The power is subject to a number of restrictions:

The definitions that may be updated are those of "inside information", "market manipulation" and "attempted market manipulation" and the method of determining and the threshold (currently 600 GWh per year) of the consumption capacity at which end user transactions are subject to the prohibitions.

The definitions may be updated only for the purposes of ensuring coherence with other relevant EU legislation in the fields of financial services and energy (such as the proposal for MAR) or in order to take into account future developments on wholesale energy markets.41

Any such revisions must take into account42 at least:

  1. the specific functioning of wholesale energy markets, including the specificities of electricity and gas markets, and the interaction between commodity markets and derivative markets;
  2. the potential for manipulation across borders, between electricity and gas markets and across commodity markets and derivative markets;
  3. the potential impact on wholesale energy market prices of actual or planned production, consumption, use of transmission, or use of storage capacity; and
  4. network codes and framework guidelines adopted in accordance with Regulations 714/2009 and 715/2009.

ACER is also required to publish non-binding guidance on the definitions.43 It is likely that the guidance will adopt many of the illustrations used in the proposal for MAR, the CESR guidance and the Commission's implementing Directives for MAD, although obviously modified to reflect the specificities of the energy market.

Market monitoring, data collection and registration requirements

Reinforcing the prohibitions on market abuse, REMIT provides for market monitoring.44 This will be the responsibility of ACER. ACER will monitor trading activity in order to detect insider trading and market manipulation. In order to do so, it will collect data relating to wholesale energy market transactions. Primary responsibility for providing these data will lie with market participants, but in practice, in the interests of minimising the burden on industry, ACER is expected to receive as much of the information as possible from third parties and existing sources, including markets and other authorities.45

National energy regulators will cooperate at a regional level and with ACER in monitoring energy markets, and will have access to information held by ACER in order to do so. They may also monitor national markets, and Member States may also appoint national competition authorities and/or market monitoring bodies to cooperate with national regulators.46

Market participants will also be required to register with the national regulatory authority in the Member State in which they are established or resident, or if they are not established or resident within the EU, in a Member State in which they are active. They are required to register with one authority only.

The requirements relating to data collection and registration will not enter fully into force until 6 months after the Commission has issued implementing rules on the data collection requirements.

ACER will establish mechanisms for sharing information with national regulatory authorities, financial authorities, competition authorities, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and other relevant authorities, subject to various safeguards in relation to data protection, confidentiality and integrity.47

Duty to notify suspicious transactions

Any person professionally arranging transactions in wholesale energy products who reasonably suspects that a transaction might breach the prohibition on insider trading or market manipulation must notify the national regulatory authority. Such persons must establish effective procedures to identify breaches.48

Enforcement by national regulatory authorities

Responsibility for enforcing the prohibitions on insider trading and market manipulation lies with the national regulatory authorities - the national energy regulators such as Ofgem. Member States must ensure that energy regulators have the investigative and enforcement powers necessary to carry out their functions.49 Depending on the national enforcement tradition, the powers may be enforced directly, in collaboration with other authorities or by application to prosecutors. Powers of investigation will include the usual powers to request information and documents in any form, to carry out on-site investigations, to require the production of communications records, to require the cessation of offending practices, to request a court to freeze assets or to request a court to impose a temporary prohibition of business activities.50 Member States must provide for "effective, dissuasive and proportionate" penalties, reflecting the nature, duration and seriousness of the infringement, the damage caused to consumers and the potential gains from trading on the basis of inside information and market manipulation.51 Implementation of the requirements relating to investigative and enforcement powers must take place within 18 months of entry into force of REMIT.

Member States must also provide for a right of appeal to an independent body.52

When taking enforcement in respect of behaviour which relates both to wholesale energy products and the financial instruments to which MAR will apply, the proposal for MAR provides for cooperation with ACER and the national regulatory authorities of the Member States to ensure a coordinated approach.

Private enforcement

As an EU Regulation, REMIT is directly applicable and requires no national implementation (except where it specifically provides - for example in relation to the reinforcement of the powers of national energy regulators). The two prohibitions, of insider trading and market manipulation, are sufficiently clear and unconditional that they will have direct effect for the purposes of EU law, and will give rise to rights that individual and legal persons can enforce against each other. Even before the national regulators are given investigation and enforcement powers, therefore, it would be open to market participants adversely affected by market manipulation and/or insider trading to bring a claim before the courts to seek compensation for any loss suffered, and/or to secure termination of any ongoing infringement.


1 The text adopted by the Council can be found here:

2 Article 2(4), first paragraph.

3 Article 2(1).

4 Directive 2003/6:

5 The Commission's proposal can be found here:

6 See for example the definition of market manipulation, which in MAR includes "entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or any other behaviour which.....secures, or is likely to secure, the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contracts at an abnormal or artificial level" but which in REMIT includes "entering into any transaction or issuing any order to trade in wholesale energy products which...secures or attempts to secure... the price of one or several wholesale energy products at an artificial level..."


8 Directive 2004/39:

9 Article 2(4), second paragraph and (5).

10 Article 3.


12 Note also that Article 7(8) of the proposal for MAR expressly excludes from the definition of nsider trading "transactions conducted in the discharge of an obligation that has become due to acquire or dispose of financial instruments where that obligation results from an agreement concluded, or is to satisfy a legal or regulatory obligation that arose, before the person concerned possessed inside information".

13 Article 7(7).

14 Article 3(2).

15 Article 3(5).

16 Article 3(3).

17 Article 3(4).

18 Article 2(1).

19 Article 2(1), third paragraph.

20 Article 2(1), second paragraph, (a) to (d).

21 Article 3(6).

22 Article 4(1).

23 Article 4(2).

24 Directive 2003/124:

25 Article 4(3).

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Similar Articles
Relevancy Powered by MondaqAI
In association with
Related Topics
Similar Articles
Relevancy Powered by MondaqAI
Related Articles
Up-coming Events Search
Font Size:
Mondaq on Twitter
Mondaq Free Registration
Gain access to Mondaq global archive of over 375,000 articles covering 200 countries with a personalised News Alert and automatic login on this device.
Mondaq News Alert (some suggested topics and region)
Select Topics
Registration (please scroll down to set your data preferences)

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including your content preferences, for three primary purposes (full details of Mondaq’s use of your personal data can be found in our Privacy and Cookies Notice):

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting to show content ("Content") relevant to your interests.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, news alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our content providers ("Contributors") who contribute Content for free for your use.

Mondaq hopes that our registered users will support us in maintaining our free to view business model by consenting to our use of your personal data as described below.

Mondaq has a "free to view" business model. Our services are paid for by Contributors in exchange for Mondaq providing them with access to information about who accesses their content. Once personal data is transferred to our Contributors they become a data controller of this personal data. They use it to measure the response that their articles are receiving, as a form of market research. They may also use it to provide Mondaq users with information about their products and services.

Details of each Contributor to which your personal data will be transferred is clearly stated within the Content that you access. For full details of how this Contributor will use your personal data, you should review the Contributor’s own Privacy Notice.

Please indicate your preference below:

Yes, I am happy to support Mondaq in maintaining its free to view business model by agreeing to allow Mondaq to share my personal data with Contributors whose Content I access
No, I do not want Mondaq to share my personal data with Contributors

Also please let us know whether you are happy to receive communications promoting products and services offered by Mondaq:

Yes, I am happy to received promotional communications from Mondaq
No, please do not send me promotional communications from Mondaq
Terms & Conditions (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd (Mondaq). Mondaq grants you a non-exclusive, revocable licence to access the Website and associated services, such as the Mondaq News Alerts (Services), subject to and in consideration of your compliance with the following terms and conditions of use (Terms). Your use of the Website and/or Services constitutes your agreement to the Terms. Mondaq may terminate your use of the Website and Services if you are in breach of these Terms or if Mondaq decides to terminate the licence granted hereunder for any reason whatsoever.

Use of

To Use you must be: eighteen (18) years old or over; legally capable of entering into binding contracts; and not in any way prohibited by the applicable law to enter into these Terms in the jurisdiction which you are currently located.

You may use the Website as an unregistered user, however, you are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the Content or to receive the Services.

You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these Terms or with the prior written consent of Mondaq. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information from the Content. Nor shall you extract information about users or Contributors in order to offer them any services or products.

In your use of the Website and/or Services you shall: comply with all applicable laws, regulations, directives and legislations which apply to your Use of the Website and/or Services in whatever country you are physically located including without limitation any and all consumer law, export control laws and regulations; provide to us true, correct and accurate information and promptly inform us in the event that any information that you have provided to us changes or becomes inaccurate; notify Mondaq immediately of any circumstances where you have reason to believe that any Intellectual Property Rights or any other rights of any third party may have been infringed; co-operate with reasonable security or other checks or requests for information made by Mondaq from time to time; and at all times be fully liable for the breach of any of these Terms by a third party using your login details to access the Website and/or Services

however, you shall not: do anything likely to impair, interfere with or damage or cause harm or distress to any persons, or the network; do anything that will infringe any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights of Mondaq or any third party; or use the Website, Services and/or Content otherwise than in accordance with these Terms; use any trade marks or service marks of Mondaq or the Contributors, or do anything which may be seen to take unfair advantage of the reputation and goodwill of Mondaq or the Contributors, or the Website, Services and/or Content.

Mondaq reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to take any action that it deems necessary and appropriate in the event it considers that there is a breach or threatened breach of the Terms.

Mondaq’s Rights and Obligations

Unless otherwise expressly set out to the contrary, nothing in these Terms shall serve to transfer from Mondaq to you, any Intellectual Property Rights owned by and/or licensed to Mondaq and all rights, title and interest in and to such Intellectual Property Rights will remain exclusively with Mondaq and/or its licensors.

Mondaq shall use its reasonable endeavours to make the Website and Services available to you at all times, but we cannot guarantee an uninterrupted and fault free service.

Mondaq reserves the right to make changes to the services and/or the Website or part thereof, from time to time, and we may add, remove, modify and/or vary any elements of features and functionalities of the Website or the services.

Mondaq also reserves the right from time to time to monitor your Use of the Website and/or services.


The Content is general information only. It is not intended to constitute legal advice or seek to be the complete and comprehensive statement of the law, nor is it intended to address your specific requirements or provide advice on which reliance should be placed. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the Content for any purpose. All Content provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers hereby exclude and disclaim all representations, warranties or guarantees with regard to the Content, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. To the maximum extent permitted by law, Mondaq expressly excludes all representations, warranties, obligations, and liabilities arising out of or in connection with all Content. In no event shall Mondaq and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use of the Content or performance of Mondaq’s Services.


Mondaq may alter or amend these Terms by amending them on the Website. By continuing to Use the Services and/or the Website after such amendment, you will be deemed to have accepted any amendment to these Terms.

These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and you irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these Terms. If you live outside the United Kingdom, English law shall apply only to the extent that English law shall not deprive you of any legal protection accorded in accordance with the law of the place where you are habitually resident ("Local Law"). In the event English law deprives you of any legal protection which is accorded to you under Local Law, then these terms shall be governed by Local Law and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with these Terms shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts where you are habitually resident.

You may print and keep a copy of these Terms, which form the entire agreement between you and Mondaq and supersede any other communications or advertising in respect of the Service and/or the Website.

No delay in exercising or non-exercise by you and/or Mondaq of any of its rights under or in connection with these Terms shall operate as a waiver or release of each of your or Mondaq’s right. Rather, any such waiver or release must be specifically granted in writing signed by the party granting it.

If any part of these Terms is held unenforceable, that part shall be enforced to the maximum extent permissible so as to give effect to the intent of the parties, and the Terms shall continue in full force and effect.

Mondaq shall not incur any liability to you on account of any loss or damage resulting from any delay or failure to perform all or any part of these Terms if such delay or failure is caused, in whole or in part, by events, occurrences, or causes beyond the control of Mondaq. Such events, occurrences or causes will include, without limitation, acts of God, strikes, lockouts, server and network failure, riots, acts of war, earthquakes, fire and explosions.

By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions